Rethinking Copyright: Intellectual Property and Second-Personal Communication by McKeahnie, James
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 
2017+ University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 
2018 
Rethinking Copyright: Intellectual Property and Second-Personal 
Communication 
James McKeahnie 
University of Wollongong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1 
University of Wollongong 
Copyright Warning 
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University 
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, 
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe 
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court 
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the 
conversion of material into digital or electronic form. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Wollongong. 
Recommended Citation 
McKeahnie, James, Rethinking Copyright: Intellectual Property and Second-Personal Communication, 
Doctor of Philosophy thesis, School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, 2018. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1/436 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
 
 
Rethinking Copyright: Intellectual Property and 
Second-Personal Communication 
 
 
 
 
 
James McKeahnie 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisors: 
Dr. David Neil 
Dr. Patrick McGivern 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is presented as part of the requirement for the conferral of the degree: 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
This research has been conducted with the support of the Australian Government Research Training 
Program Scholarship 
 
 
 
The University of Wollongong 
School of Humanities and Social Enquiry 
 
 
March 2018
i 
 
Abstract 
 
The historical development of copyright has been compromised by a lack of clear and 
coherent justificatory principles. A set of these principles is required to assess the 
appropriateness of copyright’s dual expansion in duration and scope. Whereas 
copyright was once limited to a term of 14 years, it now persists for the lifetime of an 
author plus 70 years. Similarly, whereas copyright once applied uniquely to the printed 
word, it now applies to maps, charts, music, photography, choreography, sculpture, 
software, and more. Previously, attempts to assess how long copyright should last, and 
attempts to assess which objects copyright ought to apply to, have been conducted 
largely independently. In this thesis I consider both questions in conjunction, arguing 
that resolving the problem of copyright’s scope, by determining which objects should 
be copyrightable (and why), is a necessary precursor in determining what protections 
(and what duration of protection) those objects should receive. 
 
In this way I attempt to resolve the central tension between utilitarian economic 
accounts and deontological natural law accounts of copyright. Utilitarian economic 
accounts consider that copyright is justified precisely insofar as it incentivises the 
production of socially valuable copyrightable works, by providing monopoly rights that 
prevent free-riders from driving down the value of those works as commodities. 
Because copyright involves a restriction against the free use of socially valuable 
objects, however, on this view the duration of copyright should be restricted to the 
shortest term that still preserves its initial incentivising effect. By comparison, the 
deontological view regards copyright as a natural entitlement due to creators for the 
labour they perform. On this view, copyright protections should be perpetual, just the 
same as any other natural property rights which arise from labour. 
 
I demonstrate through an assessment of the Lockean labour theory of property that the 
natural law account cannot sustain a justification of perpetual economic copyright. 
However, an account of droits moral – or authors’ moral rights – is examined as a basis 
for the provision of perpetual copyright. Although it is appropriate to regard moral 
rights as perpetual rights, and despite moral rights intersecting importantly with 
economic copyright protections, it is shown that moral rights are not economic rights. 
Additionally, although moral rights legislation is indexed as a subsection of copyright 
law, it is also shown that most moral rights apply equally to uncopyrightable objects. 
Only one moral right, which is the right protecting authors against the modification of 
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their work, correctly applies uniquely to copyrightable objects. It is shown that this is 
because correctly copyrightable objects are second-personally communicative, which 
makes it uniquely important that they are preserved as a specific author’s exact 
communication. It is argued this second-personal communicative quality should be 
recognised as the defining feature of copyrightable objects, and so ought to inform 
copyright’s scope. This requires a recategorization of what objects are copyrightable. 
Because second-personal communicativeness represents the only natural difference 
between correctly copyrightable and uncopyrightable objects, however, the duration of 
economic copyright must continue to be determined as an empirical matter of 
incentivisation. 
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Chapter 1  
Structure of the Argument: The Dual Expansion of Copyright 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with two problems relating to the implementation of 
copyright: 
 
1) The Duration Problem: What is an appropriate duration for copyright? 
2) The Scope Problem: Which objects should qualify for copyright protection? 
 
A central claim of the thesis is that the Duration Problem cannot be adequately resolved 
independent of the Scope Problem. This is because there is a deep connection between the 
question of duration and the question of scope that has not been adequately recognised. 
Specifically, what kinds of objects copyright protects ought to inform the protections that 
copyright confers; and the nature of the protections copyright confers ought to inform the 
duration of those protections. 
 
Existing approaches to these problems are typically inconsistent. The question of 
copyright’s duration is widely understood to be of central importance to justificatory 
accounts of copyright. This acknowledged centrality motivates universal accounts founded 
on basic primary principles (drawn from political philosophy and meta-ethics), which are 
intended to sustain holistic responses to the issue. By contrast, the issue of determining 
which objects ought to attract copyright protection is often treated as a problem of 
peripheral cases. That is, the appropriateness of copyright is typically taken for granted in 
relation to what might be called the ‘core domains’ of copyright (e.g. books, music, and 
visual art), while any cases where the appropriateness of copyright is either contested or 
unobvious (e.g. software and computer code) are treated as unique problem cases requiring 
individuated, industry-specific solutions. 
 
I argue that treating the scope problem as a problem of peripheral cases is inadequate. This 
is because determining the copyrightability of different objects in a piecemeal manner, 
rather than by appeal to a single principle that can be universalised across all objects, fails 
to establish a consistent and coherent account of what copyright fundamentally ought to be 
protecting. Moreover, without a coherent understanding of what copyright protects, it is 
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impossible to determine what provisions (and what duration of provision) it is necessary to 
provide by way of copyright protection.  
 
A universalised solution to the problem of scope is required, and this forms the novel 
contribution made in the latter portion of the thesis (from Chapter 5 onward). The account 
provided suggests that copyrightability ought to be determined based on whether an object 
is a second-personal communication. This account is useful in two ways. First, it provides 
a general principle for determining whether any given object should be copyrightable. 
Second, it is instrumentally useful in informing solutions to the problem of copyright’s 
duration. The account ultimately reveals the need for a radically less expansive version of 
copyright, which should extend to fewer objects and provide shorter periods of economic 
protection. At the same time, however, defining copyrightability on the basis of second-
personal communicativeness is shown to require a more expansive protection of authors’ 
personal non-economic rights. 
 
1.2 Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis beings with a detailed historical examination of the introduction and 
development of copyright in Great Britain and the United States. This investigation is 
important to the philosophical project because numerous problems which arise in relation 
the duration and scope problems have their origins in copyright’s earliest implementation. 
Even challenges relating to modern objects like computer software cannot be effectively 
diagnosed without reference to the origin and incremental expansion of copyright. 
 
In the early Eighteenth Century, the duration of copyright was 14 years. Today, copyright 
lasts for the lifetime of the author, and an additional 70 years. Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
historical account of the incremental expansion of copyright, which has culminated in the 
present term of protection. Whether the modern duration of copyright provides adequate, 
inadequate, or exorbitant protection is contested in scholarship, policy, and popular 
discourse. This contestation takes two main forms: one economic and one philosophical. 
 
1.2.1 Duration Problem: An Economic Approach 
 
As an economic question, determining an appropriate duration for copyright is approached 
as a utility maximising task. At the heart of this task sits a collective action problem that 
hampers the realisation of utility. That is, the initial labour cost that must be outlaid to 
produce a creative object can be very high, whereas the labour cost required to subsequently 
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copy such an object is usually quite low. This acts as a deterrent to original creation, since 
there is a threat that freeloaders may copy original creations at little cost to themselves – 
thereby driving down market values to the point that original creators are unable to realise 
a worthwhile return on their labour. This deterrent incurs a steep social utility cost, since it 
decreases the likelihood of socially valuable objects being created. 
 
The standard economic response to this problem is the introduction of statutory monopoly 
rights – copyrights – that provide an exclusive opportunity for original creators to realise a 
return on investment, sans the threat of competition by freeloaders. From this perspective 
the question then becomes: how long should such monopolies last in order to maximise 
utility? Although copyright monopolies may be accepted as necessary to overcome a 
socially costly freeloader problem, artificially sustaining higher market values limits access 
to these useful objects, and so incurs its own social utility cost. For any given creative 
object, then, the problem of appropriate copyright duration comes down to determining the 
shortest monopoly term that would still be sufficient to incentivise the object’s original 
creation. The standard economic view is that after this sufficient period of monopoly, 
creative objects should be freely subject to copying, to maximise society’s access to the 
utility those objects provide. 
 
1.2.2 Duration Problem: A Philosophical Approach 
 
The philosophical problem of copyright’s duration is logically prior to the economic 
problem. This is because the fundamental philosophical question is whether the economic 
question, represents a justifiable framework in the first place. Numerous critics object to 
the reduction of the duration problem to a utilitarian economic question, and instead assert 
that the conception of copyright as a mere economic tool is mistaken. Such critics propose 
deontological accounts of natural property – which they take to extend to intellectual 
property – and insist that natural law property rights (including copyright) cannot be justly 
limited by statute. On this view, the fixing of copyright to any limited term, for the purpose 
of allowing freeloaders to drive down market values and thereby increase social supply, 
amounts to an attack on individual liberties for the benefit of undeserving opportunists. 
 
Although this thesis does not contend directly with the economic question, the 
philosophical account presented in the first portion (particularly Chapters 3 and 4) largely 
endorses the utilitarian economic framework as the correct approach to determining 
appropriate copyright durations. That framework often delivers economic accounts which 
recommend copyright terms of between 15 to 25 years; but I remain agnostic regarding 
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copyright’s precise duration, and no account presented here is contingent on that 
determination. Instead, the view presented here is simply that, contrary to natural law 
accounts of copyright, it is correct to regard economic copyright as a purely statutory 
artefact, justified solely by its provision of utilitarian value. I affirm that economic 
copyright protections should endure for whatever term of years shall maximise copyright’s 
utility – as determined by good, empirical economic analysis. 
 
In objecting to natural law accounts of intellectual property, some charity is required. This 
is because natural desert arguments for extensive (and even perpetual) copyright durations 
frequently take the form of naïve appeals to labour. Often, natural rights proponents draw 
a comparison between copyright and the (perpetual) property rights that are established in 
relation to physical property. However, such comparisons are typically based on a flawed 
understanding of pre-existing labour accounts of the origin of property. Rather than respond 
directly to these simplistic and underdeveloped arguments, I consider whether a labour 
account of property (in particular Lockean accounts) can provide a basis for intellectual 
property. 
To this end, I demonstrate in Chapter 3 that otherwise-underdeveloped natural law accounts 
of copyright, insofar as they appeal to notions of desert arising from labour, are implicitly 
established in the tradition of Lockean property theory. That is, the essential features of 
naïve accounts of natural copyright are also found (but better expressed) in Locke’s labour 
account of property. Moreover, given the historical success and influence of Lockean 
property theory in relation to property law in the West, situating naïve accounts of 
copyright within the Lockean tradition is defensible in that it is charitable. Such a 
conception preserves the core components of naïve accounts of copyright (i.e. labour; 
desert; and naturally perpetual proprietorship) in a way that is compatible with a standard 
account of traditional property. 
 
Proceeding on this basis, then, the case against natural law copyright is made by 
demonstrating its incompatibility with fundamental tenets of Lockean theory. I show that, 
due to the intangible nature of intellectual objects (over which copyright exclusively 
extends), two of the fundamental limitations Locke placed on property acquisition (i.e. the 
‘Lockean provisos’) entirely preclude a natural law basis for economic copyright. In 
addition, I demonstrate that Locke’s social contracting theory is compatible with a statutory 
system of copyright – so long as it achieves an adequately utilitarian end. 
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1.2.3 The Scope Problem 
 
Although the account developed in Chapters 3 and 4 provides a novel refutation of natural 
law responses to the duration problem of copyright, there are components of copyright 
which do have a legitimate basis in natural law. These must be given due consideration, as 
it is important to positively establish their natural basis and to clearly distinguish them from 
copyright’s strictly statutory components. In providing this consideration, however, the 
question of copyright’s scope naturally arises. 
 
If the only point of difference between copyright and other IP regimes was the duration of 
the protections it offers, then the account provided in Chapters 3 and 4 would reasonably 
raise doubts as to copyright’s overall necessity. Given that the standard justifications for 
patent regimes are utilitarian, it would seem as though the institutions of copyright and 
patent could be merged. In addition to the prevailing difference of duration, however, there 
are presently three critical points of distinction between the two regimes. These differences 
are: 
1) The process through which protection is awarded; 
2) The applicability of moral rights; and 
3) Which objects are eligible for protection 
Beginning in Chapter 6, I argue that each of these components is naturally related. 
 
Summarising the first two of these differences is quite straightforward. To the first point, 
copyright applies automatically upon the publication of an eligible object, while patent 
protection requires the formal lodgement and assessment of an application. To the second 
point, the legal concept of ‘moral rights’ applies explicitly in relation to copyright law, but 
does not apply explicitly in relation to patent law. 
 
By comparison, however, the third point of difference is not easy to quantify. Trivially, the 
scope of copyright can be taken to extend to ‘artistic’ works, while the scope of patent is 
taken to be limited to inventions. However, while this provides something of an intuitive 
difference, supplying a normative articulation of the distinction is exceedingly difficult. 
Even a descriptive account of this difference proves challenging, since numerous 
unintuitive counter-examples arise. For instance, it is natural to doubt the ‘artistic’ qualities 
of reference books or instruction manuals. Indeed, the copyright eligibility of such objects 
has previously been challenged at law. 
 
Together, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 construct a normative account of the distinct scope of 
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copyright. This account locates a natural reason for copyright existing independent of 
patent regimes. Historically, copyrightable objects have been defined in terms of physical 
media: books, sheet music, records, film, and so on. The account developed here, however, 
rejects the idea that copyright eligibility ought to be determined based on an object’s 
physical medium. Rather than endorse the categorisation of classes such as ‘writings,’ 
‘books,’ ‘music,’ or ‘film’ as copyrightable, I argue that copyright should be extended 
exclusively to a specific subgroup of communicative objects. I show that the historical 
development of modern copyright – from its origins as a response to the invention of the 
printing press – has led to the understandable but mistaken methodology of categorising 
objects as copyrightable by medium. This is understandable insofar as objects like novels, 
music, and films are typically understood to have a unique quality that intuitively separates 
them from the class of inventions. This unique quality is communicativeness. An object’s 
physical medium, however, is a mistaken basis for determining copyright eligibility, 
because it does not closely enough track the kind of communicative action that requires the 
unique protection of copyright. Even intuitively, there is a substantive difference between 
a novel (the archetype copyrightable object) and reference manuals. Although each of these 
objects is written, and each communicates information, these should not both be 
categorised as copyrightable. There is something unique about the communicative quality 
of novels that is not shared by reference books, and copyright’s scope is correctly directed 
when it tracks that unique quality. 
 
The quality which ought to determine copyright eligibility is second-personal 
communicativeness. A full account of second-personal communication is provided in 
Chapter 7, but it suffices for now to say that second-personal communications are speech 
acts which, to be interpreted correctly and meaningfully, must be contextualised as a 
product of a particular speaker (whether a de re or de dicto authorial identity is established). 
Not only does tying copyright eligibility to this quality preserve what is intuitive in 
establishing copyright as a unique system of protections, it also brings together the two 
other unique components of copyright protection in a rational and cohesive way. I show 
that the relevance of moral rights, and the automatic qualification for copyright, correctly 
pertain to and reflect the second-personal communicativeness of justifiably copyrightable 
objects. 
 
Although it is shown that moral rights hold a special relevance in relation to copyright, 
existing conceptualisations and implementations of moral rights are also shown to be 
flawed. This is for two reasons. First, moral rights are typically regarded as individualistic 
rights which serve the specific purpose of protecting authors (usually by safeguarding their 
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honour and reputation against the effects of inaccurate attribution). Although that is indeed 
an important function of moral rights legislation, such an account is nevertheless incorrect 
insofar as audiences also have an important interest in the preservation of accurate 
attribution. The force of this error is compounded by the mis-categorisation of moral rights 
as a subset of intellectual property rights (which are personal rights), when moral rights 
legislation correctly protects against deception offences rather than property offences. 
 
Second, the prevailing implementation of moral rights legislation reveals a conceptual 
confusion in that moral rights are only legislated explicitly in relation to copyright. By 
comparison, most moral rights that are legislated for in connection with copyright are 
equally applicable in relation to uncopyrightable objects. Regardless of the nature of the 
labour one conducts – whether it is artistic, inventive, or menially productive – it is always 
equally appropriate to expect the correct attribution of one’s labour to oneself to be 
maintained. The only appropriately unique moral right, which should apply specifically in 
connection to copyrightable objects, is the right to preclude others from altering a 
copyrightable work even if they become the economic proprietor of the object. 
 
1.3 A Visual Representation of the Argument 
 
The argument outlined above contains numerous components that are complexly 
interconnected. One challenge that this presents is that it is difficult to adequately convey 
the multiplicity of those interconnections within a linear textual structure. Although direct 
references to logically related but non-adjacent sections are made regularly throughout the 
thesis, a diagrammatic representation of the structure has also been included below. This 
diagram is presented in four parts. Diagram 1.1 functions as a visual representation of the 
diagnostic account represented in this chapter. It depicts the traditional treatment of the 
duration and scope problems of copyright as independent issues, but also conveys why 
those components must ultimately converge if a holistic account of copyright is to be 
achieved. 
 
Diagrams 1.2 and 1.3 represent most of the content in the thesis. These diagrams are colour 
coded, such that each of them corresponds with a similarly coloured component within 
Diagram 1.1. In this way, Diagram 1.2 represents an extended consideration of the 
possibility (posited in Diagram 1.1) that a “natural rights basis for copyright exists” which 
“could be shown to supersede” the utilitarian justification of proprietary copyright 
provisions. The conclusion reflected in Diagram 1.2 – that natural limitations against 
monopolies prevent a natural law account of IP from superseding a consequentialist 
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conception of IP as strictly statutory – can therefore be understood to justify the redirection 
of the ‘philosophical’ approach to the duration problem into an ‘economic’ consideration 
of the same problem (in Diagram 1.1). 
 
Similarly, Diagram 1.3 should be understood to represent an expanded excerpt of the 
corresponding element in Diagram 1.1. That is, Diagram 1.3 represents the development of 
an account of what objects copyright ought to protect (and why), culminating in the 
conclusion that an essential natural rights component does exist in relation to copyright. 
Again, this can be seen to justify the progression represented on Diagram 1.1, in that it 
follows from the conclusion of Diagram 1.2 that the two main arms of Diagram 1.1 (i.e. 
the ‘duration’ and ‘scope’ arms) must ultimately be shown to intersect. 
 
Finally, Diagram 1.4 summarises the positive account developed over the course of the 
thesis in response to the diagnosis of the duration and scope problems established in this 
chapter. Diagram 1.4 thereby reflects the positive account that is developed over the course 
of the thesis, as that positive account is ultimately summarised in Chapter 9. Throughout 
the diagrams, reference markers (to Chapter and Section) are included to indicate where 
each component of the argument is advanced within the thesis. 
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Chapter 2  
The History of Copyright 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Copyright protection is not an ancient tradition. It is doubtful that copyright can accurately 
be construed as constituting a tradition at all. At no point has copyright existed in a single 
unchanging form, for a sufficient length of time, such that it would be appropriate to say 
that it had ever developed or retained a traditional form. Even when the origins of copyright 
are located as far back as the Reformation and the Scientific Revolution of Western 
Europe,1 the ways in which copyright protection has been conceptualised and implemented 
across time have persistently shifted in such dramatic fashion, that the version of copyright 
we have today, bears striking dissimilarity to copyright institutions of centuries or just mere 
decades past. As this chapter demonstrates, it is therefore wrong to construe modern 
copyright as a traditional pillar of national or international economies. The copyright 
institutions presently in place across the world are, instead, largely the product of a 
nebulous and malleable notion of intellectual property that has been consistently reshaped 
by a series of ad hoc attempts to further various (and often competing) political; economic; 
and corporate ends. 
 
To demonstrate this, the present chapter highlights key moments in the history of 
copyright’s development. These are moments of change: instances in which additions or 
alterations were made to copyright legislation; or in which clarifications or other 
declarations as to the nature of copyright were made at law. Where it is evident and 
available, the reasoning employed at the time to justify such additions; alterations; 
clarifications; or determinations is provided. However, a central feature of much of 
copyright’s development is that the justifications for significant legal judgements in 
copyright cases were either not recorded, or were made simply on appeal to some uncritical 
sense of intuition. It is the persistence of this critical lack of principle which makes the 
investigation of copyright’s justificatory basis an imperative task still today. 
 
The present account is, intentionally, United Kingdom and United States centric. This is 
not because other countries did not develop notable intellectual property regimes, but 
                                                     
1 Adrian Johns, Piracy: The Intellectual Property Wars from Gutenberg to Gates (University of Chicago 
Press, 2009)., p. 8. 
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because the United States provides the primary impetus behind most current international 
copyright arrangements. The United States, in turn, derived its domestic copyright policy 
(during the drafting of the United States Constitution) largely from the policy of the United 
Kingdom. However, one critical contribution to international copyright law – droits 
morales or ‘moral rights’ – is decidedly European.2 Moral rights have a central role in the 
argument of this thesis, but the examination of the development of moral rights in relation 
to copyright is taken up in later chapters. 
 
2.2 Unprincipled Beginnings 
 
2.2.1 Livery Companies and the Invention of Printing 
 
Text does not have to be published mechanically (or electronically) on a press, to be 
protected by copyright. Nevertheless, copyright did not exist in Britain until the printing 
press was introduced there. This is not a coincidence. Reproduction of text before the 
invention and implementation of the printing press was difficult and extremely time 
consuming. Although this did not prevent the misappropriation of written works 
(complaints of which date back to ancient times),3 such misappropriation could not 
previously be conducted on the kind of scale that has subsequently become possible 
through the development of various forms of mechanised reproduction, beginning with the 
printing press. 
 
Furthermore, although today the central driving forces behind copyright legislation are 
commercial in nature, the impetus for the introduction of copyrights during the early era of 
the printing press stemmed from political rather than commercial interests. Specifically, 
copyright’s original intended function (as a response to the introduction of the printing 
press) was specifically and exclusively to serve the interests of the British Crown.4 In a 
very real sense, everything copyright has since become has resulted as an accident of its 
initial function. 
 
In understanding the politicisation of the printing press, and thus of copyright, it is 
necessary to consider the interrelationship between The Crown, Livery Companies, and the 
public in English society between the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Centuries. While each of 
these entities still exists today, the nature of their relationships to one another has, 
                                                     
2 See for example: Dan Rosen, 'Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American Revolution' (1983) 
2 Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ, p. 155. 
3 Johns, above n 1, p. 19. 
4 Ibid. p. 24. 
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unsurprisingly, changed significantly over time. The hierarchy present in the traditional 
relationship between the Crown and the public is obvious. However, the Livery Companies 
have historically fit into this relationship as somewhat intermediary powers, and this has 
facilitated a change in the dynamic between the Crown and the public over time. Whereas, 
prior to the Seventeenth Century, the British Crown had vast political power, the 
democratic nature of British politics today is the result of a transfer of significant portions 
of that power away from the Crown and into the hands of the public. The contributing 
factors to this social evolution are so numerous and complex as to be well beyond the scope 
of the present historical account, but the role of one particular Livery Company throughout 
this change – the Stationers’ Company – has had an enduring effect on the shape of 
copyright law. 
 
In general, Livery Companies effectively began as trade guilds, and (still today) are decreed 
to be Livery Companies only via Royal Charters issued by the Crown. The last time such 
a charter was issued was to the 108th Company, the Company of Security Professionals, in 
2008.5 Although some all-but-defunct trades still have corresponding Livery Companies 
which remain focused on delivering philanthropic services (as was always a tradition of 
every Livery Company), the primary function of the Companies has been to regulate each 
of the trades they represent. The Gunmakers’ Company, for instance, is currently 
responsible for ensuring that all guns sold in the United Kingdom can be safely fired.6 
Livery Companies therefore supplied both their tradespeople and their customers a service 
of significant practical importance, and thus defined their relationship with the public – but 
they did so under Royal Charters which suggested that their primary purpose was to serve 
the Crown. 
 
This serving of two masters is what made Livery Companies such ready vehicles for 
facilitating the change in balance of power within society, and the Stationers’ Company 
serves as what is probably the most profound example of this. The Guild of Stationers in 
London became an Incorporated Company in 1557 and a fully-fledged Livery Company in 
1559. The Charter they received decreed that participation within the stationery trade was 
illegal for anyone who was not a member of the Stationers’ Company, and that the 
Company was responsible for settling disputes between its members – most of which had 
to do with what has since come to be known as copyright.7 The system that the Company 
had in place by which to fulfil this responsibility was one of registration, whereby 
                                                     
5 The Worshipful Company of Security Professionals, About the Company <https://www.wcosp.org/about-
the-company>  
6 City of London, Livery Companies <https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-city/history/Pages/livery-
companies.aspx>. 
7 The Stationers' Company, The Hall & Heritage <https://stationers.org/our-heritage.html>. 
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individual stationers would submit to the Company, for approval, any manuscript they 
intended to print. Once approved, those titles would be entered into a leger, with each title 
entered under attribution to the stationer who had submitted it to the company. The given 
stationer thereby established an exclusive right to print and publish copies of that title.8 
 
While simultaneously serving the interests of the registered stationers, this process of 
limiting printing exclusively to members of the Company (and the process of registering 
individual titles) served a purpose that was just as important to the interests of the State. 
The regime established by the Stationers’ Company made it significantly more difficult to 
propagate texts that promoted sedition; heresy; blasphemy; or obscenity, since such content 
could be discovered in any manuscript submitted to the Company for registration, and 
publishing rights would be denied in relation to it. The limiting of printing privileges to 
registered members of the Company also made investigating the illegal publication of any 
such material much simpler, and so deterred people from printing titles which were rejected 
and denied registration by the Company.9 This function was eventually reiterated in law, 
in 1662, under the Licensing Act (full title: An Act for Preventing Abuses in Printing 
Seditious, Treasonable, and Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets, and for Regulating of 
Printing and Printing Presses, 1662).10 
 
2.2.2 Growing Dissatisfaction 
 
By this stage of the Seventeenth Century the increased ease with which written material 
could be accessed led reading to become more popular than ever before. With this growing 
popularity arose a public estimation of quality books as pillars of culture, and out of this 
attitude emerged some degree of dissatisfaction with the regulation of the stationery trade 
as dictated by the Stationers’ Company. Segments of the population were coming to regard 
the stationers’ practices not as a service to the State, but rather as representing “an ambition 
by this community of traders in knowledge to establish its own code of conduct, 
independent and in defiance of the state itself,”11 given that “[c]laiming a prerogative to 
create and defend property in works of culture required denying that prerogative to the 
king.”12 
 
                                                     
8 Johns, above n 1, p. 18 
9 Brad Sherman and Lionel Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British 
Experience, 1760-1911 (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 11. 
10 Ronan Deazley, Commentary on the Licensing Act 1662 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1662>. 
11 Johns, above n 1, p. 18. 
12 Ibid. 
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This conflict saw a competition for dominance between two systems of organisation: the 
traditional system of registration developed by the Stationers’ Company (and the precursor 
to modern copyright); and a system of Royal Patent (by which ‘Letters of Patent’ issued by 
The Crown would provide groups or individuals the exclusive right to engage in various 
commercial pursuits) that was longer standing, but which had not previously influenced the 
printing profession. Whereas, under the Stationers’ system, an exclusive right over a title 
could be garnered by any member of the Stationers’ Company, a Royal patent could only 
be issued by the Crown (ideally to encourage the development of industry, but not 
uncommonly issued as personal favours). The new degree of commercialism that 
accompanied the booming popularity of printed materials motivated certain sectors of the 
broader literary industry to support the implementation of Royal Patent to govern printing. 
These proponents considered that, by licensing books in the more direct manner of Royal 
patents, the Crown could retain its prerogative in publishing.13 Authors had previously 
lamented the system of registration, which they considered to have been established only 
to serve the printers themselves. A sizable number of printers were even suspicious of an 
apparent oligarchy of influential printers, whom they considered to be abusing their power 
to make the register disproportionately serve their own interests.14 
 
This competition of systems was further complicated by an already prevailing trend 
towards division of the stationery trade between printers and booksellers, resulting in a 
disorganised situation whereby people variably and inconsistently conformed to one 
system while defying the other, and vice versa. This significantly complicated the process 
of determining what reproductions of texts were authorised or unauthorised, and 
subsequently hindered the regulation of printing overall. It was from commentary during 
this period that the word ‘piracy’ was popularised as a term to refer to the unauthorised 
reproduction of written texts.15 
 
This conflict eventually came to a head after 1695, when the last of the Licensing Acts, 
which were what had previously provided stationers with control over the book trade, came 
to lapse.16 Despite concerted lobbying on the part of stationers, no recourse to this absence 
of legislation would be made until 1710, and even then, the privileges regained by the 
printers would prove to be significantly curtailed. This sparked the earliest philosophical 
considerations of the function and justification of sanctioned monopolies within the book 
trade. 
                                                     
13 Ibid., p. 28. 
14 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
15 Ibid., pp.23-24. 
16 Sherman and Bently, above n 9, pp. 11-12. 
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2.3 Ad Hoc Continuation 
 
2.3.1 Statute of Anne, 1710 
 
In England, during 1710, a legislative Act was passed which reintroduced some degree of 
order through the stationery trade. The Act was titled “An Act for the Encouragement of 
Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such 
Copies, During the Times therein mentioned,” but was in practice referred to as the ‘Statute 
of Anne.’17 Although a degree of control over the book trade was returned to the stationers 
via the Statute of Anne, members of the Stationers’ Company remained dissatisfied due to 
the limits included in the Act. These limitations, and the reasons for which the stationers 
remained so dissatisfied, highlight the fact that an important transition had occurred by the 
turn of the century that was catalysed by the Stationers’ Company’s self-instigated reliance 
on their own system of registry. 
 
Rather than the perpetual control that was previously assumed over a title entered in the 
Company’s register by its entrant, the Statute of Anne only provided protection for between 
14 and 28 years. This generally took the form of an initial 14 years, with the possibility of 
an additional 14 years in cases where the text’s author was still alive at the end of the first 
period; however the term was set at a standard 21 years for books already in print as of the 
date that the legislation passed.18 For the stationers, however, the problem remained that, 
for quite some time, they had belonged to a trade which was associated with an elevated 
distinction: they were considered custodians of their civilisation’s knowledge itself. And 
yet, this ostensibly noble calling had been long underscored by a comparatively crass 
commercial reliance, felt by individual stationers, on the exclusive rights they had to 
produce specific popular titles. Such a high proportion of the stationers’ financial 
sustenance was derived from the monopoly sale of a relatively small number of profitable 
texts (the proceeds from which being what sustained the production of all the less popular 
titles), that the prospect of those important monopolies being limited in their duration was 
understandably perceived as a threat to them and their trade. The issue of copyright would 
inevitably explode into the public forum by the 1730s, when the monopolies afforded under 
the Statute of Anne, over the majority of the stationers’ staple publications, came to lapse. 
 
                                                     
17 Statute of Anne, London (1710), in L. Bently and M. Kretschmer (eds.), Primary Sources on Copyright 
(1450-1900), 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRepresentation?id=representation_uk_1710>. 
18 Ibid. 
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This situation brought about the first period of popular philosophical consideration 
regarding the defensible basis for copyright. It was no longer going to suffice as 
justification, in the public’s eye, that copyright served the will of the Crown. At the same 
time, the stationers had come to be even more financially reliant on their practice of registry 
than they had been when copyright’s purpose was unapologetically asserted to be justified 
by virtue of the service it provided the Crown. Consequently, the first hint of divergence 
between copyright’s ideological basis and copyright’s pragmatic economic role emerged 
during this period of public discussion. The stationers who had previously been content to 
enjoy the benefits of the registry system, without paying consideration to its justifications, 
were now under pressure to seek a moral justification which might feasibly satisfy public 
demand for accountability. 
 
Although it was primarily the Stationers who benefited economically from the Statute of 
Anne, the language of Statute precluded them from being at the centre of a principled 
argument in favour of perpetual proprietorship. The fundamental objective of the Statute, 
as conveyed through its full title, was to promote learning by establishing a system of 
governance over the book trade that would facilitate public access to rich sources of 
knowledge. Moreover, the system that the Statute was intended to implement was one 
which began not with printers’ or publishers’ rights, but with the rights of authors’ 
themselves. Although the Statute allowed for the proprietor of a piece of written material 
to be an individual (or a company) who did not originally author of the material, this was 
only because the author’s original proprietorship was stipulated to be transferrable. That is, 
any property rights had to originate with the author, but could subsequently be sold to 
somebody else. In practice (in economically viable cases), such a sale would typically be 
conducted between an author and a stationer, since stationers ordinarily represented an 
author’s only practical means to the printing and publishing of their work. 
 
Inconveniently for the stationers, authors had previously been one of the groups who had 
objected to what they perceived as persistent abuses of monopoly under the previous 
system of registry. Having considered themselves generally subject to neglect and 
exploitation under that system (to the benefit of corrupt printers, no less), authors were not 
necessarily a natural ally to the stationers’ cause. Nevertheless, for stationers to regain the 
economic security they had lost, they would need to convince legislators that reinstating 
the previous provisions was necessary to adequately serve the interests of authors. This 
represents one of the earliest concerted ad hoc attempts to influence the progression of 
copyright protection based on an ostensibly principled moral basis. Notice, however, that 
the stationers’ objective was not to establish a principled account and follow it to its natural 
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conclusion regarding copyright. Rather, it was to locate a convincing justification for re-
establishing the monopoly rights they had lost. 
 
2.3.2 Appeal to Natural Law 
 
The philosophical argument that became popular, in serving this end, began with the claim 
that the Statute of Anne had not conferred any new right of proprietorship to authors; it had 
merely reinforced the importance of a pre-existing right by affording it additional legal 
security. William Warburton contributed one of the oldest surviving instances of such an 
argument. He addressed the following passage from the Statute of Anne: 
 
. . . Booksellers and other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of 
printing reprinting and publishing . . . Books and other writings without the 
consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings . . .19 
 
He concluded that the reference within the Statute to authors and proprietors, whose 
writings had been replicated without permission ‘of late’ (meaning necessarily prior to the 
publication of the Statute) must have been intended as a reference to a form of 
proprietorship that had not been established by the Statute. Therefore, he took it to follow 
that the purpose of the Statute could not have been to introduce a system of property rights 
via fiat, but must instead have been intended to serve as an acknowledgement and 
reinforcement of property rights to which authors were already entitled.20 
 
Similarly neither the Royal Charter providing Livery rights to the Stationer’s Company, 
nor any previous Licensing Act, had ever explicitly established authors’ proprietary rights. 
These provisions had only given the Stationers’ Company the responsibility of regulating 
the industry; they had not contained instruction as to how that responsibility ought to be 
met. This meant that the origin and nature of the rights authors held over their works 
seemingly remained open to contention. Interested parties, like authors and stationers, 
therefore launched the argument that authors held a natural right to the perpetual control 
of texts they produced (a right that, to the satisfaction of stationers, was transferrable); and 
that no statutory limitations could be imposed upon such rights. 
 
Both the philosophical argument used to support that position, as well as the arguments 
                                                     
19 Ibid. 
20 William Warburton, 'A Letter from an Author, to a Member of Parliament, Concerning Literary Proprerty 
(1747)' in William Warburton and Richard Hurd (eds), The Works of the Right Reverend William Warburton, 
D.D. Lord Bishop of Gloucester (Luke Hansard & Sons, 1811) vol 12, p. 405. 
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which were levied against it in response, are complex. An examination of those arguments 
occupies much of the present thesis. More immediately pertinent to the present chapter, 
however, is the historical development of those arguments at law. It is important to make 
this distinction between an examination of the arguments per se and an examination of the 
legal treatment of such arguments, because the arguments recorded during the process of 
developing the law have typically not been the strongest possible arguments; or have not 
represented the strongest possible forms of the arguments presented. Despite (or rather, 
because of) the suboptimal nature of these arguments, it is necessary to examine their 
historical development within the context of formulating legislation, in order to 
contextualise the modern state of copyright law. 
 
2.3.3 Millar v Taylor (1769) 
 
Despite the unprecedented movement of the copyright debate into the public sphere by the 
1730s, it was not until the late 1760s that a legal consideration was made regarding the 
origins and nature of proprietary rights over published objects. The case that finally 
delivered that consideration was Millar v Taylor in 1769. The plaintiff in the case, Andrew 
Millar, accused Robert Taylor of encroaching upon an exclusive proprietorship that had 
been secured over James Thompson’s The Seasons, as per the provisions established by the 
Statute of Anne.21 
 
Taylor conceded that he had printed two thousand copies of the text, but raised the point 
that Millar had initially secured his exclusive right to it 30 years prior to the printing of 
those copies, and that the text’s author had also been dead for 15 of those years. Taylor 
contended that, therefore, the protection granted by the Statute had already expired prior to 
his printing of any copies. Implicit in Taylor’s argument, however, was the assertion that 
the Statute had formed the sole basis for Millar’s claim over the title, and that its expiry left 
no other basis for a claim. The case turned on this point, as Millar (drawing from arguments 
introduced in the 1730s, like that of Warburton’s) responded that James Thompson had 
originally enjoyed, as author, a natural right that had subsequently been transferred to 
Millar (as publisher). This right, Millar posited, was not a product of the Statute of Anne, 
and had not been curtailed by it. Instead, Millar argued, that this natural right was a 
perpetual right, and thus had not expired.22 
 
                                                     
21 Deazley, R. (2008) ‘Commentary on Millar v. Taylor (1769)', in L. Bently & M. Kretschmer (eds.) Primary 
Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1769>. 
22 Ibid. 
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Four judges of the King’s Bench presided over the case: Willes, Aston, Yates, and Lord 
Chief Justice Mansfield. After considerable deliberation, they delivered a three-to-one 
majority decision in favour of Millar. The court found that there was sufficient evidence of 
a pre-statutory right of property for authors; that this right established a transferrable right 
to the perpetual proprietorship over the written works an author produced; and that such a 
right had not been limited by the Statute of Anne, nor by any other legislation. The British 
Court of Chancery therefore decided to continue to restrict Taylor from publishing The 
Seasons. It appeared, then, as though the traditional custodians of the printing and 
publishing trade had once again secured a great advantage for themselves.23 But their 
victory was short lived. 
 
2.3.4 Donaldson v Becket (1774) 
 
Just one year later, another case was brought in front of British courts. Once again, the case 
concerned reproductions of The Seasons. The plaintiff this time was Thomas Becket, who 
had also secured the right to print The Seasons. Becket had appealed for an injunction 
against Alexander Donaldson’s printing of the text. On the precedence of Millar v Taylor, 
it was a standard matter of course that the presiding judges decided in favour of Becket and 
granted the injunction against Donaldson. However, Donaldson launched an appeal that 
resulted in the case eventually being moved before the House of Lords in 1774. This 
hearing ultimately saw the precedence be overturned and the decision reversed.24 
 
Although the Lords were ultimately the presiding authority during Donaldson v Becket in 
1774, twelve common law judges were also called upon for the hearing, and tasked with 
advising the Lords on their decision. The common law judges were asked a series of 
questions, which essentially surveyed their opinions on each of the following matters: 
 
1) whether there was a natural, pre-statutory basis upon which an exclusive right 
to copy should be acknowledged; 
2) whether, if there was, that right should be considered waived upon publication; 
3) whether statutory law could supersede any such natural right by the authority of 
government or judiciary; 
4) whether the Statute of Anne had in fact done that; and 
                                                     
23 Ibid. 
24 Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Donaldson v. Becket (1774), in L. Bently and M. Kretschmer (eds.), 
Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900),  
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1774>. 
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5) how an author’s rights, whatever they were deemed to be, could be transferred 
to second and third parties, such as publishers. 
 
 
The results of the survey showed that a majority of the common-law judges considered that 
there was a pre-statutory basis for recognising authors as having an exclusive right to 
produce copies of their own works. Further, more than half the judges considered that the 
Statute of Anne should not be interpreted as limiting that right.25 Nevertheless, the Lords 
diverged from that conclusion, and instead ruled that only statutory law could serve as the 
basis for any exclusive right which authors might have with relation to the copying of their 
works. The Lords also, thereby, contradicted the ruling delivered in Millar v Taylor, and 
overturned the injunction which had been granted against Donaldson.26 
 
Perhaps this decision could have represented the final legal determination in relation to the 
tumultuous matter of whether authors’ proprietary rights ought to be considered natural or 
merely statutory. Though the legal situation in Britain had, for a long time, been disputed 
and untested (and then decided in Millar v Taylor but overturned in Donaldson v Becket), 
perhaps that question could now have been regarded as closed. The ability for this to serve 
as a stable international standard was critically undermined, however, by the most 
important political development of the late Eighteenth Century: American Independence. 
 
2.4 The American Copyright Experience 
 
The period of judicial contemplation which led to Millar v Taylor and Donaldson v Becket 
was concurrent with the period of extraordinary British-American history that culminated 
in American independence. America’s newfound political independence, entailing the 
rejection of a previous authority, naturally necessitated a declaration of law which would 
represent the newfound American autonomy. The centrepiece of that new legal 
arrangement was the United States Constitution, which was written in 1787 and ratified in 
1788. This included the Constitutional Copyright Clause (Article 1, Section 8.8 of the 
Constitution). 
 
Despite the American rejection of British authority, it was still natural for American 
legislators, in writing their own law, to consult and draw from British example and 
precedent. The influence of the Statute of Anne, for instance, is plain in the final wording 
                                                     
25 Though inaccurate reports were printed, at the time, suggesting that the majority thought the Statute did 
correctly limit authors’ natural rights. See Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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of the Copyright Clause. The Clause was implemented to give Congress the power to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
… the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”27 James Madison, in The Federalist 
no. 43, cites British precedence as the justificatory basis for the inclusion of the Clause, 
saying that the matter of copyright’s justification had been “solemnly adjudged” in Great 
Britain.28 
 
The timing of Madison’s determination was critical, however. The fact that the period in 
which the British consideration of copyright was coming to a legal head overlapped with 
the American Revolutionary War had the fortuitous effect of contaminating Madison’s 
interpretation. Although the year was 1788 when Madison deferred to the British 
adjudication on the matter of copyright – a full four years after Donaldson v Becket had 
been decided in Great Britain – the logistics of communication at that time (especially 
between two warring forces) meant that Madison’s understanding was founded on his by-
then outdated knowledge of the Millar v Taylor case. Having not yet learned of the 
subsequent reversal of the decision reached in that case, Madison was acting on the belief 
that the ‘solemn adjudication’ under British law was that copyright was a legitimate right 
under common law.29 
 
The culmination of Great Britain’s centuries-long experience with copyright had been 
almost immediately undone in America. Given the predominance that the United States has 
subsequently enjoyed when it has come to shaping international copyright arrangements, it 
is impossible to know how differently history would have progressed if Madison had been 
aware of Donaldson v Becket.  As it happened, however, the period of debate that had been 
manifested in Britain between the 1730s and the 1770s was to be largely played out again 
in the United States between 1778 (when the Constitutional Copyright Clause was 
established) and 1834 (when the first instance of American copyright case law was 
decided). 
 
I return to a discussion of the United States’ reprisal of the copyright debate below (Section 
2.4.2). That discussion includes a description of the IP legislation that was subsequently 
introduced to define how the United States Congress would realise its power to establish 
copyright (within the parameters of the Constitutional Copyright Clause). Before that, 
however, a note must be made about an additional component of the Constitutional 
Copyright Clause. 
                                                     
27 United States Constitution, art I, §8.8. 
28 James Madison, 'The Federalist Papers (Vol. 43)', American State Papers (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) 
29 Ibid. 
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2.4.1 The American Extension of IP to Patents 
 
Although it ostensibly diverges from the history of copyright per se, an important note must 
be made regarding the American introduction of patent protection. The introduction of 
patent protection within the United States is relevant to the history of copyright because it 
marked a critical point of arbitration in the development of IP law. In subsequent chapters, 
this arbitration is shown to be fundamentally unprincipled. Important corrections to the way 
IP regimes are implemented – including copyright – therefore turn on the reworking of the 
distinction between the concepts of copyright and patent. 
 
The notion of patents was first introduced to the United States via the same Constitutional 
clause as copyright. The respective concepts appear side-by-side (though neither are so 
named) in the following passage: 
 
[The American Congress shall have the power to] promote the Progress of Science 
and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.30 
 
Madison, in explaining the inclusion of inventors and their discoveries within the clause, 
provided no separate justification to that which he stated in defence of providing for 
copyright. He only added that “[t]he right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to 
belong to the inventors,”31 when compared to the rights that authors are due in relation to 
their writings. This alleged equivalence depends on several critical conceptual 
assumptions, which must each be defended if the claim is to be sustained. Centrally, it 
requires the demonstration of a conceptual equivalence between writers (and their writings) 
and inventors (and their inventions); and the further demonstration that this equivalence 
entails that the provision of IP protections is justified in the case of both, or not in the case 
of either (i.e. it cannot be justified for one but not the other). At the same time as it would 
be necessary to demonstrate this shared equivalency, however, it would also be necessary 
to demonstrate a substantive non-equivalence between the two, such that the protection of 
writings and inventions as part of two distinct regimes (copyright and patent, respectively) 
would be justified. After all, if writings and inventions (and authors and inventors) are 
strictly equivalent, then it would seem appropriate to grant them both protection under a 
single, unified system. 
 
                                                     
30 United States Constitution, art I, §8.8. 
31 Madison, above n 28. 
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Demarcating the conceptual boundaries around these classes of IP protection therefore 
requires a concerted consideration of the essential features of the objects to which the 
protections respectively extend. Historically, however, no such consideration has ever 
explicitly informed the development of IP law. As seen later (Chapter 6), this error is 
compounded by the expansion of copyright into non-written objects, such as photographs; 
sculptures; and film. In each of these cases, the expansion of copyright’s scope has been 
led seemingly by uncritical intuition. Such intuitions are shown to fail, however, in relation 
to numerous prominent ‘problem’ cases of IP, such as software and computer code. An 
analysis of the respective essential properties of copyrightable and patentable objects is 
then undertaken in Chapter 7. That analysis is used to construct a justificatory account of 
copyright that, when applied, systematically resolves the ‘problem’ cases in which our 
intuitions otherwise fail. 
 
2.4.2 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1790 (and Act of 1831) 
 
The very first Act regarding copyright in the United States was enacted in 1790, and was 
titled An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, 
and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies, during the Times therein 
mentioned (henceforth ‘The Copyright Act’). The Copyright Act extended to authors 
essentially the same privileges as had been extended, in Great Britain, under the Statute of 
Anne. That is, the Act provided the exclusive right to reproduce one’s copyrighted texts for 
a period of 14 years. Upon the expiry of that term, an author’s copyright could be extended 
for another term of 14 years, provided that the author was still alive (this ability to extend 
the term was indexed to the life of the author even if the copyright had been transferred to 
another party). In 1802 a legislative amendment was made to the Copyright Act, which 
extended protection to a wider array of objects such as pictures. That legislation prevailed 
until 1831, during which (under the notably enduring behest of Noah Webster, of Merriam-
Webster fame), a significant revision was made to the law.32 
 
By the 1820s Noah Webster had already enjoyed great successes via the business of writing 
and printing reference books about the English language. In the 1820s, however, he turned 
his attention towards compiling An American Dictionary of the English Language. He 
hoped that the profits he would realise from his dictionary would suffice to ensure a 
financially secure future for himself and his family. He estimated, however, that the 
copyright provisions on offer to him at the time would be entirely insufficient for him to 
                                                     
32 Craig Joyce, 'A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature: Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of the Story 
(of Copyright in the New Republic)' (2005) 42 Houston Law Review 325., pp.336-340. 
27 
 
achieve that end. In Webster’s estimation, only a perpetual copyright protection would do 
for such a work, given the measure of labour involved in such a project; and because of the 
invaluable influence he anticipated that the work would have on discourse across the 
nation.33 The project would, after all, require Webster (who eventually completed the 
project, working unassisted), to compile and arrange the definitions of some 70,000 
words.34 
 
After more than a decade of lobbying, Webster was successful in having legislative changes 
implemented by the courts. However, a qualification in the Constitutional Copyright 
Clause, which requires that Congress only establish copyright protection that lasts for 
‘limited times’ prevented Webster (along with any other author) from being able to secure 
a perpetual copyright. Instead, under the 1831 Copyright Act, the duration of an initial 
period of copyright was doubled from 14 to 28. An author who survived that initial term 
(or, for the first time, a surviving widow or children of a deceased author) could still 
subsequently extend the term of protection by 14 more years.35 In addition to this change, 
the range of copyrightable materials was extended to include engravings musical 
compositions.36 
 
In this period from 1790 to 1831, then, two simultaneous expansions of copyright occurred: 
1) The maximum duration of copyright in the United States was expanded from 28 
years to 42 years (if the relevant author survived an initial term of 14 years and 
28 years, respectively).37 
2) The scope of copyright had been expanded, such that instead of applying strictly 
to authors’ writings specifically, it provided protection (additionally) to printed 
material of all forms (including of pictures, maps, and charts); as well as to 
engravings and musical compositions.38 
The record of the House debate, prior to these expansions being incorporated into the 1831 
Act, indicates that the arguments for and against them were once again structured around 
the notion of whether copyright represented a mechanism for the protection of common 
law rights; or whether copyright was entirely statutory. These arguments, while varied and 
complex, largely echoed the arguments that had been presented in Britain by people such 
as William Warburton. A substantive consideration of that question (which draws from 
both the British and American experiences with that dialogue) is undertaken in subsequent 
                                                     
33 Ibid., p. 340. 
34 Ibid., p. 335. 
35 Ibid., p. 341. 
36 Ibid., pp. 340-41. 
37 8 Congressional Debate, (1831) 422-424. 
38 Ibid., 423. 
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chapters – especially Chapters 3 and 4.39 
 
By comparison, the record of the House debate reveals very little about the motivation that 
was had for expanding copyright’s scope. Prima facie, the motivation behind the expansion 
of copyright to other media (beyond strictly writing) might be explained by the intuitive 
similarity of the processes behind the reproduction of those media and the reproduction of 
writing. Printed maps, charts, and sheet music can (and could at the time) be mechanically 
reproduced in much the same way as printed writing. Importantly, this meant that 
unauthorised copies of those objects could be made with similar ease as unauthorised 
copies could be made of, for example, books. It might seem pragmatically sensible, then, 
to extend a system designed to regulate the copying of objects (e.g. copy-right) to such 
objects as well. In a similar vein, the process of engraving has much in common with the 
process of writing: it seems correct that two authors should be equally able to claim 
copyright protection if the sole difference between their works is that one of them etches 
text into a surface, while the other author places their text onto a surface in ink. The same 
kind of extension is made today in relation to electronic text. 
 
One important contribution to the consideration of copyright’s scope was not made until a 
legal case decided in 1879. Although other important copyright case law was decided 
earlier than 1879 (to which I return below), the relevance of the 1879 case to the present 
subject of copyright’s scope makes it worthwhile to consider immediately. That case was 
Baker v Selden (1879).40 
 
2.4.3 Baker v Selden (1879) 
 
In the previous section, several similarities were noted between written objects; non-written 
printed objects; and etchings. It was speculated that these similarities may have formed the 
unstated basis for the 1831 expansion of copyright’s scope in the United States. In the case 
of Baker v Selden, however, the appropriateness of these similarities as a basis for 
determining copyright eligibility was challenged by W.C.M Baker. 
 
The case concerned a book, printed by Charles Selden, in which a novel system for 
effective bookkeeping was presented. As part of the content of his book, Selden had 
included various blank accountancy forms which he intended to form a material component 
of his system. Because of the utilitarian functionality of Selden’s bookkeeping system, it 
                                                     
39 Ibid., 422-424. 
40 Baker v Selden 101 US 99 (1879), 103. 
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(and the blank forms which were a part of it) seemed as though they should naturally be 
patentable; indeed, Selden had applied for patent protection over his system. However, 
because Selden’s book, and the forms it contained, were also printed objects, they were 
also considered to be categorically copyrightable. This dilemma represented the central 
contention in the case, and Baker v Selden therefore came to be the first major United States 
legal case in which a Court acknowledged that substantive challenges had resulted from 
the way in which copyright’s scope had come to be defined in terms of physical media. 
With the Court asked to consider the differences between written works and non-written 
printed materials, rather than only the similarities between those objects, the case 
demonstrated an eventual limit to the historical basis that had been used for determining 
copyright eligibility.41 
  
The Court’s attempt to solve the dilemma presented in Baker v Selden involved the 
recognition that copyrightability must be established on the basis of some non-physical 
quality of certain (copyrightable) objects. The Justices attempted to represent this solution 
in what has come to be characterised as the ‘Idea-Expression’ distinction, by which the 
object of Selden’s book (an expression) was intended to be conceptually separated from 
the object of Selden’s bookkeeping system (an idea). By this distinction the Court intended 
to permit copyright protection only in relation to expressions where that would not also 
extend protection to any idea described within it. I demonstrate in Chapter 6 that solution 
is insufficient. I then argue in Chapter 7 that the non-physical quality which should instead 
replace the historically physical basis for determining copyright eligibility is second-
personal communicativeness. 
 
2.4.4 Wheaton v Peters (1834) 
 
While a consideration of Baker v Selden is specifically useful in informing the construction 
of a justificatory account of copyright’s scope, several broader foundational considerations 
related to copyright were raised during the very first copyright case to be heard in the 
United States Supreme Court. The case, Wheaton v Peters (1834), was referred to the 
Supreme Court on appeal by Henry Wheaton, after the case he brought against Richard 
Peters Jr. was initially decided against him in the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. In much the same way as the British cases Millar v Taylor and Donaldson v 
Becket, the case of Wheaton v Peters contended centrally with the question of whether 
copyright constituted a natural right, or merely a statutory right. This represented the 
                                                     
41 ‘Baker v. Selden (1879),’ Washington D.C. in L. Bently & M. Kretschmer (eds.), Primary Sources in 
Copyright (1450-1900), 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_us_1879b>. 
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critical opportunity for the Supreme Court to either confirm James Madison’s assertion (as 
he took Great Britain to have affirmed) that copyright arose as a product of natural law; or 
to establish copyright as a strictly statutory regime, thereby aligning the United States’ 
policy with the contemporary British position that had been upheld in Donaldson v Becket. 
 
In addition, several other key questions arose during the case. For example, consideration 
was given to the question of when, or under what conditions, a possessive claim could be 
understood to entail a proprietary claim. Further, the Justices were required to deliberate 
on the matter of whether objects constituting part of the public record could be considered 
copyrightable. Throughout this process, the Justices remained committed to promoting a 
certain practicality in the implementation of copyright. For example, they were determined 
that, for sectors of the public system to function, no segment of the public record could be 
allowed to be privately owned by individuals; and that this was to hold regardless of the 
strength of any ideological reasons that there may otherwise have been to grant private 
proprietorship over the record (e.g. even if private labour was the only means by which the 
public record had been preserved). Although this practical-mindedness generally directed 
the Justices towards correct conclusions, it unfortunately meant, as explained below, that 
some of the ideological prepositions articulated during the case were not even addressed, 
since the Justices had predetermined that nothing turned on the success or failure of such 
claims. 
 
Some contextualisation is required for modern readers to make sense of the case that 
developed between Wheaton and Peters. This is because it is simply unfathomable that a 
case of the same nature could arise today. Specifically, it was only possible for the case to 
arise because the practice of Supreme Court recordkeeping between 1789 and 1831 differed 
so drastically from any process of recordkeeping to be found in the developed world today. 
Any court decision that is made in the United States today is officially recorded, across 
multiple media, as an integrated part of the judicial process. During the nation’s infancy, 
however, no records of any case law decisions were officially recorded or published, even 
within the Supreme Court. 
 
Unsurprisingly, this lack of recordkeeping presented a serious obstacle to proper judicial 
procedure in the United States. Theoretically, the role the Supreme Court was always to 
represent the highest legal authority in the country, and therefore to serve in establishing 
precedents that the lower level courts could follow and replicate. The practical 
implementation of such a model, however, was rendered functionally impossible by the 
fact that there existed no means by which to disseminate knowledge of the Supreme Court’s 
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supposedly precedential decisions to legal professionals elsewhere in the country. For 
anybody not physically present at the Supreme Court during the oral delivery of a decision 
(such as legal professionals in other states or cities), it would have been difficult if not 
impossible to know what decision had been made, or even what the case was about. 
Remarkably, the legal system in the United States persisted in this manner for more than a 
decade after the Constitution had been ratified. 
 
This difficulty was eventually mitigated, first, by a man named Alexander Dallas. Dallas, 
operating alone, recorded and compiled volumes of the legal decisions that had been 
delivered in the Supreme Court. This was not an official or sanctioned position, but rather 
one that Dallas took on entrepreneurially. The prospective reward which spurred Dallas 
was the anticipated ability to profit directly through the sale of his volumes to practicing 
lawyers and other legal professionals. Eventually, however, the labour demanded by the 
task, combined with high production costs, discouraged Dallas from continuing his 
endeavour. A second reporter, William Cranch, subsequently attempted the same 
undertaking, but encountered similar difficulties; he also quit. 
 
In addition to frustrating the entrepreneurial attempts of Dallas and Cranch, the laborious 
and expensive process of reporting also frustrated legal professionals. The labour intensity 
involved in writing and compiling decisions made it common for the publishing of reports 
to be delayed by five years or more. The cost of printing the volumes also meant that they 
were available only at a considerable price to legal professionals. In 1815, however, 
Wheaton took up the task of reporting and was revolutionary within the position; he took 
up the task under the promise of releasing up-to-date volumes of decisions at least 
annually.42 
 
In response to Wheaton’s success, the United States government resolved to officially 
recognise and institutionalise the position of the Reporter’s Office. This came complete 
with a $1000 salary for Wheaton, payable on the condition that 80 copies of the Office’s 
reports were made available for government use in addition to whatever number of reports 
were produced for private sale. Although this was an improvement for Wheaton, the 
private-sale component nevertheless remained by far the more lucrative part of his 
operation. Despite the developments he had pioneered, Wheaton ultimately reached the 
same assessment as his predecessor, and deemed the return on labour not to be worthwhile; 
he resigned in 1827.43 
                                                     
42 Joyce, above n 32, pp. 344-349. 
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The next person to fill the Reporter’s Office was Richard Peters, Jr. Much more so than 
any of the previous reporters, Peters brought to the position a particularly pragmatic and 
business-like focus, which proved valuable in his pursuit to maximise the profitability of 
the position. For instance, where his predecessors had insisted upon printing using 
materials of sufficient quality to reflect the important nature of the work, Peters did not 
allow an idealisation of the position to steer him away from austere production values. 
Perhaps this quality of Peters’ was the product of necessity, given that a new legislative 
act, pertaining to the Court Reporter’s Office, was introduced in 1827. That legislation 
required that volumes of reports be published half-yearly, at an individual cost of no more 
than five dollars per volume. 
 
In addition to meeting the requirements of the 1827 legislation, Peters resolved to also 
revisit the reports made by his predecessors, and compile them into similarly affordable 
volumes. Specifically, he intended to format a collection the previous reports as a collection 
of no more than six volumes, to be made available for no more than thirty-six dollars in 
total. This would necessitate condensing the previous reports (especially those of 
Wheaton’s, whose quality and detail of work surpassed the work of Dallas and Cranch), 
and printing the volumes in a smaller type and a generally lower standard. Despite these 
compromises, Peters regarded the endeavour to be of great public value, and the idea was 
met with broad enthusiasm by legal professionals.44 
 
Not everybody was happy with Peters’ project, however. While the reissued reports would 
benefit the public and profit Peters, the surviving past reporters did not view the project 
positively. Peters reached a settlement with Dallas early on, but no such arrangement was 
made with Wheaton, who continued in his objection. Wheaton understood that his own 
publications would be greatly devalued if Peters successfully reissued the reports onto the 
market. Indeed, when Peters did publish his Condensed Reports, the volumes were enviably 
consumed. The third volume of Peters’ reports was published in 1831, and, being that it 
was the first volume to catalogue cases which had first been recorded in Wheaton’s reports, 
Wheaton brought a suit against Peters in that year. Wheaton lost the case in the Circuit 
Court, but appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, where it was ultimately decided.45 
 
The escalation of the case to the Supreme Court meant that the case was decided in the 
same place that both Wheaton and Peters had sat as reporters. Moreover, it meant that it 
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was to be presided over by Justices with whom each of the reporters had developed close 
personal acquaintanceships. The Justices, who confessed they were pained in having to 
preside over a case being contested between two of their legal peers, were called to consider 
two main questions in relation to copyright: 
1) Whether there existed a common-law, pre-statutory basis for copyright in the 
United States, and whether statutory law could justifiably constrain common 
law copyright; and 
2) Whether copyright could legitimately be held to apply to documents such as 
the court records Wheaton had compiled.46 
The Court’s determination regarding the former question – which clearly mirrored the 
central question considered in the British cases of Millar v Taylor and Donaldson v Becket 
– concurred with the British precedence. That is, it was decided that no common law basis 
to copyright existed, and that statutory provisions represented the only viable avenue 
through which authors could secure copyright protections. It was the latter question, 
however, which ended up proving more determinate in the outcome of the case; it was 
decided that a certain class of objects, to which court documents belonged, could not be 
copyrighted. The reasons behind each of these decisions shall be considered in turn. 
 
Whereas, in Britain, the notion of common-law copyright was introduced with the aim of 
bringing into question the validity of statutes placing temporal limitations on authors’ 
proprietary rights, in Wheaton v Peters the notion was introduced to challenge the validity 
of introducing statutory formalities as prerequisites to copyright protection. Specifically, it 
arose because Wheaton required a defence to the allegation that his reports were not subject 
to copyright, since he had failed to provide notices of copyright within his published 
reports. It also arose in relation to the fact that Wheaton had failed to deposit a required 
copy of his volumes with the Secretary of State. In response Wheaton argued that authors 
held a natural and automatic right to exclude others from producing copies of their works, 
and that statutory laws could not legitimately restrict the automatic applicability of that 
natural entitlement by means of such conditions. Although the Court finally rejected 
Wheaton’s response, it did so as the result of a four-to-two division between the Justices.47 
 
On the matter of whether judicial reports could be subject to copyright, the Court ruled that 
they could not; but this did not leave Wheaton’s publications entirely unprotected. It was 
determined that Wheaton’s publications were eligible for partial copyright protection, 
because of an important material difference between his reports and the reports of his 
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predecessors. When Wheaton took over the position, the Supreme Court Justices had 
informally agreed (eager to assist in improving the accuracy and expedience of the 
publications), to make available to him “any written opinions they might prepare, or notes 
they might take, in connection with their oral opinions.”48 In addition, Wheaton largely 
sequestered himself away with the Justices in his private life, since the Justices boarded in 
the same lodging to isolate themselves from the politics of society.49 
 
This proximity and level of engagement with the Justices enabled Wheaton to achieve 
something no other reporter had. Not only were his publications precise and expediently 
published, but he took the unprecedented step of affixing extensive scholarly annotations 
to his reports. These additional comments provided readers with comprehensive overviews 
of the areas of law pertinent to the cases reported.50 Critically, however, that original 
component of his reports was deemed to be conceptually distinct from the core portion of 
the reports (being the Justices’ opinions, specifically). This was important because, by 
Wheaton’s own testimony, he was indisputably the owner of his original annotations, being 
“the Summary of Points decided[;] of the Statements of the Cases prefixed[; and] of the 
analytical Indexes at the end of each [volume],”51 but the more contentious point had 
always been whether or not he held copyright over the record made of the Justices’ opinions 
themselves. 
 
The Justice’s opinions, of course, contributed the fundamental component of the reports; 
especially in Peters’ Condensed Reports, where any supplemental material his predecessors 
had attached was largely stripped out to lower costs. The Court concurred with Wheaton 
regarding his ownership of those supplementary components of his reports, but decided 
against him in relation to his owning of the Justices’ opinions. This was despite two 
arguments presented by Wheaton. First, Wheaton (somewhat meekly) suggested that an 
ownership of a significant portion of his reports (i.e. his supplemental material) ought to 
be sufficient in establishing property in the whole object. When this argument failed to 
convince the Justices, his counsel Elijah Paine produced a particularly inventive argument 
in support of Wheaton’s claim, which entailed some peculiar metaphysical assumptions. 
 
Paine’s argument was that the Justices’ manuscript opinions,52 having had to have belonged 
initially to somebody, had either first belonged to Wheaton or to the Justices themselves. 
If to Wheaton, then the case was trivial; and if to the Justices, then they had gifted that 
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property (as was their right) onto Wheaton. The first assumption upon which this argument 
turned (other than the central matter in question, being whether the opinions could be 
considered property in the first place) was that the oral opinions delivered by the Justices 
were distinct from the manuscript opinions published by Wheaton. This assumption was 
critical because the Justices’ oral opinions were regarded (and Paine agreed) to belong to 
all citizens, qua objects of public record. Thus, to be eligible as private property, it had to 
be shown that there was a non-equivalency between Wheaton’s manuscript opinions and 
the Justices’ oral opinions. Paine argued that, since the Justices discharged their duties 
through the delivery of their oral opinions alone, the additional discharge of a manuscript 
opinion (which, by comparison, was not requisite in their discharge of duty), represented a 
point of non-equivalency between the two; the drafting of Wheaton’s reports must therefore 
have constituted the delivery of a distinct object.53 
 
The second assumption Paine relied upon was that the original ownership of the Justices’ 
opinions (if it originated with the Justices) could be transferred to Wheaton. Supposing the 
oral and manuscript opinions were distinct, Paine’s argument turned on the idea that the 
delivery of oral opinions satisfied the public record even without the publication of any 
manuscript opinions. That being the case, the suggestion was that, since the Justices did 
not owe the manuscripts to the public record, the citizenry could not be thought to have any 
claim upon them, and thus they must instead be eligible for consideration as private 
property.54 
 
A central challenge to Paine’s argument regards an inequivalence between a Justice’s 
written opinion as it exists before it is published, and the ‘same’ written opinion as it exists 
after it is published. This is a dimension of a class of objects (which includes court 
opinions) that is not common to all literary objects. The complication is that, because of 
the nature a Justice’s appointed position, a Justice’s oral opinion transitions from a purely 
(private) locutionary act, to a public illocutionary act, when it becomes published in 
manuscript. That is, although Justices may form opinions privately (about all kinds of 
things, including the basis on which they believe certain legal cases should be decided), 
this kind of private propositional thought has no legal implication. When the same thought 
is externalised, however, as in the case of Wheaton’s manuscripts, this alters the way in 
which the public record (of the case decisions) must be interpreted. It is therefore of great 
practical importance that these externalised opinions not only be understood to affect the 
public record, but also to form part of the public record. 
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Although this distinction between a Justice’s private locutionary opinions and their public 
illocutionary opinions might seem informative only in the case of objects that are produced 
in some official capacity (that capacity being the source of the illocutionary power), this 
observation points towards a general quality common to all copyrightable objects. That is, 
authored objects must be understood to be simultaneously attributable as one person’s (qua 
property), while being simultaneously attributable to a different person as the source of its 
provenance. For example, an artist may legitimately boast, at a gallery auction, that a 
specific piece of art is theirs, if they created it. At the same time, an art collector may 
legitimately boast that that same piece of art is theirs, if they won the auction to buy it. 
These agents can simultaneously claim that the object is theirs because the claims they are 
making upon the object are distinct and non-contradictory. The collector advances a 
proprietary claim, and the artist advances a claim on the artwork’s provenance. 
 
Wheaton v Peters demonstrates just one case in which delineating these separate claims is 
critical. Paine’s argument that the Justice’s opinions were originally theirs is trivially true 
in the sense of the provenance of the opinions; everybody’s opinions are their own. The 
notion that such a claim on provenance could translate to a claim of proprietorship, 
however, was not established by Paine. Moreover, it is difficult to see how such a claim 
could have been defended. In any exchange that could be described as somebody ‘selling’ 
their opinion (e.g. freelance film or food critics), the transaction is more accurately 
characterised as a provision of service rather than as a transfer of goods. A person who is 
‘paid for their opinion’ is paid to disclose it; not to transfer it. 
 
The implications of treating the sale of an opinion as the transfer of an object, rather than 
as the provision of a service, bears out its absurdity. Consider that changing one’s own 
opinion is a perfectly standard phenomenon. This cannot be taken to mean that, after the 
sale of an opinion (as in the case of an expert critic), the ‘purchaser’ of that opinion can 
claim it as their ‘own’ in such a way as would allow them to change it. Indeed, the very 
value of such an opinion – including to the purchaser – is inherently located in its continued 
indexation to the person by whom it was formed. That is, what the opinion is as an object 
is contingent on its being second-personally indexed. 
 
This is also true in the case of Wheaton’s commentary. Wheaton’s legal opinions regarding 
Supreme Court decisions, being that he enjoyed no authority over such decisions, bore no 
more legal impetus than that of any other private citizen. The value of Wheaton’s additional 
commentary, if that was what sustained its market value, was in the fact that it encapsulated 
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the Justices’ opinions. If the Justices could be said to have ‘gifted’ their opinions to 
Wheaton, then this can only sensibly be interpreted to mean that they provided a service 
(insofar as they performed some action that Wheaton could capitalise on and profit from) 
with no expectation of remuneration; not that they transferred a proprietary object. As can 
be seen later chapters (especially Chapters 5-8), this distinction between providential 
ownership and proprietary ownership sets a basis for the recognition of discrete copyright 
protections that apply depending on the form of ownership that is claimed. 
 
Despite the complex conceptual matters raised through Paine’s argument, the Court 
decided the case on more direct utilitarian grounds. Thus, although the Justices correctly 
(and unanimously, alone of all the decisions in the case), found in favour of Peters on the 
matter, they did so extemporaneously. Though the Justices agreed that Wheaton had a 
legitimate claim to copyright over his annotations and appendices, they concluded that no 
copyright could be held over the opinions of the Court or its individual members (whether 
oral or manuscript). This was evidently motivated out of concern for the public good, and 
the prima facie observation that it was important not to artificially restrict public access to 
records of court opinions.55 
 
Wheaton v Peters ultimately delivered two central developments in the history of copyright. 
First, the decision of the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion, which was also the 
prevailing position in Britain, that there existed no common-law basis for the recognition 
of copyright. Although the notion of perpetual common-law copyrights continues to 
resurface in public dialogues, the ruling by the Justices in Wheaton v Peters consistently 
prevails at law. Second, Wheaton v Peters saw the preclusion of a class of objects 
(comprised of enactments of Congress and court opinions) from copyright protections. 
Although ostensibly the effect of this preclusion seems limited, being that restricts only a 
narrow range of objects from being made proprietary, an examination of the underlying 
principles that are capable of sustaining that determination also hints towards broader 
implications for copyright. 
 
2.5 Twentieth Century Expansions in Scope and Duration 
 
In view of the number and variety of case law decisions that had been established in the 
United States during the century after the 1790 Copyright Act, U.S. legislators in the early 
Twentieth Century considered it necessary to consolidate the changes in copyright (and 
take the opportunity to correct what were seen to be prior errors in the development of 
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copyright law) by means of a comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act. The first such 
revision was achieved in 1909. Several subsequent revisions also introduced additional 
changes in the Twentieth Century. Prominent among these changes, in each case, were 
increases to both the duration of copyright; and a broadening of the scope of objects deemed 
eligible for copyright protection. Less prominent throughout the Century, however, were 
clear and unambiguous principles used to sustain such substantive changes.  
 
2.5.1 Copyright Act of 1909 
 
The Copyright Act of 1909 represented the first major contribution to United Sates 
copyright law of the Twentieth Century. As the House Committee on Patents reported, 
those “familiar with the copyright laws of [the United States] have urged the necessity of a 
complete revision.”56 The Committee also cited the summation of copyright by President 
Roosevelt, who said of the laws in 1895 that: 
 
They are imperfect in definition, confused and inconsistent in expression; they 
omit provision for many articles which, under modern reproductive processes, are 
entitled to protection; they impose hardships on the copyright proprietor which are 
not essential to the fair protection of the public; they are difficult for the courts to 
interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction 
to the public. Attempts to improve them by amendment have been frequent, no 
less than 12 acts for the purpose having been passed since the Revised Statutes. 
To perfect them by further amendment seems impracticable. A complete revision 
of them is essential.57 
 
 
There are two especially noteworthy points to be taken from President Roosevelt’s 
assessment. First, it points to the ambiguity as to the appropriate scope of copyright, insofar 
as the passage alludes to “many articles which, under modern reproductive processes, are 
entitled to protection” – without supplying a justificatory basis for the inclusion of such 
articles, except, apparently, for their replicability under modern processes. Second, the 
passage also alludes to the general justificatory basis of copyright by invoking the notion 
of the “fair protection of the public,” which is implied to represent a just limit to the 
provision of protections to copyright proprietors. 
 
These were both central points with which the House had to contend in constructing the 
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1909 Act. Regarding the appropriate scope of copyright, the Committee began with a 
consideration of the terms ‘author’ and ‘writings’ – being that those formed the original 
verbiage used in the Constitutional Copyright Clause. The Committee observed that 
Congress and the courts had always “given a liberal construction to the word ‘writings,’”58 
noting that the very first Congress included maps and charts within the scope of copyright; 
and that the 1831 amendment to the original Copyright Act expanded copyright protection 
to musical compositions and cuts.59 
 
In addressing the subject of copyright’s scope, the House Committee also referred to 
specific commentary that was offered during Burrow-Giles Lithograph Company v Sarony 
(1884), which was a case that dealt with the copyrightability of photographs. The 
Committee quoted Justice Samuel Freeman Miller’s assertion, from that case, that the 
United States’ early instances of copyright legislation… 
 
…certainly answer the objection that books only, or writing in the limited sense 
of a book and its author, are within the constitutional provision. Both these words 
are susceptible of more enlarged definition than this. An author in that sense is ‘he 
to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker’ one who completes a work 
of science or literature’ [Here, Miller was quoting Joseph Emerson Worcester’s 
Dictionary of the English Language]. So, also, no one would now claim that the 
word ‘writing’ in this clause of the Constitution, though the only word used as to 
subjects in regard to which authors are to be secured, is limited to actual script of 
the author and excludes books and all other printed matter. By ‘writings’ in that 
clause is meant the literary production of those authors, and Congress very 
properly has declared these to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, 
etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible 
expression. The only reason why photographs were not included in the extended 
list in the act of 1802 is probably that they did not exist. 
 
Two salient points stand out in Miller’s argument. First, he is presumably correct in his 
conclusion that, had photographs existed when the first copyright acts had been 
implemented, they would have been included among the classes of objects deemed 
copyrightable. The nature of photographs is such that their classification as copyrightable 
objects seems intuitive. The second thing to notice in Miller’s testimony, however, is that 
his articulation of what that nature consists of is extremely limited. 
 
In extending the notion of author to non-textual objects, Miller appealed to a regular 
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dictionary definition – but that definition was surely too broad; it captures more than Miller 
intended.  For instance, if the law was to define an author as ‘anyone to whom anything 
owes its creation,’ then it would have to follow that bricklayers be considered authors of 
walls; and walls to be copyrightable. Obviously, even Miller intended a narrower 
conception of ‘author’ than this, according to which writers and photographers would both 
qualify, but bricklayers would not. Although this seems, at least initially, like an intuitive 
point of distinction, an articulation of that intuition is ultimately required.  
 
Ostensibly, one way to account for this intuitive point of distinction would be to appeal to 
a notion of artistry, by which artistic work (like literature and photography) is eligible for 
copyright protection; and unartistic work (like bricklaying) is ineligible. However – placing 
aside the difficulties involved in defining the qualities that mark ‘art’ – such a conception 
would surely preclude the inclusion of unartistic objects such as (some) reference texts and 
charts. Further consideration of such possible accounts, and their consequences, is provided 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
In relation to President Roosevelt’s second prominent point – the appropriate basis of 
copyright, generally – the House Committee confirmed the prevailing view, established in 
Wheaton v Peters), that no natural law basis for copyright existed. Instead, the Committee 
considered that the statutory provision of copyright was maintained “upon the ground that 
the welfare of the public will be served”60 through the provision of (temporary) monopolies; 
and that “[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the 
public, such rights are given.”61 The Committee therefore concluded that: 
 
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider … two questions: First, how 
much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public; and, 
second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public.62 
 
Although this may have been the first time the social utility formulation of copyright was 
officially affirmed by the Legislative Branch (rather than the Judicial Branch), the 
application of this basis was implemented inconsistently throughout the remainder of the 
House Committee’s recommendations. This is apparent, for instance, in connection with 
the 1909 implementation of special protections for authors of dramatic works. This 
example is worth considering, since it involves the intersection (or rather, lack of 
intersection) between copyright’s expanding scope and copyright’s theoretical justificatory 
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basis. 
 
The unique concern identified by the House Committee, in relation to dramatic works, was 
that the authors of such works often intended to realise profits through the provision of 
performances of the work, rather than copies of the work per se. That is, the Committee 
considered that: 
 
It is usual for the author of a dramatic work to refrain from reproducing copies of 
the work for sale. He does not usually publish his work in the ordinary acceptation 
of the term, and hence in such cases never received any royalty on copies sold. His 
compensation comes solely from public representation of the work. It has 
sometimes happened that upon the first production of a dramatic work a 
stenographer would be present and would take all the words down and would then 
turn the manuscript over to some one who had hired him to do the work or sell it 
to outside parties. This manuscript would then be duplicated and sold to persons 
who, without any authority whatever from the author, would give public 
performances of the work. It needs no argument to demonstrate how great the 
injustice of such a proceeding is, for under it the author’s rights are necessarily 
greatly impaired. If an author desires to keep his dramatic work in unpublished 
form and give public representations thereof only, this right should be fully 
secured to him by law.63 
 
 
Despite the Committee’s assertion to the contrary, an argument is required to demonstrate 
that the extension of copyright protection to (performances of) dramatic works is justified. 
Moreover, such an argument cannot rely on an appeal to an inherent injustice against the 
author’s rights in the way the Committee implied, because this: 
1) Begs the question: The argument attempts to justify the extension of statutory 
copyright by appeal to an ‘obvious’ injustice that – if copyright has no basis in 
natural law – cannot be considered an injustice prior to the provision of the 
statutory protection being argued for; and 
2)  Indexes copyright’s function to the benefit of the author, rather than to the 
benefit of society. 
The failure of the Committee to construct a justification of this extension on a social utility 
basis (even if such a basis would theoretically have been available) betrays a conceptual 
inconsistency that permeated the formulation of early Twentieth Century copyright law. 
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In addition, the argument presented in favour of extending copyright protections to authors 
of dramatic works, in such a way as would restrict others from performing the ‘same’ work, 
is complicated by the precedent supposedly established in Baker v Selden. Insofar as 
copyright is taken to extend protection only to the tangible expressions of authors’ ideas; 
and not to the ideas themselves, it is difficult to justify the House Committee’s 
recommendation that copyright be extended in a way that would exclude an author’s 
potential competitors from producing their own performances of the original author’s 
dramatic work. Although a competitor’s performance would represent a tangible 
expression of the first author’s narrative idea, that performance would nevertheless be 
strictly distinct the first author’s own performance (i.e. the tangible expression of their 
idea). The competitor’s performance could only be characterised as an infringement, then, 
if the sameness of the underlying idea was taken to mark an offence; but that would require 
recognising the original author as having an exclusive right to the use of the idea itself. 
 
Inconsistency regarding justificatory bases was also evident in connection with the most 
consequential revision incorporated into the 1909 Act: the increase of copyright duration 
from a maximum of 42 years to a maximum of 56 years (consisting of two terms of 28 
years). The House Committee presented the view that the term of copyright prior to 1909 
was frequently insufficient, and ought to be increased so that “there would be no probability 
of its being taken away from him in his old age, when, perhaps, he needs it the most.”64 
Once again, however, this appeal to the interests of authors cannot be taken to have any 
inherent moral force, given the social utility basis for copyright that the Committee 
simultaneously endorsed. In arguing for an extension to the maximum duration of 
copyright, the Committee should instead have been moved to demonstrate some benefit 
which the extension might provide the public. 
 
It might be thought that the Committee could have represented the provision of further 
guarantees to authors (especially in their old age) as being instrumentally valuable to the 
promotion of social utility (i.e., if those guarantees would motivate more authorship). 
However, a plain reading of the Committee’s assertion that the previous term of 42 years 
had been “in many cases insufficient”65 reveals that the Committee was occupied with the 
consideration of instances in which the act of authorship had already been realised (i.e. the 
authors had received copyright protection; it just did not persist long enough). On the social 
utility account, however, the protection afforded in those cases must be regarded as 
necessarily sufficient, since the authorship demonstrably occurred. Furthermore, if the 
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Committee had intended to reference the prevalence of cases in which authorship had not 
successfully been incentivised, there would have been no way to specify whether those 
cases numbered “many” or few. 
 
Although the House had set out to establish a holistic revision of copyright law, the 
principles guiding the 1909 legislation were applied inconsistently. Rather than managing 
to escape the disorder and confusion of the previous Century’s copyright development, the 
House’s positions continued to be a product of that legislative environment. The 
implementation of the Copyright Act of 1909 did not settle copyright matters, and it was 
not long before there were calls for further revision. 
 
2.5.2 Copyright Acts of 1962 to 1976 
 
Although major calls for revision of the Copyright Act of 1909 were prevalent from the 
1920s to the 1940s, another systematic review of copyright was not completed until the 
1960s. Another House Committee report (1961), prepared ahead of the Copyright Act of 
1962, provides an expanded commentary regarding several of the issues raised in 1909. It 
would take more than a decade for substantial revisions suggested to be finalised, however. 
This delay was important, because the timing of the legislature’s renewed interest in 
copyright – arising in the early 1960s – was not coincidental. The year 1965 would mark 
the 56th anniversary of the Copyright Act of 1909; the same length of time as the maximum 
term of copyright. Until a ‘permanent’ expansion of copyright could be legislated, 
Congress therefore used a series of Interim Acts to temporarily prevent the expiry of 
copyrights which were otherwise due to expire. Interim Acts were implemented in 1962; 
1965; 1967; 1968; 1969; 1970; 1971; 1972; and 1974, before the Copyright Act of 1976 
eventually provided more enduring legislation. 
 
The House Committee report of 1961 included a more detailed theoretical account of 
copyright than had been presented in the report accompanying the 1909 legislation. That 
theoretical account attempted (in part) to address several of the theoretical difficulties that 
were flagged as problems in Section 2.5.1. The theoretical account attempted to clarify or 
solve three main issues: 
1) What function, in principle, is copyright supposed to serve? 
2) How long should copyright endure to best fulfil its function? 
3) What kinds of objects ought to be copyrightable? 
 
In relation to the first question, the report departed from the historical claim that copyright’s 
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sole purpose was to serve a social utility function. Although the report maintained that the 
promotion of social utility was “the primary purpose”66 of copyright, it also introduced – 
as a distinct notion – the idea that copyright ought to provide authors with ‘due reward’ for 
their labour.67 Unfortunately, although this distinction was introduced with the intention of 
solving inconsistencies within the House’s theoretical conception of copyright, it only 
really served as an acknowledgement of that inconsistency, because the proposition was 
never defended. 
 
It is apparent that the House Committee intended to resolve certain theoretical problems 
through the proposal of this secondary function of copyright, particularly in relation to 
justifying its duration. For instance, it was seen in Section 2.5.1 that an author’s potential 
increased ‘need’ for copyright in their old age was used as a justificatory basis for the 
provision of expanded copyright terms, despite that carrying no inherent moral force under 
a social utility account of copyright. Indeed, the closest the Committee came to a defence 
of this proposed secondary function of copyright was to emphasise the instrumental 
connection it might have with the social utility function, saying: 
 
Although the primary purpose of the copyright law is to foster the creation and 
dissemination of intellectual works for the public welfare, it also has an important 
secondary purpose: To give authors the reward due to them for their contribution 
to society. These two purposes are closely related. Many authors could not devote 
themselves to creative work without the prospect of remuneration. By giving 
authors a means of securing the economic reward afforded by the market, 
copyright stimulates their creation and dissemination of the intellectual works.68 
 
 
It should be clear that this alleged relation is theoretically fraught. First, the passage 
involves a critical transition from the phrase ‘the reward due’ to the phrase ‘the reward 
afforded by the market.’ Copyright functions as a regulation on markets (by limiting 
competition within markets), which means that the reward afforded by the market is 
contingent on the version of copyright that is enacted. On an optimised ‘social utility’ 
version of copyright, the market reward that is artificially sustained, through such 
regulation of the market, would be the lowest reward that is sufficient to still incentivise 
the production of socially valuable objects. It is therefore disingenuous to introduce the 
notion of ‘due reward’ as some threshold other than the lowest reward capable of 
                                                     
66 House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report of the Register of Copyright on the General 
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (1961), p. 5. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
45 
 
incentivising creative authorship, while attempting to demonstrate a ‘close relation’ 
between the two values. 
 
The practical consequence of introducing this delineation in copyright’s function, as the 
1961 House Committee intended it, was to enable for the case to be argued (or at least 
asserted) that the duration of copyright should be increased. On this point the Committee 
reported to “believe that the benefits of copyright should be available to an author for his 
lifetime and to his dependents if he dies prematurely.”69 In addition to there being no 
defence given of the general claim that a ‘due reward’ should be guaranteed independent 
of the social utility function of copyright, the Committee also provided no argument for the 
claim that, assuming a guarantee of that kind was in fact justified, the appropriate value of 
the reward should be established as whatever an author could realise via a lifetime-spanning 
term of copyright. This was a bare assertion. 
 
A further House Committee report, produced to inform the 1976 Copyright Act, attempted 
to downplay concerns about the potential friction evident between the social utility function 
and the ‘due reward’ function of copyright. That Committee commented that: 
 
Although limitations on the term of copyright are obviously necessary, too short a 
term harms the author without giving any substantial benefit to the public. The 
public frequently pays the same for works in the public domain as it does for 
copyrighted works, and the only result is a commercial windfall to certain users at 
the author’s expense.70 
 
This attempt to demonstrate that the provision of ‘due reward’ was not in conflict with the 
social utility function of copyright can be challenged. The notion of ‘harming’ authors 
(especially as opposed to abstaining from benefiting authors) implies the existence of a 
positive duty that has not been established; that is precisely what is in question. 
Furthermore, insofar as commercial exploiters of authored material (i.e. publishers and 
other distributors) represent the sole beneficiaries of works entering the public domain, it 
stands to be argued that this is a product of industry trusts which develop precisely because 
of the consolidation of monopoly rights under copyright. In fact, the development of 
exactly that situation was discussed by the 1909 House Committee, in relation to the music 
industry, as the basis for establishing compulsory licensing provisions as an anti-trust 
measure.71 The same concerns, of course, dated back to as far as the perceived trust 
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established within the Stationers’ Company in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century 
Britain. 
 
On the substantive question of how long copyright protections should last, the opinion of 
the House shifted significantly between 1961 and 1976. Although in both years the House 
reported the opinion that copyright should persist for the whole duration of an author’s life 
(and be able to supply an author’s dependents, in the case of an untimely death), the 
preferred means by which to achieve that had changed. In 1961, the House Committee 
reported that two alternatives had been taken under consideration. The first method, 
preferred by the House at that time, was for a fixed term of copyright which would begin 
upon first publication of a work. The House estimated that a term of 76 years would be 
sufficient in achieving its desired end.72 The alternative system, which the Committee did 
not recommend, was a term indexed to the death of the author. The term of copyright under 
consideration on that model was the lifetime of the author, plus 50 years.73 
 
The 1961 House Committee’s reasons for preferring a fixed-term system over the variable 
system indexed to an author’s death were multifaceted, but included the clarity afforded by 
being able to record the expiry date on published editions; and the uniform applicability of 
the term to corporate and anonymous works.74 Nevertheless, by 1976 the House had come 
to recommend the implementation of a copyright term consisting of the length of an 
author’s life, plus 50 years.75 The weight of opinion was so strong on this point, in fact, that 
the Committee noted that the “Register of Copyrights now regards a life-plus-50 term as 
the foundation of the entire bill.”76 This was subsequently the term that was enacted in the 
bill. 
 
The final major matter considered by the 1961 House Committee, and which was revised 
in the Copyright Act of 1976, was the scope of copyright. In 1961 the Committee 
acknowledged several of the shortcomings present in the 1909 Act. Most notably, the 
Committee identified the need to explicate several otherwise implicit general requirements 
which objects ought to meet in order to be considered copyrightable. The Committee 
explained that: 
 
…basic requisites of copyrightability are not mentioned explicitly in the [1909] 
statute. While they are generally recognized by copyright specialists, the absence 
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of any reference to them in the statute seems to have led to misconceptions as to 
what is copyrightable matter. We believe it would be desirable for the new statute 
to mention these basic requisites in general terms.77 
 
 
In view of contentions raised in later chapters (especially Chapters 6 and 7), it is likely that 
the copyright specialists referred to in the quoted passage did not have a good critical 
conception of what the basic requisites of copyrightability ought to be. They did, however, 
likely have an intuitive understanding of what should be copyrightable, and that intuition 
would have closely approximated a good critical conception much of the time. The House 
Committee demonstrated the same intuition in making its own recommendation that new 
legislation: 
 
…should be broad enough to include not only those forms in which copyrightable 
works are now being produced, but also new forms which are invented or come 
into use later. At the same time, we do not think that the language of the statute 
should be so broad as to include some things – typography, broadcast emissions, 
and industrial designs are possible examples – that might conceivably be 
considered the ‘writings of an author’ but are not intended by Congress to be 
protected under the copyright law.78  
 
This concern mirrors the potential objection identified in Section 2.5.1 in relation to the 
potential classification of a bricklayer being considered the ‘author’ of a wall. The 
Committee’s recommendation to explicate the general requisites of copyrightability were 
intended to add substantive definition to those guiding intuitions. 
 
The 1961 report recommended the adoption of three specific principles in determining 
general copyright eligibility. These were: 
1) That the object must be ‘written,’ in the historical sense that it must be fixed 
in some tangible form (although, as noted below, the intended sense of 
‘tangible’ was still ill-defined); 
2) That the object must be original, in that an author must have produced it 
through their own intellectual effort, and not merely copied it; and 
3) That the object “must represent an appreciable amount of creative 
authorship.”79 
To make sense of the third requirement, the notion of ‘creative authorship’ must be taken 
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to be the component that grants eligibility to books and music; while restricting the 
extension of copyright to typography, industrial designs, and walls. This means that the 
term ‘creative,’ in this context, does not refer just to the bringing of something into 
existence (since, in that sense, building walls is creative). Instead, ‘creative’ work must be 
understood as work that is emotively or expressively artistic. Unfortunately, by not fully 
articulating the nature of ‘creativeness,’ the House failed to alleviate the need to appeal to 
intuition in determining copyright eligibility. The general guiding principles intended to be 
explicated therefore remain implicit. 
 
Eventually, the Copyright Act of 1976 defined the scope of copyright by stipulating that: 
 
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works 
of authorship include the following categories: 
(1) literary works; 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and 
(7) sound recordings.80 
 
In 1980, Congress amended this list further, to include software.81 
 
In addition to stipulating what kinds of objects were copyrightable, the House recognised 
that instruction was required regarding what copyright (as a protection against ‘copying’) 
ought to entail in relation to certain kinds of objects. As the House recognised, this need 
arose from the apparent tension (also highlighted in Section 2.5.1) between the claim that 
copyright was to exclusively protect expressions of ideas fixed in tangible media; and the 
allegedly ‘obvious’ injustice of allowing competing expressions of the same idea in certain 
contexts (such as competing performances of a stage play that express the same story). 
 
The 1961 House Committee report once again offers the most extensive commentary on 
this issue, but this proves unsatisfactory once again. In attempting to resolve the central 
point of tension, the Committee tried to draw a distinction between the ‘ideas’ expressed 
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in copyrightable objects, and a quality of copyrightable objects that the report termed 
“essential substance.”82 The notion of what constitutes the ‘essential substance’ of a 
copyrighted work, however, was left critically underdefined. 
 
The non-copyrightability of ideas was explicitly reiterated in the 1961 House Committee 
report. The Committee asserted that an author’s enjoyment of copyright “does not preclude 
others from using the ideas or information revealed by the author’s work,” and that “anyone 
is free to create his own expression of the same concepts, or to make practical use of them, 
as long as he does not copy the author’s form of expression.”83 At the same time, however, 
the Committee characterised the law as correctly protecting literary, dramatic, and musical 
works against “the making of new versions,” and against their “reproduction in any 
transcription or record.”84 The simultaneous espousal of these claims represents a 
conceptual contradiction. A restriction against the production of ‘new versions’ must 
function as a restriction against alternative expressions of the same idea; and restricting the 
production of a transcript or record (as in the case of the stenographer taking notation 
during a play) was already shown (Section 2.5.1) to be at odds with the Idea-Expression 
divide. 
 
The House Committee recognised this tension, noting that the word ‘copy’ had historically 
been used in a broader form than would refer merely to the physical manifestation of an 
object. The Committee attempted to explain away this apparent tension by saying that, 
“[w]hile anyone is free to use the ideas disclosed in a work, and to use the same source 
material in creating another work, the reproduction of the essential substance of an author’s 
expression constitutes ‘copying,’ even though his work is altered in the reproduction or is 
reproduced in a different medium or form.”85 This leaves two problems, however. First, it 
means that, although copyright is only extended to objects which are affixed in tangible 
forms (and so objects are categorised as copyrightable or uncopyrightable based on their 
media class), the tangible form of a copyrighted thing is in no way the object of copyright 
protection. It is therefore neither the metaphysical object (the idea) nor the physical object 
(the material embodiment of the idea) that copyright purportedly protects. Second, insofar 
as the ‘essential substance’ of an object is intended to mark what is protected, the term is 
not sufficiently defined. It is unclear what the essential substance of an author’s work 
consists of, if not the author’s ideas. 
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Compared to the commentary produced in 1909, a more explicit and detailed theoretical 
account of copyright was attempted by the House in 1961, which eventually influenced the 
Copyright Act of 1976. The account acknowledged several conceptual problems and 
inconsistencies that had been present in the legislation since 1909. The report demonstrated 
that these problems and inconsistencies had obscured the understanding of the intended 
function of copyright; and of what copyright was intended to apply to. Despite the 
articulation of the problems, however, the proposed solutions were lacking; often turning 
on poorly defined conceptual notions. 
 
2.5.3 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (1998) 
 
The most recent legislative action that effected an increase in the duration of copyright, in 
the United States, was the implementation of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act (1998). Whereas Acts that had previously increased the term of copyright in the United 
States had also implemented other significant revision as well, the Sonny Bono Act was 
drafted with the exclusive intention of increasing the term of copyright by 20 years. With 
the enactment of the extension, the term of copyright was increased to the lifetime of the 
author, plus 70 years. All other copyright terms (such as for corporate works or ‘works-for-
hire,’) were extended by 20 years as well. For instance, the term for corporate works 
became 95 years from the date of publication; or 120 years from the date of creation 
(whichever is shorter). These increases were applied retroactively to copyrighted objects 
that had not already entered the public domain.86 
 
The central reasons cited for providing this extension were that life expectancy had 
increased since the provision of the life-plus-50 term in 1976, and that it would serve a 
pragmatic usefulness in standardising copyright conditions internationally.87 The 
legislation was soon challenged, however, in a legal case that was escalated to the Supreme 
Court: Eldred v Ashcroft (2003). The lead counsel for the plaintiff, Professor Lawrence 
Lessig, advanced two arguments alleging the unconstitutional nature of the Sonny Bono 
Act. First, that the extension represented a violation of the limit set on Congress, in the 
Constitutional Copyright Clause, to establish copyright for “limited Times.” Second, that 
the retroactive extension of terms for an additional 20 years violated the First 
Amendment.88 
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The claim advanced against the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Act, by appeal to the 
restriction placed upon Congress (that copyright was only to be establish for limited terms), 
was based on the allegation that the provision of a term that could be perpetually extended 
would amount to a form of protection that was functionally without limit. Subsequently, 
the assertion went, retroactive extensions of copyright ought to be considered 
unconstitutional; especially because such an extension could not be construed to promote 
progress in science or the useful arts.89 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, 
however, was that the term of life-plus-70 represented a finite term, and that finite terms – 
even very long finite terms – satisfied the condition of being a limited term.90 This was a 
familiar stance, in that it was also adopted by Congress during the drafting of the Sonny 
Bono Act. In fact, Mary Bono (whose husband, Sonny Bono, sponsored the Copyright 
Term Extension Bill) urged Congress that it should, in absence of the option to establish 
perpetual copyright, pursue Jack Valenti’s proposal to limit copyright’s term to “forever 
less one day.”91 
 
Lessig’s second argument, which alleged a contravention of the First Amendment, 
characterised copyright as a limit on free speech. The contention was not that copyright 
presented a violation of the Amendment generally; the point Lessig intended was that, by 
providing Congress the power to extend the term of existing copyrights, Congress was 
provided the power to determine who had the right to speak. As Lessig accounts, a 
consideration of this argument was not demonstrated in the Justices’ written opinions.92 
 
The challenge levied against the Sonny Bono Act in Eldred v Ashcroft was not successful; 
the constitutionality of the Act was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Lessig attributed the 
outcome to a failure he saw as his own. Whereas several Justices indicated that their 
opinions turned on whether previous extensions in copyright could be demonstrated to have 
had a negative material impact on progress in the sciences and useful arts, Lessig 
considered such pragmatic questions to be immaterial to the principled basis upon which 
he believed the case ought to be decided. Therefore, even though he considered such 
material harms to be easily demonstrable, he refused to deign to direct his answers towards 
those concerns, and instead redirected the Justice’s questions to what he saw as the 
principle of the matter: the imperative to limit the powers of Congress. By Lessig’s 
estimation, the answers he provided were correct, but were not the right ones to give.93 
                                                     
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Mary Bono, quoted in Congressional House Record (7 October 1998), H9952., at: 
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-10-07/pdf/CREC-1998-10-07-pt1-PgH9946.pdf#page=7>. 
92 Lessig, above n 88. 
93 Ibid. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
The history of copyright’s development is a history of inconsistency and confusion. It is a 
history which involves the persistent retrofitting of (purportedly) principled accounts to 
existing systems, by agents already invested in those systems. Moreover, where 
justificatory accounts of copyright have been offered, they have routinely been made on 
appeal to intuitions that have not been adequately articulated. Nevertheless (and with 
increasing regularity) those under-articulated accounts have been allowed to serve not only 
as a basis for maintaining copyright; but for consistently expanding it. That expansion has 
been twofold: both the duration of copyright, and the scope of the objects to which 
copyright applies, have been extended without clear principle. 
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Chapter 3  
Assessing Locke as a Basis for Natural Copyright 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 it was shown that, throughout the development of copyright in both Great 
Britain and the United States, a recurring point of social and legal contention was the 
question of whether there existed a natural law basis for the provision of copyright; or 
whether copyright could only exist via fiat. Through Donaldson v Becket (1774) and 
Wheaton v Peters (1834), both nations respectively established that there was no natural 
basis for the provision of copyright. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to question whether those 
determination were correct. After all, the decisions had not come simply or unanimously; 
and other influential legal decisions regarding copyright have been shown to be erroneous. 
 
Furthermore, even if one accepts that the arguments presented in favour of recognising 
natural law copyright were correctly dismissed when tested in court, it might be the case 
that those arguments did not reflect the strongest available form of the argument. Indeed, 
most popular arguments for natural law copyright (and copyright expansionism) have, 
historically, lacked philosophical rigour – and this remains true today. Although such 
accounts typically enjoy some intuitive appeal, the intuitions that they test are ultimately 
left under-examined. Those accounts are thus unable to withstand even moderate scrutiny. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to explicate a strong natural law account of 
property, which can be tested (in Chapter 4) as a basis for sustaining a natural law 
justification of copyright. 
 
Subsequently, the argument developed in Chapter 4 is that when even the most compelling 
labour-based natural desert account of property is considered, it proves incapable of 
supporting an account of natural economic copyright. This is prefigured in the present 
chapter by a consideration John Locke’s labour theory of property. Although Locke 
articulates a more rigorous and compelling account than has been presented at law or in 
popular commentary, while successfully incorporating all of the defining components of 
those inferior accounts, it shall be shown that a Lockean account is incompatible with a 
natural law account of IP. 
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3.2 Lockean Theory 
 
Despite the underdeveloped nature of most popular natural law arguments for copyright 
expansion, several themes are common throughout them. Centrally, they all take the form 
of ‘desert’ or ‘fairness’ accounts; and they identify labour as the basis of desert or fairness. 
I therefore refer to these accounts as naïve desert accounts. In their simplest form, naïve 
desert arguments affirm the ostensibly uncomplicated view that people ought to have the 
right to enjoy what they produce through their own labour; secure against appropriation by 
others. In seeking the strongest form of that argument, it is essential to consider the property 
theory of John Locke. 
 
Several natural law property accounts exist other than Locke’s. These include notable 
accounts by Hegel; Kant; Grotius; Pufendorf; and Aquinas. Lockean theory is preferred 
here, however, for two reasons: First, the labour-centrism of Locke’s account makes it 
analogous to the popular desert accounts that are deployed in arguing for expansive 
copyright protection. Second, Lockean property theory has enjoyed a preeminent historical 
influence in connection to the development of modern property law in both Great Britain 
and the United States; and is regularly regarded within academic literature as being 
important to IP law.94 Therefore, insofar as underdeveloped accounts of natural law 
copyright can be attached to an established and rigorous philosophical account, they appear 
most naturally to attach to a Lockean account of property. Moreover, an account of 
copyright that is attached to a Lockean account should also be expected to remain legally 
(and in principle) consistent with prevailing property law. 
 
On the other hand, it is important to note that Locke did not develop his account with 
anything other than material property in mind. The application of Lockean theory to 
intellectual property is therefore not straightforward. As such, one of the central functions 
of the explanatory account of Lockean property theory that follows is to make prominent 
the qualities of the account that are critical to assessing its extensibility to IP. This shall 
contextualise a subsequent account, provided in Chapter 4, which demonstrates that 
Lockean property theory precludes, rather than establishes, a natural basis for proprietary 
copyright. 
 
It should be noted that the treatment of Lockean theory given here is not intended to 
                                                     
94 See for example: Justin Hughes ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988), vol. 77, no. 2, Georgetown 
Law Journal, 287; Adam D. Moore, ‘A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property Revisited’ (2012) 49 San 
Diego Law Review 1069; Spinello, Richard A., Spinello and Maria Bottis, A Defense of Intellectual Property 
Rights, (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 2009); and Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean 
Rights in Property (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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persuade proponents of competing property theories (e.g. Hegelian, Kantian, etc.) that the 
Lockean account of property is correct. Rather, the explication and analysis of the Lockean 
model (presented across this chapter and the next) is intended only to demonstrate that 
proponents of Lockean property theory cannot ground a defence of natural law proprietary 
copyright on that basis. Furthermore, if proponents of popular desert arguments object to 
the features of a Lockean account that prevent it from establishing natural proprietary 
copyright, then those proponents carry the burden to demonstrate the relative superiority 
of their account over Locke’s.  
 
3.2.1 The Naïve Desert Narrative 
 
Popular arguments for expanding (or at least not restricting) the terms or provisions of 
copyright typically invoke a naïve desert narrative that lacks philosophical substance. They 
are also frequently presented by celebrities (often with a vested interest in IP law 
outcomes), or by politicians. A 2016 example, offered by Australian author Jackie French, 
is illustrative. An alternative example, offered by Joseph Biden, demonstrates an equivalent 
example framed in terms of fairness. 
 
French, in a one-page open letter composed in response to a report issued by the Australian 
Productivity Commission, defends a rudimentary desert account of IP. She intends this 
account to reveal the injustice of the Commission’s recommendation that Australia restrict 
the duration of copyright to be to (approximately) 15 years. Under the heading ‘Theft and 
the Failure of Economics 101,’ French contests the Commission’s assertion that authors 
“rarely write for financial reasons,”95 and suggests that writers are treated unjustly as 
compared to other property holders and people who derive income by different means.96 
 
By way of comparison to the 15-year proprietary period recommended by the Productivity 
Commission, French points out that if she “had spent [her] time renovating houses, or 
investing in shares, [she] would own them. So would [her] heirs.”97 She then presents a 
series of five rhetorical questions, including (and each similar to) the inquiry, “[i]f you built 
a bicycle or a house, would you give it to anyone who cares to grab it, in 15 years’ time?”98 
                                                     
95 The actual claim made by the Productivity Commission is that “Few, if any, creators are motivated by the 
promise of financial returns long after death, particularly when the commercial life of most copyright material 
is less than 5 years.” See: Productivity Commission, Intellectual Property Arrangements, Inquiry Report 78, 
Canberra, 2016, p. 8. 
96 Jacquie French, An Open Letter from Jacquie French (AM) in Response to the Productivity Commission’s 
Report on Australia’s Intellectual Property Arrangements, Harper Collins Publishers, 
<http://www.harpercollins.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Open-Letter-from-Jackie-French.pdf>. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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Each of these questions is intended to function, without further comment or explication, in 
support of French’s objection against the Commission’s suggested copyright term. 
 
French’s argument is uncompelling because she attempts to demonstrate an analogousness 
between traditional physical property and IP, without considering important differences 
between those objects. Her comparison of a book and a bicycle loses force, for example, 
when one considers that, although owners of physical objects like bicycles own those 
objects perpetually, inventors of objects like bicycles only enjoy the patent rights for a fixed 
term. This represents a difference in the way ownership of types is treated differently (under 
IP) than the ownership of tokens is treated under traditional property law. Without 
considerably expanding her account, French in unable to demonstrat that there is good 
reason to treat the ownership of types identically to the ownership of tokens. 
 
Despite its significant lack of rigour, French’s letter belongs to a tradition of arguments 
which often evoke public sympathy, and that even enjoy some legal success when presented 
in court. It is therefore worth highlighting the defining features of this kind of naïve desert 
argument. This can serve to demonstrate the prima facie similarities between these popular 
accounts and John Locke’s much more substantial and rigorous labour theory of property. 
To do that, however, it is also necessary to consider one more way in which naïve desert 
accounts can be framed. 
 
Rather than being expressed in terms of what an author deserves on the basis of their labour, 
the favoured notion of people pursuing a naïve desert account of copyright is often fairness. 
An argument for expanding copyright protection was presented in this form, for instance, 
by United States Senator Joseph Biden in 2002. Acting as Chairman in a Congressional 
hearing on IP, Biden opened accounts with an appeal to fairness by arguing that, even if a 
musical band was incentivised enough to continue playing music for the public while their 
recordings; videos; and merchandise were distributed for free, it would not be fair for the 
band to have to do so.99 
 
Like French, Biden’s objection regarded the proposition that authors are not primarily 
motivated by economic reward. However, whereas French attacked the accuracy of the 
proposition, Biden’s objection was against its pertinence. That is, Biden’s argument was 
that, even if it were granted that creators of copyrightable material are not predominantly 
driven by economic reward (and that they would create content even without the prospect 
                                                     
99 Joseph Biden, in United States Cong. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Examining the Theft of 
American Intellectual Property at Home and Abroad, 107th Cong. 2nd Sess., U.S. G.P.O, Washington (2002), 
p.2. 
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of economic gain), that fact would be immaterial to the question of what right they ought 
to have to extract economic gain if they were to choose to. To highlight the desert 
component of Biden’s claim, it can be restated: Even if authors knew ahead of time that 
they would not receive economic compensation for producing a work; but were motivated 
by other factors to produce the work anyway, that willingness on the part of authors would 
not vindicate society in withholding from them the economic reward they deserved. 
 
Whether stated in terms of desert or fairness, naïve desert arguments share common core 
components. Specifically, naïve desert accounts locate the basis for proprietary desert in 
the acts of labour by which objects are produced. French, for example, argues that building 
a bicycle ought to generate ownership rights over that bicycle; and that (by implicit 
analogy) writing a story ought to generate ownership rights over that story. In this way, 
insofar as a naïve desert account of property is intended to be extended to copyright, no 
conceptual difference is acknowledged to exist between tangible and intangible objects. 
Whether one’s labour produces a bicycle or a story, the fact of the labour is taken to beget 
a natural proprietorship over the object thereby produced. 
 
The central tenet of the naïve desert narrative is mirrored in Lockean property theory. 
Insofar as such desert theories regard tangible objects (e.g. French’s bicycle example), they 
should be expected to agree with traditional Lockean theory. Specified in Locke’s account, 
however, are important limits which are placed upon natural proprietorship. These limits 
are implemented by Locke through two provisos: one which prohibits waste; and one which 
prohibits the monopolisation of resources. Close examination (see Chapter 4) reveals that 
these provisos prohibit the possibility of natural proprietorship in relation to authored 
works. This is because of the way the provisos intersect uniquely with non-physical objects 
that are infinitely replicable and do not expire. 
 
3.2.2 The Rigorous Lockean Account 
 
Locke’s famous contribution to property theory comes via his second essay in Two 
Treatises of Government; through a short chapter titled ‘Of Property.’ The objective of that 
chapter is to account for the process by which humans could have originally come to 
justifiably own property. To that end, Locke begins by imagining a hypothetical state of 
nature, wherein private property does not already exist. The argument then proceeds upon 
the claim that, under such conditions, each person would be entitled to an equal claim to 
the resources of the world. Locke therefore characterises the Earth’s natural resources as 
existing in a commons, from which all people have a natural right to extract objects that are 
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useful in furthering their own projects and guaranteeing their continued survival.100 
 
Locke uses the concept of labour to explain the process by which objects can be extracted 
from the commons and made into private property. According to Locke’s labour theory, 
humans are unlike other things, in that they do not form part of the natural commons. 
Instead, humans (including their bodies) are subject solely to their own authority, and, in 
this sense, belong only to themselves. 101 Locke even goes so far as to say that holding this 
authority over oneself makes a person “master of himself, and proprietor of his own 
person.” 102 On the Lockean account, this exclusive self-mastery is what subsequently 
substantiates all legitimate claims of exclusive proprietary ownership. 
 
From the fact that each person enjoys exclusive authority over themselves and their own 
body, Locke extrapolates that each person must also be permitted to enjoy a unique claim 
over anything that is produced through the application of their person or body. He explains 
why this is so in terms of a ‘mixing’ metaphor: When a person exerts themselves in work, 
they are able to ‘mix’ their labour with objects located in the commons, and can thereby 
extend the exclusive right they have in their bodily labour to the object with which it is 
mixed. For example, if an individual cut branches from a tree (located in the commons), 
with the intention of using the material to construct a shelter, then they would thereby have 
mixed their labour with the branches through the cutting. In doing so, the person would 
secure an exclusive right to the use of the branches, and any attempt by another to use them 
without permission would constitute an offence against the labourer. 
 
It is important to Locke’s account that adherence to this principle serves a pragmatic 
function. This is because Locke takes the central challenge to an account of private property 
to be the tension that ostensibly exists between one’s own alleged property rights, and the 
fundamental natural right, that others have, to use the resources of the natural world for 
self-preservation. Locke suggests that an individual’s assertion and exercising of an 
exclusive right to the use a natural resource seems, initially, to contradict the obligation  
that all human have not to interfere with other peoples’ pursuit of subsistence. He says that: 
                                                     
100 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, (Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1947), pp. 133-134. 
101 Locke does make allowances here by, for instance, conceding that parents hold a temporary authority over 
their young children (Ibid., p. 147); and by permitting for the dutiful representation of the interests of mentally 
incapacitated individuals, unable to exercise reason in their condition (Ibid., p. 150). It is beyond the present 
scope to assess the merits of these peripheral scenarios. 
102 Ibid., p. 123. Invoking the notion of proprietorship in this way is a mistake on Locke’s part. In inherent 
quality of property rights is that they can be waived or transferred, but it is evident that this is now what Locke 
intends, given the position he takes on slavery. On slavery, Locke contends that “a man … cannot by compact 
or his own consent enslave himself to [anyone], nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of 
another…” (Ibid., p. 114). This demonstrates that, in whatever way a person may be master of themselves or 
their body, this mastery cannot be voluntarily transferred, and so is not proprietary. 
59 
 
 
[If] we consider natural reason, which tells us that men, being once born, have a 
right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink and such other 
things as Nature affords for their subsistence … it seems to some a very great 
difficulty how any one should ever come to have a property in anything.103 
 
 
For labour to serve as a just basis for proprietorship, then, it must be shown to facilitate 
people’s ability to justly secure their own preservation (i.e. without unduly preventing 
others from doing the same). It can be understood to achieve this function through the 
instrumental value it provides when exerted upon common objects. It is apparent that, 
within the state of nature, many objects in the commons would obviously be indispensable 
in the fulfilment of one’s self-preservation obligations. Moreover, it is also clear that, for 
the potential value of these objects to be realised, labour must be exerted upon them. 
Indeed, Locke wrote that, if we consider what portion of the value an object offers “is 
purely owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine 
hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour.”104 
 
This value which labour contributes, combined with the personal cost involved in 
performing it, is what establishes it as a just basis for the generation of private property 
rights. Since it would be generally counterproductive to a person’s pursuit of subsistence, 
for them to labour without reaping a return, the principle of assigning ownership of an 
object to the person who ‘mixed’ their labour with it, is well founded. Such a principle 
addresses the obstacle that would be presented against the preservation of life, if there was 
to develop a convention by which some people waited for others to labour, with the 
intention of using the proceeds of that labour for themselves. 
 
Freeriding would harm those who laboured, so its occurrence would naturally discourage 
people from labouring. In this way, each person would inherit the perverse incentive not to 
labour, in view of the risk of falling prey to freeloaders. Furthermore, people would be 
motivated to seek opportunities to freeload themselves. This would introduce a competitive 
component to the pursuit of the perseveration of life, which would be in clear contradiction 
to what Locke observed as the natural obligation to not, where possible, promote one’s 
preservation or subsistence at the expense of the preservation or subsistence of others. 
 
Lockean property theory therefore represents a natural law desert account. The natural fact 
                                                     
103 Ibid., p. 133. 
104 Ibid., p. 141. 
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of the value added by labour means that the people who add value deserve to benefit from 
it. Insofar as a labourer’s ability to realise such a benefit is contingent on the object of their 
labour not being used by other people, an exclusive right over that object ought to be 
guaranteed to them. That right constitutes proprietorship.   
 
Although the Lockean account can be characterised as a desert account, it is quite dissimilar 
to the naïve desert accounts considered previously. What separates Lockean theory from 
rudimentary labour accounts, like French’s and Biden’s, is a rigorous consideration of the 
characteristics of the natural commons that informs critical limitations against the freedom 
of individuals to appropriate objects from it. As is seen in Chapter 4, those limitations 
critically affect the extensibility of Lockean theory to intangible objects. 
 
3.2.3 Characteristics of the Natural Commons 
 
By the time Locke wrote about property, people had already come to question what the 
existence of a natural commons would entail, if all people were to be taken to share an 
equal claim regarding the contents within it. Two competing account had been advanced, 
which found favour in different natural law theories.105 According to one account, every 
person must be considered to have an equal negative right to extract (and use) objects from 
the commons. According to the alternative account, every person must be considered to 
have an equal positive right to extract (and use) objects from the commons. 
 
On the negative-rights view, people are entitled to extract anything from the commons, 
without limit, and to claim it as private property when they do. This operates on a strictly 
‘first-come’ basis, in that one’s right to extract from the commons is not considered to limit, 
or to be infringed by, anyone else’s extraction of objects from the commons. Therefore, if 
somebody discovered that a resource they had intended to extract from the commons had 
already been depleted, they would be owed no recourse, since they had never secured any 
right in the use of it.106 
 
The positive-rights account also contends that everyone has the right to claim private 
proprietorship over any objects they extract from the commons. Unlike the negative-rights 
account, however, it also holds that everyone has a prior right to enjoy an equal portion of 
the commons; even before they extract their portion from it. This means that, in extracting 
objects from the commons, care must be taken not to extract so much as to deny the fair 
                                                     
105 Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, England, 
1996), p. 46. 
106 Ibid. p. 45. 
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opportunity of others to extract their own share of natural resources.107 
 
Lockean theory affirms the positive-rights view of the commons.108 This view is 
conceptually more complex than the negative-rights view. This is because holding the 
positive-rights view requires a further determination to be made about how the pre-existing 
(pre-labour; pre-extraction) right to a portion of the commons should be conceptualised. 
After all, it is not immediately clear how an individual could extract objects from the 
commons and remain confident that they had only extracted the share naturally allotted to 
them. 
 
One way of conceptualising the equal positive right to a share of the commons, for instance, 
would be by regarding every person as being entitled to an equal share of each individual 
object in the commons. That is, for a population of size n, all persons would be entitled to 
an nth of every acorn, and an nth of every raindrop – and so on. Under such a system, 
however, it is hard to see that anyone could ever come to own enough of anything to be 
make any object useful at all. Locke acknowledges as much, noting that it would be utterly 
unfeasible, under such an arrangement (especially in the state of nature), to consult with 
every other claimant, and to thereby negotiate the kind of multilateral transfer of claims 
that would be needed for a person to ever own any whole object.109 
 
Instead, one might take the view that each person’s positive claim to a portion of the 
commons must manifest as a right to use whole objects. The challenge in that case, 
however, arises in determining how different whole objects are to be allocated fairly 
between different people. If one’s right to make use of the commons was to be understood 
as a right to use a specific subset of the objects within it, then it would be unclear how a 
person could determine which objects belonged to their personal subset. This would make 
it impossible for anyone to know where they could justifiably direct their labour, and thus 
also an entirely unpracticable solution. 
 
Locke resolved this difficulty by explaining that nobody has a pre-existing positive right in 
relation to any specific objects that are in the commons (either in whole or in part), but that 
they instead have, in the words of Peter Drahos, “merely the right to be included in the 
commons for the purpose of exercising the natural rights of survival and subsistence.”110 In 
this way, Locke generalised the equal positive right so that it could be understood as 
                                                     
107 Ibid., p. 46. 
108 Locke, above n 100, p. 135. 
109 Ibid. p. 117. 
110 Drahos, above n 105, p. 46. 
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affording the ability to make use of natural resources (whichever ones prove useful), as 
long as the extent of one’s use of them would not inhibit the ability of others to use the 
same resources in pursuit of the same ends. 
 
On this conception of the positive right every person has the right to access the commons 
and extract from it objects that would improve their condition. However, in making such 
use of natural resources, every person is obliged to leave enough in the commons as is 
necessary to ensure that everyone can pursue survival and subsistence with resources of 
equal quality and usefulness. This is expanded upon and made more explicit in Locke’s 
account when he introduces the first of two provisos which limit the process of property 
acquisition in different ways. 
 
3.2.4 Natural Limitations: The Two Lockean Provisos 
 
Two complimentary formulations have just been provided as to the role of labour in 
Locke’s theory of property. On one formulation, the power of labour to establish private 
property stems from the natural and exclusive self-mastery that every person enjoys. From 
this self-mastery, one derives an exclusive claim to one’s labour, which in turn can be 
mixed with objects located in the natural commons to extend an exclusive claim to those 
as well. On the second formulation, labour is what makes common resources useful, and 
so a collective regard for labour is necessary in preventing a natural free-rider problem 
from arising (which would obstruct people from fulfilling their obligations of self-
preservation and subsistence). Within this framework, however, Locke regarded one’s 
ability to employ labour towards the acquisition of private property to be fundamentally 
limited in two critical ways. These are described as two Lockean provisos. 
 
The first proviso Locke establishes in ‘Of Property’ requires that individuals, in 
appropriating common objects as private property, must leave in the commons enough of 
the resource they appropriate (and of equal quality to that which they appropriate) as might 
be needed to service the needs of any person who may also want to make use of that 
resource.111 This is known as the as good and as much proviso, and represents an explicit 
protection against any appropriation of common objects that is so extensive as to inhibit 
the ability for other people to pursue their own sustenance and self-preservation with equal 
opportunity. This proviso, in effect, represents a natural protection against the 
establishment of monopolies. 
 
                                                     
111 Locke, above n 100, p. 134. 
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Locke’s second proviso prohibits waste. This waste proviso limits property acquisition by 
prohibiting labourers from allowing the objects they have extracted from the commons to 
expire uselessly under their proprietorship. An offence against this proviso would occur, 
for example, if an individual picked fruit (and thereby removed it from the commons), but 
subsequently allowed it to rot before it was consumed. 
 
Both Lockean provisos can be justified as natural products of the dual formulations of the 
role of labour in Locke’s account. Consider, first, the ‘as good and as much’ proviso. 
According to the self-mastery component of the Lockean account, the power that labour 
has in garnering private property stems from the sovereign mastery that a person enjoys 
over themselves and their own body. The exclusive right to the use of one’s body can be 
extended, through the ‘mixing’ of labour, to objects naturally located in the commons. 
Recall, however, the difficulty which Locke encountered in determining whether the equal 
claim held by all people in relation to the commons constituted a negative or a positive 
right. The ‘as good and as much’ proviso resolves this problem, in favour of the positive-
rights account, by eliminating the potential for competing claims to arise in relation to 
objects which are in the commons. This is because, as Locke explains, whoever “leaves as 
much as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all,”112 and thus cannot 
reasonably be taken to infringe upon the equal share owed to anyone else. He gives the 
further example that: 
 
Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he 
took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench 
his first. And the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly 
the same.113 
 
 
An explanation of the ‘as good and as much’ proviso can be equally well produced with 
reference to Locke’s formulation of labour as correctly generating private property because 
of the value it adds to natural objects; and because of the role it therefore plays in enabling 
the fulfilment of self-preservation and subsistence. By identifying the obligations of self-
preservation and subsistence as mutual obligations, common to all humans, Locke 
identifies a natural basis for requiring that people not unnecessarily (or exploitatively) 
impinge upon the ability for other people to pursue those mutual ends. The ‘as good and as 
much’ proviso represents a collective embodiment of that limitation, since reciprocal 
adherence to it ensures that any strategy selected by an individual, in pursuing self-
                                                     
112 Ibid., 118. 
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preservation, is guaranteed to be compatible (i.e. non-competitive) with any possible 
combination of strategies employed by all other people engaged in the same pursuit. 
 
It is worth noting that the ‘as good and as much’ proviso represents a natural basis for 
establishing arguments for the prohibition of market phenomena like monopolies; trusts; 
and price gouging. The act of creating a monopoly (or agreeing to act in trust), to artificially 
raise the market value of objects; or the act of arbitrarily raising the market prices of base 
necessities during a state of emergency, could reasonably be perceived to represent an 
undue obstruction against one’s peers in their pursuit of self-preservation and subsistence. 
In that case, these actions would constitute natural offences on the Lockean account. 
 
In the case of the waste proviso, the two aspects of labour’s role in generating private 
property and even more intertwined. According to Locke: 
 
… he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of Nature 
as any way to alter them from the state Nature put them in, by placing any of his 
labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them; but if they perished in his 
possession without their due use – if the fruits rotted or the venison putrefied 
before he could spend it – he offended against the common law of Nature, and was 
liable to be punished: he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he had no right farther 
than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him 
conveniencies [sic] of life.114 
 
The reference in this passage to ‘offending against a neighbour’s share’ reiterates that, for 
Locke, humanity’s collective claim upon the commons is to be enjoyed equally by all. It is 
only by the usefulness that individual labour contributes, when applied to natural objects 
(which owe “ninety-nine hundredths”115 of their usefulness to labour), that labour can serve 
as a basis for the private apportionment of the commons. However, because the sole 
justificatory power that labour has in warranting private appropriation arises by appeal to 
this contribution it makes to the usefulness of objects, the neutralisation of that usefulness 
(e.g. by allowing one’s property to expire uselessly in one’s possession) would therefore 
logically invalidate the natural basis on which the proprietorship was originally justified. 
 
One may question why, on Locke’s view, waste is characterised as an offence against a 
neighbour’s share, if we are to assume that the appropriation was otherwise undertaken in 
accordance with the ‘as good and as much’ proviso. After all, waste should not affect one’s 
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neighbour, if the taking of the wasted object originally amounted to ‘the taking of nothing 
at all.’ The waste of what amounts to nothing at all should, it seems, amount to the waste 
of nothing at all. The effects of waste on third parties aside, however, the investment of 
labour represents a cost that, if conducted for nothing (because the product of the labour 
was permitted to expire uselessly), would be counterproductive to self-subsistence. On the 
Lockean view, this would be enough to constitute a natural offence. As explained in 
Chapter 4, however, the effect of waste on third parties may have a special relevance in 
relation to intangible objects. 
   
3.2.5 The Two Types of Value that Objects Can Have 
 
A final aspect of Locke’s account, which relates to the value of objects, must be considered. 
It is necessary to distinguish between two separate kinds of value that objects can have. 
These types of value shall be called natural and conventional value. The consideration of 
the difference between natural and conventional value intersects importantly with the 
Lockean waste proviso. It can be shown to critically impact the way in which a Lockean 
account, if it is to remain consistent, must regard intellectual objects (see Chapter 4). 
 
Locke considers that the objects of most value to human life are those which generally 
perish after a short time, such as fruits; meats; and other foodstuffs. He also considered that 
the value of these objects is both obvious and inherent, but that, since their value expires 
when they perish, it would be foolish and dishonest to appropriate more of them from the 
commons than one has a use for (as reflected by the waste proviso).116 At the same time, 
however, Locke suggest that a second class of objects exist (and existed in the state of 
nature), which consists of non-perishable objects. This category includes objects such as 
precious metals and gemstones. Unlike perishable items, Locke did not consider non-
perishables to have real value, but says of them that they are “things that fancy or agreement 
hath put value on, more than real use and the necessary support of life.”117 I shall refer to 
the value typically represented by perishable items as natural value; and the value 
established by agreement, in relation to non-perishables, as conventional value. 
 
Locke understood that objects of conventional value intersect uniquely with the waste 
proviso (or, rather, have no intersection with the waste proviso). Because of their non-
perishable nature, objects of conventional value never expire after they are removed from 
the commons, as so cannot expire uselessly under a labourer’s proprietorship. This also 
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makes the perpetual accumulation of more and more conventionally valuable objects not 
wasteful. 
 
Locke used this observation regarding the unique quality of conventionally valuable object 
to rationalise and account for the existence of money. On this view, a centralised currency 
– consisting of tokens of a precisely defined conventional value – would enable people to 
accumulate property of persistent value. These could then be exchanged for naturally 
valuable, whenever the token holders came to require them. This would motivate 
individuals to labour in the production of more than was immediately pertinent to their 
needs, and thereby to lead to a capital economy. It is on this basis that readers like C.B 
MacPherson interpret Locke as providing an account of the way by which the state of nature 
(wherein the Lockean provisos rightly apply) is transcended via the establishment of 
capitalist systems capable of effectively eliminating the restrictions represented by the 
Lockean provisos.118 In the next chapter, consideration is be given to the way in which IP 
regimes fit within the range of proprietary systems that are developed under such capital 
economies. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
Naïve desert accounts are often invoked in an attempt to demonstrate a natural basis for 
copyright. These accounts are aimed towards establishing labour as a basis for natural (and 
perpetual) proprietorship. However, naïve desert accounts fail to grasp how labour accounts 
of property properly function. Rather than simply dismissing such claims, this chapter 
considers whether it is possible to construct a Lockean natural law basis for copyright. 
 
Three critical components of Locke’s account have been identified. The first component is 
the conception of a natural commons of objects, to which every individual has an equal 
claim. This equal claim takes the form of a positive right; but instead of being entitled to a 
pre-defined portion of the commons (as had been previously theorised), Locke theorises 
that one’s claim upon the commons is realised through an avenue that remains equally 
available to all: labour. 
 
The role of labour in establishing private property is twofold in Locke’s theory. First, labour 
represents a natural extension of the exclusive self-mastery that individuals enjoy over 
themselves and their bodies. By metaphorically ‘mixing’ their labour with natural objects, 
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Locke contends that people can convert their self-mastery into mastery (i.e. proprietorship) 
over those objects. Second, Locke identifies labour as necessary in overcoming what is, 
essentially, a coordination problem. If an equal claim to the commons is taken to be a right 
to some material portion of the commons (prior to the application of labour), then a 
difficulty arises is discerning to whom which portion belongs. Since being unable to clearly 
and unambiguously apportion the commons fairly would inhibit the ability for each person 
to fulfil their natural obligation of self-preservation and subsistence, Locke presents labour 
as a necessary natural basis for the implementing a practicable (equal) division of the 
commons. 
 
Finally, it was shown that a Lockean natural labour account of property includes two 
constraints on the application of labour (and thus the appropriation of objects from the 
commons), in the form of two ‘Lockean provisos.’ These are the restriction against over-
extracting from the commons (i.e. the as-good-and-as-much proviso); and the restriction 
against allowing extracted objects to spoil (i.e. the waste proviso). The provisos place 
natural limits on the role of labour, and act to ensure that every person’s claim upon the 
commons remains equal, by ensuring that everybody continues to be afforded the 
opportunity to pursue their own self-preservation and subsistence. 
 
In the next chapter, it is demonstrated that the limitations posed by the Lockean provisos 
bear upon intangible objects in unique ways. Because of the underdeveloped quality of 
naïve desert accounts, this difference goes largely unappreciated in popular arguments for 
natural copyright. Nevertheless, the key consequence of this difference, which is revealed 
through the application of a rigorous labour account in relation to intangible objects, is that 
intangible objects cannot be naturally appropriated as private property. 
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Chapter 4  
Lockean Labour Theory Cannot Deliver Natural Copyright 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 described the Lockean labour account of property. The description highlighted 
that several of its key tenets are absent in less rigorous desert accounts of property. The 
purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate that those key components of the Lockean 
account preclude it from serving as the basis for natural law copyright. At most, Lockean 
social contract theory can provide an avenue for the provision of statutory copyright 
protections, but only if those protections answer to questions of social utility. 
 
A common motivation in the application of naïve desert accounts in relation with copyright 
is the notion that, if an account of labour succeeds in demonstrating that physical labour 
ought to establish natural proprietorship over physical objects, then it should be expected 
that ‘intellectual’ labour ought to establish natural proprietorship over ‘intellectual’ objects. 
Such an extension of a physical-labour account to an intellectual-labour account cannot 
succeed, however. There are two related reasons for this. 
 
First, such an extension of a physical labour account to an intellectual labour account relies 
on a common misapprehension about the nature of labour. Although it is ordinary, in 
everyday parlance, to distinguish between physical and intellectual labour, that distinction 
is merely conventional. When examined analytically, all labour is revealed to have an 
intellectual component. For this reason, a substantive conceptual distinction between 
physical labour and intellectual labour cannot be sustained. This represents an important 
challenge, since it precludes an alleged difference between the qualities of ‘physical’ and 
‘intellectual’ labour from sustaining a differentiation between instances of labour that ought 
to establish protection over a type of object (as in IP) and other instances of labour that 
ought to establish protection over a token instance of an object (as in conventional 
property). 
 
Moreover, this is indivisibility of ‘physical’ and ‘intellectual’ labour is reflected in the 
proprietary objects that labour produces. Insofar as labour produces distinct ‘physical’ and 
‘intellectual’ objects, these designations merely track (broadly) the distinct tangible or 
intangible nature of those objects. However, no appeal to a physical-intellectual labour 
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distinction is required to account for the tangible-intangible distinction. Once that 
distinction is accounted for, however, the difference between tangible and intangible 
objects can be shown to critically impact the way in which the proprietorship of those 
objects is differently affected by the Lockean provisos against monopoly and waste. 
 
The reasons that the Lockean provisos affect tangible objects differently than they affect 
intangible objects is because the provisos function on an assumption of exhaustibility. That 
is, on the Lockean account an object’s usefulness is understood to be exhausted through 
either the use of the object; or by the natural deterioration that affects unused objects over 
time. While this is true of the tangible objects with which Locke was concerned (not 
withstanding objects of purely conventional value), the usefulness of intangible objects 
does not exhaust in the same way. Section 4.4 demonstrates that, due to this 
inexhaustibility, the Lockean provisos are much more restrictive in relation to intangible 
objects than they are in relation to tangible objects. 
 
Through this chapter it is therefore demonstrated that, because of the way the Lockean 
provisos intersect with the intangible quality of ‘intellectual’ objects, natural IP rights 
cannot be established via an appeal to Lockean labour theory. Nevertheless, this is not to 
preclude a conventional (statutory) IP system from being established. It is shown in Section 
4.4 that the Lockean account provides for the development of laws via social contract (this 
being, after all, the process by which humanity was able to quit the state of nature), and a 
just IP regime can be established by exercising that option. 
 
However, Locke prescribes several principles for ensuring that the outcomes of social 
contracting are morally justifiable. By the close of the chapter it is demonstrated that 
adherence to those principles requires that the appropriate duration of copyright be 
determined as an empirical economic matter (centred on social utility acquisition). There 
are initial reasons to expect that such an economic determination shall rightly preclude 
copyright durations as extensive as those currently in place. 
 
4.2 Labour is Never a Solely Physical Process 
 
Despite the predominance of labour in various attempts to justify the institution of private 
property (not necessarily copyright), the notion of what constitutes labour is often not 
explicitly defined. This is certainly true in the case of Locke’s account, and many 
subsequent attempts to interpret it. Because he traces the origin of labour to (at least 
ostensibly) the human body, Locke is typically read as characterising labour as a physical 
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process; as being directed towards physical objects; and as thereby garnering natural 
property rights over physical things. This notion of physical labour is popularly contrasted 
with a notion of non-physical – or intellectual – labour. Indeed, if one accepts this 
interpretation of Locke, then it might be thought that an adequate way of extending the 
account to accommodate intangible objects (such as ideas) would be to provide an account 
of intellectual labour that characterises it as an intellectual process; directed at intellectual 
objects; and which garners intellectual property. 
 
It does seem initially plausible that, if people deserve to enjoy property in the physical 
objects that they labour to extract from the commons, then it must also be plausible that 
they deserve property rights over the ideas (intellectual objects) that they labour to develop. 
The success of such a view would obviously have fundamental ramifications for copyright 
theory. Such an approach cannot succeed, however, because labour in general cannot be 
divided into separate categories involving exclusively physical or exclusively intellectual 
processes. 
 
The fact that labour is never a solely physical process can be demonstrated within the 
framework of Locke’s account. This is because Locke implicitly requires that labour 
involve intention, knowledge, and planning. To illustrate this requirement, consider 
Locke’s traditional case of an individual who picks acorns from trees for later eating. 
Through this picking – by the metaphorical ‘mixing’ of their labour – the acorns have been 
made useful; turned into a convenience for the labourer to consume at any time. Similarly, 
consider that, under the pre-statutory state of nature, a person may use wood they isolated 
from the commons to construct a novel tool, such as a wheelbarrow. These are very 
ordinary cases of property acquisition for Locke. 
 
In these instances, Locke is standardly understood to be concerned with physical labour 
(i.e. the picking; the building) and physical objects (i.e. a collection of acorns; a specific 
wooden barrow). Indeed, Locke’s motivation was to justify property rights in relation to 
just these kinds of objects (and especially land). However, it must be that, even in these 
cases, the physical acts which secure property (e.g. the picking or the building) are done 
with an idea of that process – and of its rewards – held in mind. That is, a labour act is 
always an act which is intended to bring about a pre-conceived future state of affairs – for 
example, the future possession of an object of value. Without the pairing of that relevant 
propositional attitude to the act, the causal link between a physical exertion and the 
alteration of an object’s state (i.e. its extraction from the commons) is not enough to 
establish property rights over the object. 
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This can be illustrated by example: A tree climber who inadvertently shakes acorns free 
from tree branches (perhaps even without realising they have done so) cannot thereby be 
said to have property rights over those acorns. Of course, if the climber notices the fallen 
acorns, and subsequently resolves to collect them, then that act of collection would qualify 
(separately) as an act of labour. In that case, it would be the resolution to act, coupled with 
the act per se, which would mark the collecting as an instance of labour. Similarly, if the 
additional resolution was deliberately made to shake more acorns from the branches – in 
physically the same way as before – then that shaking would also qualify as labour. 
Although the person’s physical interaction with the environment would be the same both 
times, the proprietary outcomes would be different, owing to the addition of the correct 
propositional attitude. 
 
It is worth emphasising that the climber’s lack of proprietorship over the acorns, after 
incidentally dislodging them, leaves them able to be freely appropriated by others. An 
observer who saw the acorns come loose of the tree, and who understood the climber to 
have no designs upon them, would be justified in collecting them. Even though the 
observer’s exertion against the acorns (in collecting them) would be preceded by the 
climber’s exertion against the acorns (in shaking them from their branches), only the 
observer’s collection would correspond temporally with the correct propositional attitude 
to suffice in establishing proprietorship. If, after the observer had collected the acorns, the 
climber came to the realisation that it was by their climbing that the acorns had been 
removed from the tree, they could not retroactively attach a propositional attitude to the act 
of climbing (or shaking branches), to sustain a proprietary claim. 
 
What this establishes is that, for a person to perform the standard kind of labour considered 
by Locke, they must develop the correct ideational conceptualisation of the process they 
are presently engaged in. Notice that this amounts to the necessitation of the development 
of an idea, or ‘ideational object.’ Critically, however, despite the necessity of that 
accompanying idea, the proprietorship generated by labour, under Locke’s account, never 
(naturally) extends to the idea. Labouring to collect acorns establishes property in the 
collected acorns; not in the idea of collecting acorns. 
 
4.2.1 Labour and the ‘Productive Capacities’ of Intentional Agents 
 
The intellectual component involved in all labour processes has previously been 
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acknowledged in accounts of copyright and other forms of IP.119 This quality of labour has 
also served as the central justification for using labour as the basis of property in non-
Lockean accounts of property. Bryan Cwik, for example, recognises that labour, “as an 
activity, is linked with all the ways in which human beings are intentional agents.”120 He 
notes that, “in laboring, the laborer intends to bring about some end; labor is action done 
with the purpose of bringing about some change in the world,” and that a labourer 
“exercises her capacities intentionally and with forethought.”121 
 
Moreover, Cwik identifies this intentionality as the impetus for attributing property based 
on labour performed. On this, he says that: 
 
…what is distinctive about labor is that labor involves the use of individuals’ 
productive capacities, which involves decisions (potentially stretching across a 
significant chunk of an individual’s life) about how to utilize time, energy, 
resources, skills, and what opportunities to forgo, in the pursuit of ends. The more 
control individuals have over the exercise of these capacities, and the more they 
are able to benefit from their decisions, the more control they are able to have over 
significant portions of their lives, and the more they are able to live their lives in 
accord with their own freely and reflectively chosen ends.122 
 
Cwik thereby identifies IP protections as justifiable because they secure for labourers an 
important freedom and autonomy in their lives. His argument is therefore that, by using IP 
rights to expand the freedom and control labourers have in conducting their lives, as guided 
by their own values, the more those people are able to live “a free, valuable, profitable, and 
even meaningful life.”123 
 
In this way, Cwik avoids the difficulties involved in accounting for the Lockean conception 
of labour ‘mixing’ (which Robert Nozick has famously suggested ought to as easily involve 
the loss of one’s labour through its being mixed with objects one has no property in, as 
compared to establishing property rights in those things, by the act of mixing one’s labour 
with them).124 This represents an improvement over accounts in the Lockean tradition, but 
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importantly does not represent a strictly natural account of IP. For instance, Cwik 
summarises what he sees as a virtue of IP systems, by saying that they are “conducive to 
creating the economic conditions for a more liberal political society, in the old-fashioned 
Millian sense of a society that allows individuals maximum space to order their lives in 
accord with their own (freely and reflectively chosen) ends.”125 This is indeed a compelling 
function of systems like copyright – if it bears out as true. 
 
Although I take Cwik to be correct in this assessment of the function of copyright 
(especially, it might be pre-empted, with relation to second-personally communicative 
objects), it should be noted that this is effectively an empirical question that stands to be 
tested. Moreover, insofar as the efficacy of IP systems in achieving these ends can be 
assessed, they ought to be assessed over a range of possible IP arrangements. As Cwik 
acknowledges, there are important questions about the ‘level’ of protection a system like 
copyright should afford, even if there is effectively not an open question about whether 
some level of protection ought to be afforded. This plays further into the positive normative 
account developed in Section 4.4. 
 
4.3 Exhaustibility and the Lockean provisos 
 
If it is not already clear why natural proprietorship requires labour acts to contain an 
ideational component; and why natural proprietorship cannot reasonably extend to that 
ideational component of labour acts, then a consideration of the appropriate application of 
the Lockean provisos should confirm both matters. To the first point, any practicable 
application of the waste proviso must preclude physical acts from establishing 
proprietorship whenever they are not accompanied by the appropriate propositional 
attitudes. To the second point, the ‘as good and as much’ proviso naturally precludes the 
extension of private property rights to ideational components of labour. I shall consider 
each in turn. 
 
4.3.1 Waste Proviso 
 
Recall that the Lockean waste proviso prohibits the useless expiry of objects once they 
have been appropriated from the commons. Such a prohibition, in the context of a theory 
of labour which construes labour to occur any time a person interacts physically with an 
object in the commons, would have astounding implications. If labour was conceived of as 
occurring even without the accompaniment of an appropriate propositional attitude, then 
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the waste proviso would be rendered absurd. This is because it would appear impossible to 
refrain from offending against it. 
 
Given that, under such an arrangement, any exertion upon a common object would establish 
proprietorship over that object, individuals would routinely and unavoidably establish 
property rights over objects they had no intention (nor even any subsequent knowledge) of 
appropriating and owning. For example, someone who accidentally kicked an acorn mid-
stride would, thereby, unwittingly own the acorn. If the acorn (or whatever other object) 
then expired uselessly, this would constitute an offence on the part of the person who 
(unknowingly) acted upon it. It should be clear that a person’s ignorance of such an 
interaction with an object, being entirely natural and justifiable, must exempt them from 
any obligation to make use of it. 
 
This absence of obligation also follows naturally from (and is the antecedent to) there being 
no property rights derived through such unintentional exertion. Consider the previously 
described example (Section 4.2) of the tree climber who, in their ascent, unwittingly shakes 
acorns from the branches of the tree. Since it was shown that (without a second, intentional 
effort) they gained no basis to claim a right to the possession of the acorns, it must follow 
that the climber is thus not constrained by the waste proviso in relation to them. That is, it 
follows from the climber having no right to count the acorns as their possessions, that the 
climber also must not be treated as having obligations towards them qua objects ‘in their 
possession.’ It would be unjust to deny someone the right to possess an object, while 
nevertheless saddling them with the obligations that such possession would have entailed. 
 
4.3.2 ‘As Good and As Much’ Proviso 
 
If, when one laboured, the proprietorship established through that process was understood 
to extend not only to the physical object against which labour was exerted, but also to the 
ideational component (i.e. the propositional attitude) that designated that action as labour, 
then the Lockean ‘as good and as much’ proviso would also prohibit most labour. Consider 
again the typical Lockean case of collecting acorns from the commons, but under an 
interpretation in which ideas are treated as natural objects of property. In this case, the fact 
that collecting acorns is predicated on the idea of collecting acorns would mean that, 
through arriving at (or at least acting upon) that idea, an individual would naturally prevent 
their peers from being able to also justifiably pick acorns. This is because, to pick acorns, 
the first acorn collector’s peers would have to arrive at the same idea: collect acorns. This 
idea, however, having first been developed through the labour of another, would be 
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considered that person’s natural property. The unpermitted use of it would be an offence. 
 
The consequences of such a view would be dramatic, due to the ‘as good and as much’ 
proviso. The first person to pick an acorn, rather than removing that single object from the 
commons, would functionally be removing every acorn from the commons. This would be 
entirely incompatible with the mutual fulfilment of each person’s obligation towards self-
preservation and continued subsistence, since it would place too great of a restriction on 
other people’s pursuits. It would therefore be a clear violation of the ‘as good and as much’ 
proviso. 
 
This is not only true in relation to the kinds of objects Locke classically considered. The 
consequences are most obvious in relation to the kinds of objects Locke considered, since 
the logical conclusion of such a view stands in such stark contrast to the conclusions Locke 
intended. However, the consequences of such an interpretation are just as damaging in 
relation to copyright. If the ideational propositions represented in copyrightable objects 
were taken to be eligible for private appropriation as property, this would establish 
unnecessarily exclusive rights, in contravention of the ‘as good and as much’ proviso. This 
is a result of a fundamental differences in the exhaustibility of tangible and intangible 
objects, which ought to be given consideration in some depth. 
 
4.3.3 The Comparable Exhaustibility of Tangible and Intangible Objects 
 
These preclusions pertaining to the ideational component of labour are the product of a 
general difference between tangible and intangible objects. This difference becomes visible 
through an examination of the restrictions that modern copyright (as well as patent, and 
other IP) protections place on non-owners, compared to the restrictions placed on non-
owners by traditional property rights. For example, if Judy owns an acorn tree (a traditional 
instance of physical property), then she has the right to exclude Aaron from picking acorns 
from its branches. Judy’s proprietorship would not, however, grant her the right to exclude 
Aaron from growing his own acorn tree and picking its acorns. 
 
By contrast, consider a case, under modern IP law (in this case, patent law), in which Judy 
cuts down her own tree and fashions the timber into a wooden tool of her own invention – 
say, a wheelbarrow. In this case, not only would Judy have the right to exclude Aaron from 
using the wheelbarrow she made from her timber, but she could also secure the right to 
preclude Aaron from using any wheelbarrow, even if he fashioned one out of the timber of 
his own tree. By extending Judy’s proprietorship not only to the wheelbarrow, but to the 
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idea of wheelbarrows, this would function as a proprietorship over a type, rather than a 
token. If ownership over the type ‘acorns’ cannot (naturally) be established by the picking 
of a token instance of an acorn, due to its contravention of the ‘as good and as much’ 
proviso, then Judy’s ownership of her token wheelbarrow should not (naturally) establish 
an exclusive right to its corresponding type either. 
 
Although the previous example pertains to patent law, the same is true in the case of 
copyright. Under modern copyright law, if Judy pulped her tree to create paper, and then 
penned a creative work onto that paper, she would enjoy a proprietary right over not only 
the paper she made (and the markings upon it), but also over any reproductions of those 
markings (hence copy-right). Again, Judy would not only thereby own the token instance 
of the text she created; she would be extended the exclusive right to use (or even produce) 
any object of its type. From what has so far been demonstrated, this extension of 
proprietorship from token to type can be shown – in the case of both copyright and patent 
– not to be a product of natural law. 
 
This demonstration turns on the exhaustibility of tangible objects, and the comparative 
inexhaustibility of intangible objects. Consider the way it would affect Judy, if someone 
else were to cut down her tree, or collect all the acorns from it. These actions would prevent 
Judy from enjoying the free use of her tree and its products; their usefulness would have 
been exhausted by such an imposition, and they could no longer benefit Judy. Similarly, if 
Judy had fashioned either a wheelbarrow or a tangible book out of her tree, then the 
unpermitted appropriation of the wheelbarrow or the book would, for the duration of that 
appropriation, prevent Judy from employing them usefully towards her own ends. This 
demarks the exhaustibility of tangible objects; they can typically only support the ends of 
one person at one time. Objects subject to this condition have also previously been referred 
to as ‘rival goods.’126 
 
By comparison, ideational objects are intangible, and as such are not subject to the 
exhaustibility of physical objects. If a person was to recognise the value that Judy had 
realised through the ownership of her tree (through its use as a book or a wheelbarrow), 
and was thus motivated to copy the idea of planting a tree (or writing a book; or building a 
wheelbarrow), their doing so would not prevent Judy from continuing to realise the value 
of her tree or the products made from it – exactly as she had previously. This copying of 
the type ‘wheelbarrow’ or ‘book’ could only represent a natural limitation to Judy’s use of 
her own objects insofar the copying procedure required the copier to make temporary use 
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of her original token (e.g., throughout the duration of the transcription of her original text; 
or during an examination required to reverse engineer her machine), since Judy’s ability to 
use them would be restricted during that time. If the content or mechanism of an object 
could be discerned without a copier requiring direct use of the original, then the usefulness 
of the object to its original creator would not naturally be exhausted or otherwise limited 
due to its being copied by someone else. These kinds of objects can therefore be categorised 
as ‘non-rival goods.’127 
 
A consequence of this natural inexhaustibility of intangible objects is that, unlike tangible 
objects, they can simultaneously serve multiple people equally well in their pursuit of self-
preservation and subsistence. In accordance with the Lockean conception of humans as 
having a natural obligation to pursue those ends without unduly interfering with the ability 
for their peers to do the same, it would be naturally unjust to arbitrarily obstruct someone 
in their pursuit to copy an idea. Although a person would not be compelled to make their 
tangible property available for examination, if doing so would interfere with their useful 
implementation of it, any copying of an idea that does not require such examination of an 
object would be naturally unobjectionable. 
 
A response to the above account might seem apparent. It might be thought that intangible 
objects are not truly dissimilar to tangible objects in any practically relevant way, since the 
usefulness of intangibles qua marketable objects can be exhausted (or at least limited) via 
market competition. That is, one might conceive of an idea’s creator as only being able to 
derive the full value (i.e. the full usefulness) of their idea for as long as they remain the 
only person marketing it. By making simultaneous use of the idea, and bringing a 
competing product to market, a copier may exhaust (or at least limit) the value that the idea 
holds to the original labourer. The fact of this market exhaustibility (or limitation) must be 
conceded. Even traditional consequentialist arguments for copyright are motivated by 
precisely that acknowledgement; it represents exactly the free-rider problem that 
consequentialist copyright proponents endeavour to solve. 
 
Redrawing the analogy to acorns should make clear, however, that this appeal cannot 
succeed in demonstrating natural copyright. In much the same way as the creator of a book 
or a machine could most benefit from their ideas if they were afforded the exclusive right 
to market all new implementations of those ideas, the person who first arrived at the idea 
to pick acorns would have been most able to benefit from that idea if they were afforded 
the exclusive right to profit from its future implementation. Nevertheless, on a Lockean 
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account, the matter of what protections a labourer is afforded is not decided simply by 
appeal to what the labourer would prefer; it is decided based on what best promotes the 
ability for all people to mutually pursue their self-preservation and sustenance. 
 
This limitation is also present (although it is natural to describe it in different terms) in the 
labour accounts constructed by theorists such as Cwik. Cwik argues that IP rights should 
not be understood to serve primarily in excluding others from using ideas (as traditional 
property excludes people from using objects), but as reserving certain uses of ideas to those 
who produced the ideas. In the style of the response described above, Cwik intends ‘certain 
uses’ to mean commercial uses.128 He provides an illustrative example: 
Suppose … we have a forest that is so large, that no matter how many individuals 
have timber rights, the forest will never be used up. The forest is so big, that if all 
the users start logging at t, by the time they’ve cut down all trees that are standing 
at t, enough trees have regrown that there is still timber to be removed, and by the 
time those have been cut down, another swath of forest has regrown, and by the 
time that swath is cut down … and so on. In short, the sheer vastness of the forest 
ensures it will never be used up, and thus the right to remove timber will never 
lose all of its value. However, if a portion of the value of the timber rights derives 
from the fact that there is demand for timber, and thus the right to log is not just a 
usus right (that is, the right to use the forest in a certain way), but also a fructus 
right (the right to profit from that use, then the more people who have timber rights, 
the less valuable those rights will be. At some point, the timber rights will only 
have personal value: the only value having timber rights will have is the value 
derived from satisfying one’s needs for wood. All commercial value that the 
timber rights had from the potential to profit off selling wood to others who didn’t 
have the rights will be depleted.129 
 
This example is particularly useful, in connection with a consideration of Locke, because 
Cwik’s example of a functionally limitless forest is a paradigmatic case of a commons in 
which Locke would take the satisfaction of the ‘as good and as much’ proviso to be 
guaranteed. But Cwik points out that this limitlessness is only guaranteed with respect to 
personal value (or what a Lockean theorist may call natural value) rather than commercial 
value (or what a Lockean theorist may call conventional value). 
 
Although Cwik intends for a distinction to be drawn between certain use-cases of 
copyrighted or patented objects that are permissible for non-IP holders to engage in; and 
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other use-cases (commercial uses) that non-IP holders are not permitted to engage in, this 
is not a straightforward distinction to defend. This is because the commercial use of an 
object is typically realised by way of the sale of that object to purchasers who intend to use 
it to derive personal value. Therefore, the non-commercial use of objects (which Cwik 
seems to take non-IP holders not to be excluded from) can still functionally reduce the 
commercial value that objects have to IP-holders. The difficulty of this distinction arises, 
for example, in connection with the disparate (and contested) legal treatment of fan-fiction, 
compared to the legal treatment of derivative works produced by professional film studios 
(this example is also discussed in Section 6.4.1). 
 
4.3.4 The Link Between Scarcity and Commodification 
 
In understanding the essential differences between tangible and non-tangible objects, and 
the way that difference must impact their treatment under a Lockean conception of 
property, it is necessary to consider the link between scarcity and commodification. Further 
to the point made in the previous section, the objection based on an appeal to the potential 
commercial use of ideas also fails because it presupposes that intangible objects are 
naturally marketable, and proceeds to the conclusion that an agent who develops such an 
object ought to be regarded as having the (natural) sole right to market it. On the contrary, 
however, the functional importance of copyright is derived precisely from the fact that 
intangible objects are not naturally marketable commodities; copyright artificially 
establishes the market conditions that make intellectual objects commodifiable. Attempting 
to justify the mechanism that makes certain objects marketable, by appeal to the 
marketability of those objects, trivially assumes the point under contention. 
 
Moreover, to accept the presupposition of the objection is to critically misconstrue the 
essential nature of commodification. Commodity markets only develop in response to 
commodity scarcity. The reason that precious metals are valuable, for instance, is because 
they are simultaneously sought after and rare. In some cases (such as gold) the scarcity of 
a commodity is natural; there is only so much of it that can be procured. In other cases – 
for example, as infamously established by the De Beers diamond monopoly130 – a 
commodity may not be naturally scarce, but may nevertheless have its supply intentionally 
limited to produce an artificial market scarcity. 
 
Copyright involves the generation of an artificial scarcity. Because ideational objects are 
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intangible, and the implementation of intangible objects is infinitely replicable, they 
typically do not have any natural market scarcity. Rather than recognising and protecting 
the natural scarcity of ideational objects, then, copyright functions as an apparatus for 
artificially establishing a scarcity, which allows protected objects to be commodified. It 
should be noted that this is not a normative claim; it is purely a description of the effect 
copyright has. Its confusion as a normative claim would be an understandable error, 
however, since copyright today is typically implemented specifically to fulfil that function; 
it is usually understood to be either morally required or morally justified (depending on the 
strength of the normative claim) because it fulfils that function. However, copyright still 
has the effect of making intangible objects commodifiable via the establishment of artificial 
scarcity, even if that effect is incidental to the reason it is implemented. The British 
Monarch’s earliest implementation of a rudimentary copyright regime demonstrates this 
point. 
 
When the British Crown placed restrictions on the copying of text in the Seventeenth 
Century, in response to the invention of the printing press, the intended function of the 
restrictions was to secure the Crown’s control of the medium of print. This, in turn, was 
intended to allow for the censorship of seditious; blasphemous; and obscene texts. The 
purpose of copyright, at that point, had nothing to do with promoting the commodification 
of books and other writings. Nevertheless, once the restrictions were implemented, the 
printing industry became economically dependent on them. Printers objected to the repeal 
of that system because, without the Crown’s restrictions placing an artificial scarcity on 
their most profitable publications, their market value (determined by their natural scarcity) 
would become much lower. 
 
It would be natural to think that the Crown’s interference in the market was what had 
created the conditions by which book producers had become economically dependent on 
monopolies. After all, producers of books had previously fared well enough without market 
regulations; their struggles only arose in the time after the Crown imposed its restrictions. 
This, however, is to conflate the impact of the printing press with the impact of the Crown’s 
legislative response to the printing press; the former alone was sufficient to generate the 
booksellers’ historically unprecedented dependence on statutory monopolies. 
 
The printing press provided an avenue for radically overturning the previous natural 
scarcity of books and written materials. Prior to the availability of the printing press, the 
scarcity that enabled the commodification of writing was natural. Whereas the labour 
intensity involved in producing original authorial works has remained relatively consistent 
81 
 
across time, the labour intensity of copying those works has been dramatically reduced. 
The labour intensity involved in transcribing texts by hand, prior to the printing press, 
resulted in supply-side pressure that ensured books remained relatively scarce. With the 
invention of much faster, automated printing, the natural scarcity resulting from labour 
intensity had been largely overcome. 
 
Although it was not what motivated the Crown, the provision of monopoly printing rights 
to the Stationers’ Companies inadvertently substituted the then-dissolving natural scarcity 
of books with controls that established an artificial scarcity. The market conditions 
established by the Crown did not cause an economic dependence on monopolies within the 
print industry, but the revocation of those conditions prior to the Statute of Anne revealed 
that such a dependence had come to exist. 
 
4.3.5 Alternative Accounts in Lockean IP Literature 
 
In contrast to the account provided here, proponents of natural law accounts of intellectual 
property sometimes argue that, when it comes to ascertaining whether the appropriation of 
an idea would conform to or contravene Locke’s ‘as good and as much’ proviso, a different 
baseline than the one I’ve suggested ought to be used for comparing the accessibility of an 
idea before and after IP rights are assigned in relation to it. Adam Moore, for example, 
considers an increasingly complex series of potential baselines for considering whether a 
person is harmed by the creation of an object, that did not previously exist, if that person is 
subsequently excluded from accessing that object due to the applicability of IP law. 
 
Moore concludes that none of these relatively complicated baselines work. Without 
examining any of them here, I shall assume for the sake of argument that Moore’s criticism 
of each of them succeeds. Instead, Moor argues that the simplest baseline is the strongest 
and most defensible to use. He concludes: “Prior to [the] act of creation, the [object] did 
not exist, so there was no way for others to be worsened by lack of access. After [the] 
creation, others are still without access, so there has been no lessening of flourishing or 
well-being.”131 However, an examination of the “simplest of cases”132 of intellectual 
property acquisition – which initially leads Moore to this conclusion – reveals a fatal 
equivocation. 
 
Moore lays out what he describes as the ‘simplest case’ as follows: 
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After weeks of effort and numerous failures, suppose I come up with an excellent 
recipe for spicy Chinese noodles – a recipe that I keep in my mind and do not write 
down. Would anyone argue that I do not have at least some minimal moral claim 
to control the recipe? Suppose that you sample some of my noodles and desire to 
purchase the recipe. Is there anything morally suspicious with an agreement 
between us that grants you a limited right to use my recipe provided that you do 
not disclose the process? Alas, you did not have to agree to my terms, and no 
matter how tasty the noodles, you could eat something else.133 
 
Again, Moore’s argument is that, since the noodle recipe did not exist prior to his creation 
of it, his interlocuter is not harmed by the recipe becoming the object of (intellectual) 
proprietorship, since it is not less accessible under proprietorship than it was when it did 
not exist. This argument turns, however, on an equivocation of the word ‘access.’ This is 
revealed by considering that, although Moore suggests that the recipe was inaccessible 
prior to its creation, that exercise in creation inherently was an act of access. We know from 
the very fact that Moore now has access to the recipe, when it did not previously exist, that 
the non-existence of the recipe did not render it inaccessible. 
 
A distinction must therefore be drawn between what might be called discoverable access 
(involving, for example, ‘weeks of effort and numerous failures’) and what can be called 
teachable access (involving, for example, being told or seeing how to do something). 
Moore’s interlocutor might not have had teachable access to Moore’s recipe, but Moore 
provides no reason to think that his interlocutor would not also have been able to access 
the recipe via discovery. Despite this, intellectual property regimes preclude access to 
objects in a way that also denies subsequent individuals the same opportunity to discover 
the same objects independently. 
 
This should inform an analysis of Moore’s ostensibly rhetorical question as to who would 
deny the inventor of a recipe “at least some minimal” claim over control of that recipe. 
Specifically, even if we concede the claim that everyone would grant some such minimal 
control (which is contestable), by no means would this suggest that the minimum 
guarantees that Moore has in mind would be ones that anyone else would affirm. As 
demonstrated above, Moore appears to consider the appropriate minimum to involve the 
natural right of an inventor to restrict another person’s discoverable access to that recipe. 
But a much more minimalistic claim of control can be articulated. Rather than the positive 
right to exclude others from discoverable access, as Moore proposes, it is an improvement 
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to conceive of an inventor’s natural right as a negative right that protects them against 
having to explicate their invention; it is a right to refuse teachable access. 
 
On this more minimal account, I would not be able to compel Moore to divulge his recipe 
after I sampled it. After all, this would amount to me making a demand on Moore’s time, 
and would involve me compelling him to exert effort for my gain. However, if Moore 
generously agreed to share the recipe – or if he proffered the recipe unsolicited – then this 
would not (as it should not) establish for him the natural right to exclude me from pursuing 
the same object. To preclude me in this way would make me worse off than when I could 
pursue the same object (possibly through weeks of effort and multiple failures). 
 
Breakey makes a similar point when he criticises the inconsistency that he identifies in 
Lysander Spooner’s absolutism regarding private property, and Spooner’s simultaneous 
advocation for strong intellectual property rights. Breakey identifies Spooner as 
maintaining the claim that, in relation to conventional tangible property, “if I create wealth 
on someone else’s property then they – and not I – have rights to that wealth”134 on the 
basis that one must not be able to foist duties or obligations onto others through uninvited 
actions. On Spooner’s view, for example, if a person tills (and thereby improves) their 
neighbour’s farmland; but tills when the tilling was never requested, then that act of tilling 
establishes no right for that person in any of the future products of the land, nor obligates 
the owner towards the tiller in any way. Breakey contends that this is inconsistent with 
Spooner’s view on intellectual property, since Spooner permits, in effect, that property be 
established on an idea not only when it resides in their own mind (their own property) but 
also when it resides in the minds of others.135 
 
Breakey also defeats a separate line of argument that some authors mount in favour of the 
claim that the Lockean ‘as good and as much’ proviso does not prohibit the natural 
appropriation of ideas as property in the way I have suggested here. These authors suggest 
that the proprietary appropriation of ideas does not contravene Locke’s proviso because, 
even though such appropriation prohibits other people from using those ideas, it 
nevertheless leaves them in a position where they are free to make abundant use of other 
ideas that are equally capable of advancing their condition. Breaky identifies this line of 
argument as ostensibly parallel to an argumentative manoeuvre that is used to justify the 
appropriation of conventional property where that property is finite (and of which 
appropriators therefore cannot leave ‘as good and as much’). For example, although there 
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may have been a plentiful supply of land from the perspective of those living in the initial 
state of nature, such that their securing of private lots would have appeared to leave plenty 
in common, that is clearly not the case today. From the modern perspective land is scarce, 
and the prior appropriation of lots has rendered others without access. This observation of 
this ostensible failure in relation to the Lockean proviso is often answered with the claim 
that, although land has been made scarce through private appropriation, the way the land 
has been employed by earlier appropriators has given rise to an economic environment that 
offers people (however unable to appropriate land) a far more enviable access to resources 
by which they can better themselves than would have been possible of the appropriation of 
land had never been permitted.136 
 
Breakey demonstrates that this line of reasoning fails in relation to intellectual property 
because, rather than functioning analogously to the land-ownership (and other tangible 
property) case, the permission of strong natural proprietary rights over ideas directly 
interferes with the success of that same initial argument in relation to tangible property. 
This is because, as Breakey argues, the success of the argument in relation to the 
appropriation of land and other physical objects only succeeds on the basis that “greater 
technology, knowledge and know-how make each person’s limited physical resources 
enormously more productive and efficient,” and that “the development and distribution of 
substantial intellectual resources (ideas and information) grants people assets allowing 
them to make a living in modern market economies.”137 Therefore, if these ideas and 
technologies can also be exclusively appropriated at the same time as land and other limited 
tangibles, then this undercuts the basis on which the appropriation of land and other limited 
tangibles was to be permitted in the first place.138 
 
4.4 A Positive Normative Account Via Locke 
 
4.4.1 Natural Limitation on Monopolies 
 
The Lockean account of property should be understood, fundamentally, as an attempt to 
demonstrate natural law restrictions against monopolies. Locke begins ‘Of Property’ by 
highlighting an apparent incongruity between the notion that all the natural objects of the 
world ought to be taken to ‘belong’ to all humans to make use of ‘in common;’ and the 
need to privately appropriate those objects before they can be useful.139 The project Locke 
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subsequently undertakes is therefore to demonstrate a way by which people can justifiably 
appropriate common objects as private property, without offending against their peers’ 
natural claims upon the same objects. While Locke identifies labour as the means to 
achieving that end, he establishes the two Lockean provisos as mandatory constraints upon 
the labour process. 
 
The ‘as good and as much’ proviso, especially, functions as a natural provision against the 
monopoly control of natural resources. For Locke, labour succeeds as a basis for 
establishing property because of the usefulness that it places upon common objects. If, 
however, an act of labour was useful to the labourer only because it established a monopoly 
which they could exploit (at the expense of their peers, who naturally enjoy a common 
claim over the same objects), then that act would constitute an offence against natural law. 
Rather than representing the avenue by which humanity could make collective use of the 
objects in the commons, the establishment of monopolies would represent an obstruction 
against that end. 
 
The main achievement of Locke’s property account is typically taken to be the 
demonstration that labour is an appropriate basis by which to establish private property. It 
is more instructive, however, to recognise Locke’s primary achievement in ‘On Property’ 
as being the preservation of humanity’s collective claim upon the commons, despite the 
pragmatic necessity of private appropriation. This achievement is made, in significant part, 
through the demonstration of natural prohibitions against monopolies. Perceived this way, 
the prima facie expectation that an extension of Lockean theory to intangible objects should 
demonstrate that intellectual labour ought to establish intellectual property (as a parallel to 
the way in which physical labour establishes physical property) is unreasonable. Instead, 
given that institutions such as copyright are already understood to function via the 
establishment of monopolies, and Lockean property theory functions as a demonstration of 
natural limitations against monopolies, one’s initial expectation ought to be that a Lockean 
conception of property is not a natural fit for the justification of copyright. Lockean theory 
is essentially aimed at preventing the establishment of monopolies, while copyright is 
essentially aimed at establishing monopoles. Therefore, Lockean theory might initially be 
expected to preclude copyright. 
 
 
4.4.2 Copyright via Social Contracting 
 
There is, however, an avenue towards copyright that is available within Lockean theory. 
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Within his broader political philosophical account, Locke details the way by which 
individuals could exit the state of nature through the formation of societies. This would 
involve a process of social contracting, by which the mutual waiver of some natural 
individualistic rights would be negotiated, for the mutual benefit of a society’s members. 
 
Locke held unequivocally that, as a natural fact, all people begin their existence both free 
and equal, in that each person has the same right not to be “subject to the will or authority 
of any other man.”140 Indeed, on the Lockean account it is precisely this perfect authority 
over oneself that gives way to one’s ability to appropriate common objects through the 
application of labour.141 Yet, despite this, Locke also acknowledged that individuals could 
ethically leave this condition and make social agreements in order to establish 
communities, even where those communities were hierarchical and involved members 
submitting to an external authority. More than this, Locke considered people to have good 
reason to do so.142 
 
In his chapter ‘Of the Ends of Political Society and Government,’ Locke raises the question 
of why a person would voluntarily “part with his freedom … and subject himself to the 
dominion and control of any other power”143 to participate in a society. The answer he 
provides is that: 
 
… the enjoyment of the property he has in this state [of freedom] is very unsafe, 
very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, 
is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out 
and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind 
to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates …144 
 
The essential idea expressed here is that, although all persons hold a genuine moral claim 
to certain entitlements, so long as ethically unscrupulous individuals refuse to heed others’ 
rights, those rights are of little practical use within the state of nature. Rights and freedoms 
are only valuable to us insofar as we can realise them. For this reason, it would be 
reasonable for a person to limit or entirely surrender some of their natural rights if doing 
so would enable them to bolster their ability to benefit in other ways. This option becomes 
increasingly attractive the higher the chance that one would not otherwise be able to realise 
the rights being forfeited. 
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The same premise can be used to explain why the members of a group, having made 
agreeable concessions to become a society, would then agree to comply with further social 
contracts and thereby establish a system of copyright protection. If the waiver of one’s 
natural right to the unlimited use of certain inexhaustible objects (in this case, certain ideas) 
could be shown to be more beneficial to self-preservation and subsistence than one’s 
assertion of that right, one would have good reason to contract the right away. Moreover, 
if that arrangement would be mutually beneficial, and therefore equally agreeable to all the 
members of a society, then the statutory provision of a copyright regime could justifiably 
be implemented to effect it. 
 
The framework that this establishes for the provision of copyright clearly approximates the 
consequentialist social-utility account. It is here that the link between scarcity and 
commodification (described in Section 4.3.4) takes on a normative component. This is 
because, for the implementation of copyright via social contract to be sensible, the 
establishment of a system of monopolies must be shown to have some mutually beneficial 
effect that would persuade the contractors to agree to it – and the standard argument offered 
for how copyright provides such a benefit regards the incentivisation that is generated 
through the artificial establishment of scarcity. 
 
On this view, the fundamental function of copyright is to resolve what can be characterised 
as a scarcity paradox. Ideational objects are naturally scarce insofar as, before they are 
created, they do not exist at all. Once they are created, however, they are often able to be 
replicated with such a degree of ease that they subsequently retain almost no natural 
scarcity. While this is not problematic in most cases (such as in the case of the idea to pick 
acorns), it importantly intersects with two interconnected processes, which I shall call 
production and reproduction. These concepts are critical to an understanding of the 
function of copyright and other IP systems, because reproduction represents an especially 
efficient means of procuring value (and increasing social utility), that is dependent on the 
much more arduous process of original production. 
 
4.4.3 The Social Importance of Production and Reproduction 
 
‘Production’ and ‘reproduction’ are related processes that play a critical role in social 
anthropological development. Due to the social utility that they contribute, consideration 
of these processes should be central in social contract negotiations regarding copyright. 
Within that negotiation it is important to have a clear conception of what production and 
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reproduction are, and how they relate. 
 
Production as it is used here is a portmanteau term referring to the original creation of an 
object. These objects can be categorised variously, depending on the medium in which they 
are formed: e.g. inventions, literature, artwork, music, and so on. These are instances of 
intellectual content – various ideas and thoughts – that are generated and applied (in a 
tangible form) for the first time.145 People who perform production also enjoy a similarly 
diverse array of titles: e.g. inventors, designers, authors, composers, and artists. In more 
quotidian examples of production, however, a producer may receive no specific honorific 
descriptor (as in the case of menial labourers). 
 
Reproduction, by comparison, is the process of implementing intellectual content that 
already exists into new tangible instances. In this way, each new implementation generates 
a discrete token of the same type. For example, I own a reproduction of Tolstoy’s War and 
Peace, published in London by Random House. It is heavy and thick, and I can hold it in 
my hands – and it is my property. Also counted among my property is a reproduction of 
one of Sony Corporation’s smartphones, manufactured by Sony or under contract to Sony. 
These reproductions are my property, and yet are naturally described as being Tolstoy’s and 
Sony’s. This attribution persists because the objects reproduce intellectual content that was 
originally produced by Tolstoy and Sony (notice the similarity between this ownership-
attribution distinction and the case of ‘owning’ the opinions of Supreme Court Justices, as 
considered in Wheaton v Peters (1834) and discussed in Section 2.4.4). 
 
The combined social role of production and reproduction is central in human development 
and flourishing, since reproduction allows for individuals to benefit from the achievements 
of their peers, rather than only from their own direct contributions to their self-preservation 
and sustenance. This is the basic observation which underlies the standard consequentialist 
justification of statutory IP protections. For instance, various medicines, while critically 
beneficial to the individuals who use them, would nevertheless be prohibitively expensive 
(in terms of labour or money) for the specific people who need it to produce by themselves. 
In cases where the development is feasible, those who stand to benefit from a medicine’s 
production are rarely the same people who are best equipped to successfully achieve its 
production. One of the benefits of exiting the state of nature and entering a society is the 
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division of labour, and reproduction is essential for that to be possible.  
 
At the same time, however, once a medicine is produced, it typically requires only a 
comparatively low level of investment to make reproductions of it. That means that it would 
be personally worthwhile for many people to pursue the reproduction (or, more practically, 
to purchase reproductions from commercial reproducers), and the social utility of that 
reproduction would be significant. Under natural conditions, however, the opportunity to 
engage in the reproduction of complex but socially beneficial objects like medicines is rare, 
because the process of original production (on which reproduction is inherently contingent) 
is not anticipated to be rewarding enough to undertake. 
 
One contractual solution to this problem is to generate an incentive to engage in production 
through the agreement by non-producers to waive their natural right to subsequently make 
reproductions of those productions. By securing to producers the (artificial) exclusive right 
to make reproductions of their productions, it is possible to allow creators to recoup their 
investment costs by selling reproductions at a price that cannot be undercut by competitors 
(who would otherwise only need to recoup reproduction costs; not the much higher 
production costs). In this way, potential producers are given the ability to promote their 
own self-preservation by means of production, and other members of society are 
advantaged in their pursuit of self-preservation through the access provided to objects that 
would not otherwise have been produced. 
 
Although the example of medicine has been used here to demonstrate the social importance 
of production and reproduction, which should be understood as pertinent to patent 
protections rather than copyright, the same demonstration can be constructed in relation to 
copyrightable objects like literature. Insofar as printed literature has potential social value, 
either for its informative or entertaining qualities, the ability to reproduce pieces of 
literature that were created by other people is essential in realising that potential value. 
Because the original authorship is a much more demanding process than the mechanical 
reproduction of (pre-existing) literature on a press, realising a worthwhile return from 
authorship could be prohibitively difficult if the only benefit an authored object provided 
to an author was the direct natural value it offered through use (e.g. the entertainment a 
novel provides). If the author could also sell copies of their production, then the return on 
labour could sufficiently promote an author’s self-preservation and subsistence to motivate 
them to produce, and then society more broadly could also realise the value of the authorial 
objects produced; but without a system of copyright in place, the ability to realise sufficient 
returns could be easily undercut by other reproducers who have much lower overhead costs 
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to cover. 
 
Notably, this equivalence between medicine and literature presents a challenge to existing 
conceptions of copyright (and IP more broadly). This is because, given that the same 
analysis applies equally to both patentable and copyrightable objects, it is not immediately 
clear why distinct regimes are necessary to facilitate the production of different objects. A 
purely economic theory of IP, based only on this incentivisation account, seems compatible 
with a single regime under which presently copyrightable and patentable objects are both 
afforded the same protections. I return to this issue in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.4 Only Conventional Copyright 
 
It should now be clear that the conception of copyright that is delivered through the 
application of Lockean property theory to intangible objects is far removed from the 
conception of natural (and perhaps perpetual) copyright that advocates of naïve desert 
accounts typically seek to establish. Rather than establishing a natural basis for economic 
copyright, Lockean property theory represents a natural basis for the prohibition of the 
monopolies copyright produces. Fortunately for copyright proponents, Locke nevertheless 
provides an avenue towards conventional (i.e. statutory) copyright; however, this should 
be expected to be socially contracted based on the provision of a mutual benefit that 
copyright provides. Determining what contract ought to be negotiated (i.e., what contract 
would be most socially beneficial) is a largely economic, rather than predominantly 
philosophical matter. As such, I do not attempt to answer that question in this thesis, but a 
common economic proposal is that the socially optimal form of copyright would provide 
exclusive rights to authors for somewhere in the region of 15 to 25 years.146 
 
It should be noted that the contracting of socially valuable provisions does not necessarily 
need to be restricted to a consideration of the values conventionally used to justify statutory 
property provisions. For example, a society could mutually contract towards protections 
that were anticipated to maximise the space that its members would have to order their lives 
in accord with their own free ends – per Cwik’s assessment of the appropriate function of 
IP. In this way, the contractual process does involve the philosophical task of assessing 
which are the appropriate values for a contract to pursue. However, it is important to note 
that even in this case, an empirical economic analysis would be necessary for determining 
what set of protections (and durations of protection, and so forth) would best promote that 
end. 
                                                     
146 See, for example: Productivity Commission, above n 95. 
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A final challenge to this interpretation of Locke, in response to the characterisation of the 
copyright it delivers as ‘conventional,’ is worth considering. In the previous chapter 
(Section 3.2.5) it was shown that Locke takes there to be a difference between objects that 
have ‘real’ value, and objects which “fancy or agreement”147 place value on. I characterised 
these as ‘naturally’ or ‘conventionally’ valuable objects, respectively. In view of the 
account given here, the value of copyrightable objects, being the product of an artificial 
scarcity that is established through social contracting, is clearly a value generated by 
agreement. If Locke so clearly prohibits natural copyright, an only provides and avenue to 
conventional copyright, then it might be thought that we must conceive of copyrightable 
objects as providing conventional and not natural value. 
 
The practical difference between naturally and conventionally valuable objects (as shown 
in Chapter 3) is the way in which they are affected by the Lockean waste proviso. In relation 
to naturally valuable objects, Locke contends that people should not extract more from the 
commons than they have a perceptible use for, since by extracting the object and not using 
it, they infringe the common claim upon that object unnecessarily (as it does not serve self-
preservation of subsistence). However, because Locke regards conventionally valuable 
object as inexhaustible, he characterises them as being exempt from this restriction. He 
considers the private appropriation of conventionally valuable objects to be justifiable, 
even when no immediate use for them is apparent, because they represent a store of value 
which can always be realised in the future. It has been argued that Locke therefore places 
no restriction on the accumulation of stored wealth (and thus provides for the existence of 
capital).148 
 
By characterising copyright as a form of conventional property, then, it might be thought 
that the accumulation of property in copyright should not be limited; it should always 
represent a potential source of value to copyright holders. This would suggest the notion of 
perpetual copyright terms. The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it assumes 
that conventionally valuable objects are not also naturally valuable objects. On the contrary, 
in accordance with the theory of socially contracted IP regimes, copyright is implemented 
to place a conventional value on certain objects (to incentivise their creation) because of 
the natural value (i.e. social utility) they stand to provide. The conventional value that 
copyright places on objects cannot justifiably be taken to supersede the imperative to 
minimise restrictions against the free use of an object’s natural value. 
                                                     
147 Locke, above n 100, p. 144. 
148 Macpherson, above n 118. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 3 it was suggested that a reasonable person might think it intuitive that, if a 
labour account of property successfully demonstrates that physical labour correctly 
establishes natural property rights in relation to physical objects, then the same account 
might also demonstrate that intellectual labour correctly establishes natural intellectual 
property. It has been shown that this extension fails, however, because although a 
delineation could be made between physical labour and non-physical labour, this is not the 
same as a delineation between physical labour and intellectual labour (since all labour, 
physical and non-physical, contains an intellectual component).149 Instead, a more 
appropriate initial expectation would be that, if a rigorous labour account establishes 
natural restrictions against the monopolisation of tangible objects, then its application to 
intangible objects will likely establish natural restrictions against monopolising those as 
well. Indeed, this was shown to be the consequence of extending the Lockean labour 
account. 
 
Nevertheless, it was also shown that the Lockean account is not incompatible with 
copyright, even though copyright involves the provision of monopolies. Locke’s broader 
social contract theory presents a means by which members of a society, having exited the 
state of nature, can negotiate a mutually beneficial system of copyright. This mutual 
beneficence is important, however. Being a product of agreement, rather than a product of 
natural law, such a system of copyright can only be justified based on the social utility it 
provides. In accordance with a rigorous natural-law labour account of property, then, the 
matter of how to optimally structure a copyright regime becomes an economic question. 
Particularly, the determination of how long economic copyright should last ought to be 
made by calculating the duration that would generate the greatest social utility. 
  
                                                     
149 It is worth noting that non-physical labour, without an accompanying instance of physical labour, cannot 
establish copyright, since physical action is ultimately required to fix an idea in a tangible medium. For this 
reason, ‘purely’ intellectual labour, which does not involve a physical process, is not considered any further. 
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Chapter 5  
Moral Rights: A Natural Law Component of Copyright 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, a defensible Lockean conception of property 
cannot sustain a justification of economic copyright based on natural law. Instead, 
economic copyright must be derived via convention, through a process of social 
contracting. It follows that economic copyright must be statutory; and that it is justifiable 
only insofar as it provides social utility. 
 
Although this account of copyright is correct, it is not complete. This is because, properly 
understood, copyright contains a non-economic component which must be recognised in 
conjunction with any economic protections that a society extends to creators. This 
component regards such entitlements as the right to have one’s name attributed to one’s 
work; to not have one’s name falsely attributed to the work of others; and to have copies 
of one’s work (where copies are permitted) to be reproduced with fidelity. Moreover, 
whereas economic copyright can only ever be statutory, non-economic copyright is a 
product of natural law. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline an initial account of the appropriate natural, non-
economic rights that creators have. This account draws heavily on the notion of droits 
moral, or ‘moral rights.’ Such an appeal to moral rights is common within academic 
philosophical accounts of copyright.150 Despite the previous consideration that has been 
given to moral rights within academic accounts of copyright, however, their role remains 
contested. Similarly, although moral rights are represented at law, the formulation and 
application of the legislation is often misguided and confused.  
 
The approach taken here, to help resolve the contestation surrounding moral rights, 
involves the consideration of a case study that features Nature Publishing Group. The 
consideration of this case is intended to highlight a category error that is common within 
treatments of moral rights, and which occurs whenever offences against moral rights are 
treated as property offences. Instead, as the analysis of the case demonstrates, moral rights 
                                                     
150 Stephanie Plamondin Bair provides an informative overview of the contention surrounding the role of moral 
rights, within academic copyright literature. See: Stephanie Plamondon Bair ‘‘Rational Faith: The Utility of 
Fairness in Copyright’ (2017) 97 Boston University Law Review, 1487. 
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offences must be categorised as deception offences. This analysis and argument forms a re-
edited version of work I first presented in ‘‘IP’ Moral Rights Breaches are Deception 
Offences, Not Property Offences: Correcting a Category Error.’151 Repairing this 
conception better enables the understanding of the appropriate relationship between moral 
rights and economic copyright. Ultimately, this is necessary for understanding moral rights 
as natural rights, and thus for developing a complete philosophical account of copyright. 
 
This clarification of what moral rights are, and of how they relate to (and intersect with) 
economic property rights, shall be instrumental in subsequent chapters. Chapter 6 describes 
the problem of defining copyright’s scope; it highlights that a non-physical basis is required 
to define what ought to be copyrightable. Chapter 7 contends with that problem by 
describing the non-physical quality that ought to be used as the basis for determining 
copyright eligibility (briefly: that copyrightable objects are a unique kind of communicative 
object). Finally, in Chapter 8 it is explained that existing moral rights accounts represent 
rudimentary attempts to track the unique defining quality of copyrightable objects 
identified in Chapter 7. Moral rights legislation can therefore be reformulated, in view of 
the account constructed across Chapters 6 and 7, to better inform the legal scope of 
copyright. 
 
5.2 Moral Rights Are Not Property Rights 
 
5.2.1 The Case of Nature Publishing Group 
 
Nature Publishing Group (henceforth NPG), publishers of a number of prominent journals, 
including Nature and Scientific American, attracted criticism in March of 2014 in regard to 
changes it made to requirements enforced upon authors wishing to publish in the 
organisation’s journals.152 The controversy surrounded, at least in significant part, the 
requirement for authors to forgo any moral rights (in connection with copyright) that they 
might have in relation to their publishable work. The relevant clause of their licensing 
agreement, in its original form, read: 
 
7. The Author(s) hereby waive or agree not to assert (where such waiver is not 
possible at law) any and all moral rights they may now or in the future hold in 
connection with the Contribution and the Supplementary Information.153 
                                                     
151 McKeahnie, above n 119. 
152 Kevin Smith, ‘Attacking Academic Values’ on Scholarly Communications @ Duke (27 March 2014) 
<https://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2014/03/27/attacking-academic-values/>. 
153 Macmillan Publishers Limited, License to Publish (2013) 
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In late 2014, presumably in response to the controversy, the clause was revised to read: 
 
7. The Author(s) grant NPG the perpetual right to edit, correct, or retract the 
Contribution and Supplementary Information if NPG considers (in its reasonable 
opinion) that such actions are required. The Author(s) hereby agree that they shall 
not object to NPG carrying out any such actions.154 
 
Although the explicit reference to ‘moral rights’ was removed, the revised clause remains 
functionally equivalent to the previous version; it does not clearly alter or reduce the 
demands made of authors. As explained in further detail below, moral rights protect against 
the editing or alteration of a work where that alteration is not conducted in consultation 
with, and finally approved by, the original author of the work. This makes the premeditated 
non-assertion of the right to that process of consultation and approval, through the pre-
commitment to not object to edits and alterations made to one’s work, functionally a waiver 
of one’s moral rights. 
 
Such a requirement therefore raises significant questions about the nature of moral rights, 
and points to a common category error that is made when moral rights are conceived of as 
property rights. Moral rights are currently recognised as a component of copyright law and 
are thereby legally understood to be intellectual property rights. Although moral rights 
intersect with statutory property rights, they in themselves are natural, non-proprietary 
rights. Whereas property rights are the domain of offences of theft, the claim advanced here 
is that moral rights offences are acts of deception; specific species of fraud. 
 
This category error can be seen by considering the language of NPG’s original licensing 
clause; the criticism it sparked; and the response to that criticism from NPG. The clause 
can be seen to be making an incoherent request of authors, since the truth of an author’s 
having authored a work is a natural artefact that cannot be modified via fiat. It is therefore 
incorrect of NPG to regard moral rights, which protect individuals against deceptive 
practices, as rights that are alienable or waivable. Although this is one important 
consequence of correcting the category error observed, the NPG example is an instance of 
a more widely pervasive, even systematic, misconception about the nature of copyright. 
The consequences of the category error, and the implications of recognising and correcting 
it, hold material importance to a range of contemporary issues. 
                                                     
<https://www.nature.com/licenceforms/npg/mplltp.pdf>. 
154 Macmillan Publishers Limited, License to Publish (2014) 
<https://www.nature.com/licenceforms/npg/mplltp.pdf>. 
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5.2.2 The False Reduction of Deception to Theft 
 
As explained in Section 4.4, an essential role of statutory property law is to solve free-rider 
problems. The economic implications of the social value of production (and reproduction) 
are quite straightforward and well documented: the heavily concentrated individual 
investment by a single producer can ultimately result in a product that, being easy to 
reproduce, provides an advantage that is shared between the producer and subsequent 
reproducers. Because the initial investment cost is borne individually, however, while the 
advantages of the product are dispersed (rather than concentrated towards the initial 
investor), there is a natural disincentive to undertake investments which otherwise stand to 
return exceptional social value. This gives rise to social utility arguments for the 
introduction of statutory property rights like copyright and patent. 
 
One consequence of the implementation of these statutory responses (e.g. copyright and 
patent) to free-rider problems, however, is that some individuals become motivated to 
falsify claims about who produced certain objects. Given that copyright and patent systems 
afford producers (and only producers) the opportunity to exercise property rights over what 
they create, the acceptance of falsified claims would unfairly preclude genuine producers 
from effecting those property rights. Because such falsification affects an original 
producer’s ability to claim property rights (the option having been ‘stolen’ from them), the 
falsifier’s offence has the guise of being a property offence: theft. This categorisation is 
mistaken, however; and the mistake that is made in this instance is one that lies at the heart 
of a broader error committed in the categorisation of moral rights breaches as property 
offences. 
 
It is true that a (statutory) property offence occurs in the type of situation described above, 
provided that a framework of statutory law is in place to make unauthorised reproduction 
unlawful (which copyright and patent do). But it is also indisputable that the property 
offence committed, being based on the false claim of production, is facilitated by a 
deception. Moreover, this deception constitutes an offence prior to, and independent of, the 
property offence. This is not always obvious, and where the final consequence of the 
deception is economic in nature, the distinction may ultimately seem trivial. This makes 
the conflation of the deception and the property offences a simple error to commit. 
 
Unfortunately, this conflation has harmful social consequences. A range of these 
consequences can be evidenced through the consideration of three closely related instances 
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of deception: 
1) equivalent instances of deception after the expiration of statutory protections, 
under modern standards; 
2) equivalent instances of deception where statutory property provisions were 
never in place; and 
3) equivalent instances of deception in which any non-proprietary ends are 
facilitated. 
What makes these closely related is that deception after the expiration of statutory 
protections (case one) are functionally equivalent to deceptions where those protections 
were never in place at all (case two); and both of those cases involve deception intended to 
facilitate an end that is necessarily non-proprietary in nature (case three). Each is 
nevertheless worth considering in turn. 
 
An example of deception committed to facilitate statutory theft would be a case in which a 
person copies the text of a book and sells reproductions of it, while claiming to be its author. 
Ordinarily, this would be done to profit in an environment where statutory copyright law 
reserves the right to profit in that way to someone else: the genuine author. But copyright 
is limited to a fixed term, after which a text enters the public domain and can be reproduced 
freely. Suppose, then, that an individual rediscovered a long lost and forgotten, yet literarily 
important, piece of writing – perhaps a lost work of Tolstoy’s. Further, suppose that the 
finder of this text transcribed and reproduced it; claimed to be its original author; and then 
distributed the copies they had made. We can even imagine that they did this in the 
knowledge that they would not realise a monetary return; willingly absorbing the 
reproduction and distribution costs at a personal financial loss. Having been published so 
long ago, the lost text would no longer be protected by property law as the law exists today. 
In addition, the reproducer would be demonstrating no economic motivation for the 
deception. Nevertheless, such a deception would still be an offence against Tolstoy, and all 
readers. 
 
Furthermore, we might imagine a different case involving a jurisdiction in which there is 
no legal prohibition against third-party reproduction of a living author’s work. In this case, 
the act of unpermitted reproduction would never constitute a property offence; and yet the 
act of dishonestly presenting such reproductions as one’s own productions (rather than as 
reproductions) would still be objectionable. This case reveals that this objectionableness 
must arise from a non-proprietary fact.  
 
Such a deception also does not transition into a property offence simply due to the 
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introduction of statutory property protections. Within the current statutory environment, 
several deception cases of this kind are routinely dealt with outside of the property-centric 
mechanisms of copyright law. There are two major, antecedent classes of such 
misrepresentations: plagiarism and forgery. Plagiarism occurs whenever an offender claims 
to be the producer of something to which they are only a reproducer; while forgery occurs 
whenever an offender claims that something they produced was produced by someone else. 
 
An example of such a deception that is not ordinarily penalised via the mechanisms of 
property law, is an act of academic plagiarism at the undergraduate level: a student 
reproduces another person’s essay, attempting to represent it as their own production, to 
satisfy an assessment requirement and receive a qualification. Such an offence is 
considered by universities to be serious misconduct, bearing severe penalties. However, 
undergraduate plagiarism is rarely dealt with in the manner of a property offence. This is 
notably dissimilar to the quite comparable example of collegial reproduction within a 
university, whereby a member of staff reproduces a marketable object that a colleague has 
developed, and then represents it as their own invention for the purpose of patenting it. One 
would certainly expect this latter crime to be addressed as a property offence. 
 
The dissimilar treatment of the undergraduate plagiarist and the collegial defrauder is 
motivated by pragmatism, rather than principle. Because the economic interests of an 
author whose work is plagiarised by an undergraduate student is rarely compromised as a 
result, the plagiarism is not pursued as an economic (i.e. proprietary) offence. Although a 
case can certainly be made for the fact that the original author is in some way harmed by 
the plagiarism (it is worth noting that the author should have the option to initiate action 
against the plagiarist), the harm against them must affect something like their reputation or 
agency, rather than their proprietary interests. Indeed, the institution conferring the 
qualification (which is the direct target of the deception); and the public who would 
subsequently recognise the degree as legitimate (and who would thereby be deceived in 
turn), are perhaps more clearly identifiable victims of the offence. This explains why the 
initiation of proceedings against undergraduate plagiarists, although they could potentially 
be initiated by the original author, are ordinarily initiated by the institutions themselves. 
Such proceedings are (rightly) not contingent on the participation of the original author at 
all. 
 
Additional evidence for the proper categorisation of moral rights can be found by 
considering instances of unauthorised literary reproduction that avoid being plagiaristic. So 
long as the reproduction is not performed deceptively, and is incorporated into some 
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ultimately new, genuine production, a comparable act that would otherwise be plagiarism 
ceases to be so. Partial copying is common, and indeed institutionalised, within academic 
writing. It is institutionalised by systems of referencing, which are employed specifically 
to differentiate between the parts of a text which reflect innovative production on the part 
of an author; and the parts of a text that reflect only what the author has derivatively 
reproduced (either directly or in paraphrase) from the productions of somebody else. 
 
Where, in discussing Lockean theory, I quote a passage originally written by Locke, I use 
citation markers to designate those words as having been reproduced. This separates such 
passages from the content that is my own original production. If such a reproduction of 
Locke’s words was a property offence, as in a theft, then it would not become acceptable 
simply because I had acknowledged the reproduction via referencing. Instead, 
acknowledgement absolves reproducers of wrongdoing in such cases, because it is the 
misrepresentation of reproduction (i.e. presenting it as production), rather than the act of 
reproduction per se, that constitutes the offence in question. That offence can occur in 
addition to, and even facilitate, a property crime like theft, but it cannot be logically reduced 
to or conflated with it. 
 
5.2.3 Deception offences are natural offences 
 
It is clear, then, that misrepresenting the nature of an object’s production, by misattributing 
it (or any of the changes made to it) to a false producer, is the sort of offence that authors 
and artists are protected against under moral rights legislation. The right to have one’s name 
attributed to one’s work is not a right to exclude others from reproducing one’s productions, 
but a right to the assurance that those reproductions will be accurately presented qua 
reproductions; not misrepresented as being another person’s original productions. This 
represents a protection against plagiarism. Similarly, the right not to have one’s name 
attributed to the work of others is an assurance against the fraudulent misrepresentations of 
productions as containing one’s intellectual content when they do not. This represents a 
protection against forgery. 
 
The main reason that categorising moral rights as property rights is problematic is because 
it generates confusion about the natural quality of those rights. Because property rights are 
typically the product of natural law but can be established via statute; and because moral 
rights intersect so intimately with property rights, it might initially seem tempting to think 
that moral rights could reasonably be treated as being statutorily amenable. To the contrary, 
however, when one understands moral rights offences to be deception offences, the fact 
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that moral rights are inappropriate objects for statutory amendment or limitation becomes 
clear. This importantly informs the way we must treat moral rights at law. 
 
A defining feature of property rights, whether they are natural or statutory, is that they are 
transferrable. Under ordinary circumstances the owner of property, alone, has the right to 
enforce or waive their claim to exclusivity. They may also sell or gift what they own, which 
is another way of describing the transferral of property rights from one individual to 
another. Being individualistic rights, owners also have the sole ability to seek prosecution 
for, or forgive, past trespasses against their property rights. This is very different to the way 
in which moral rights ought to be treated. 
 
Once again, revisiting an act of plagiarism highlights the social, rather than purely 
individualistic, nature of a moral rights offence. The undergraduate student who plagiarises 
a former student’s work is not relieved of their culpability by obtaining the permission of 
the former student. Instead, by extending their permission, the former student would 
become complicit to a fraud. The student who produced the work, and who has the right to 
have his or her name attributed to it, is not naturally afforded the ability to transfer that 
right to others. The same is true in cases of forgery. If one attempts to artificially inflate the 
price of an artwork one produces, by attributing it as the production of a famous 
contemporary artist, then this deception is not an offence that the famous artist is afforded 
the power to excuse. 
 
Not only are moral rights limited in this way at the level of natural law, but, as the same 
case demonstrates, moral rights holders are unable to be effectively provided these powers 
of transferability; waiver; or forgiveness, via fiat. Even if the transferability of attribution 
was recognised at law, through statutory provision, the forger’s plan to artificially inflate 
the price of an artwork would continue to rely on deception. As soon as the statutory 
arrangement was divulged publicly, the legal fact of the artwork’s attribution would cease 
to bear on its value. The value would continue to be determined by the natural fact of the 
artwork’s attribution, which the legal provisions would be absolutely unable to alter. The 
effect of such hypothetical provisions, then, would merely be to protect ‘permitted’ forgers 
and plagiarists against prosecution for their deceptions – but these frauds would continue 
to impart the same negative social consequences as always. 
 
5.2.4 NPG’s Response 
 
The imperative of protecting against deception is emphasised in NPG’s response to the 
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criticism their publishing clause evoked, as well as in their ordinary daily publishing 
procedure. The group’s response to the controversy addressed truth and deception in two 
ways. First, they advanced a negative account intended to reassure against the possibility 
that they might abuse the waiver they required by perpetrating the kinds of fraudulent 
deceptions previously identified. Second, they advance a positive account of the way in 
which they suppose the original waiver facilitated their ability to protect their audiences 
from deception. 
 
NPG’s response to the controversy was delivered via a blog post. This communication was 
used to emphasise NPG’s commitment to accuracy and transparency in attribution of 
works, explaining that they “always attribute articles to authors” and “believe researchers 
should always be credited for their work,” as well as citing efforts the group has made to 
“foster disambiguated accreditation.”155 This is heavily geared towards reassuring authors 
of the maintenance of their individual interests. The statement made seems sincere; it ought 
not to be thought that NPG harbours any interest in defrauding its contributors. But the fact 
still stands that, if the clause is taken to have legal traction, and NPG did decide to offend 
against their authors in this way, the publisher would have impunity against legal 
repercussion. While NPG may not present a realistic threat to authors’ interests, 
legitimising such scenarios by legally treating moral rights in the manner of property rights 
opens the avenue to eventual abuses of this kind by one party or another. To warrant such 
legitimisation, a strong case for the social benefit of such a treatment would be required. 
 
NPG’s response supposed that a public benefit was indeed served by the waiver of moral 
rights. They suggested that this benefit would be realised in extreme cases of disagreement 
between the authors of co-authored submissions: 
 
We take seriously our responsibility towards the integrity of the scientific record. 
The “moral rights” language included in our license to publish is there to ensure 
that the journal and its publisher are free to publish formal corrections or 
retractions of articles where the integrity of the scientific record may be 
compromised by the disagreement of authors. This is not our preferred approach 
to dealing with corrections and retractions, and we work with authors and 
institutions to try seek consensus first. The right against derogatory treatment is a 
key aspect of moral rights.156 
                                                     
155   G. Baynes, ‘Clarifying NPG’s Views on Moral Rights and Institutional Open Access Mandates.’ (28 
March 2014) Of Schemes and Memes, <http://blogs.nature.com/ofschemesandmemes/2014/03/28/clarifying-
npgsviews-on-moral-rights-and-institutional-open-access-mandates>. 
156 Ibid. 
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This claim again emphasises an intended commitment to accuracy and truthfulness. The 
suggestion that if, after publication, two authors of a co-authored text come to disagree 
about the accuracy of the results – or if journal staff come to regard the contents as 
inaccurate – then reserving the ability to bypass contributors’ moral rights would enable 
the journal staff to issue corrections or clarifications that better serve the scientific record. 
This proposed function of the waiver (which evidently influenced the language employed 
in revising it) is clearly socially directed, as the integrity of the scientific record is not 
merely a matter of interest to the authors who contribute to it, but something that affects 
NPG’s audience, the broader scientific community, and ultimately society generally – 
closely akin to the consequences of plagiarism. 
 
Such a waiver is not necessary in preserving the integrity of the scientific record, however. 
Not only is the use of this avenue less than preferable, as NPG concedes, it is detrimental. 
The preferred method of resolving disputes is outlined in NPG’s requirement that 
contributing authors inform the journal of any corrections they believe need to be made, 
with the insistence that corrections to co-authored articles be accompanied by the written 
consent of all contributors. In cases of author disagreements, the coordinating author must 
also deliver copies of correspondence between themselves and the dissenting authors.157 
This procedure recognises and reinforces the importance of accurately maintaining 
attribution of contributions to the scientific record. Even where an editor decides, against 
the opinion of the original contributors, that a redaction or correction is appropriate, it 
should be simple to explain that the correction is attributable to that editor, and not to the 
contributors. For the sake of accuracy, we ought to expect that explanation to be made. 
Neither the integrity of the scientific record, nor the interests of the society that it serves, 
are advantaged through the inaccurate attribution of scientific statements or retractions. 
 
5.2.5 Moral Rights are Natural, Perpetual, and Inalienable 
 
The erroneous treatment of moral rights as property rights is pervasive. Despite the 
unobvious nature of the mistake, its consequences are not benign – as the example of Nature 
Publishing Group demonstrates. Property rights are, by definition, transferrable and can be 
waived. This is sensible because the harm caused by a property offence, such as in the case 
of theft, is typically inflicted only upon the rights-holder. Moral rights, however, protect 
against inaccuracy in the attribution of products to their producers. Offences against them 
                                                     
157 Nature Publishing Group, Nature Research Group’s Authorship Policy (2014), 
https://www.nature.com/authors/policies/authorship.html>. 
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therefore take the form of fraud, which has negative social consequences even in instances 
where the person most identifiable as the rights-holder is not harmed. As such, moral rights 
cannot defensibly be regarded as transferrable or able to be waived. 
 
Moral rights must also, given the function they have of preserving truth and accuracy in 
claims made about productions, be recognised as natural rights that cannot appropriately 
be modified by statutory provisions. Unlike other natural rights, such as the Lockean right 
to make use of objects in the commons, moral rights cannot be negotiated or contracted 
away. Even if the attribution of a work to a specific person would somehow otherwise have 
a beneficial social function, if that person was not the genuine author, then no contract 
could legitimise the claim that they were. There is no moral right to lie, and there is no 
transferrable property right that confers a right to lie. 
 
Finally, it is important to recognise that moral rights are perpetual rights. Unlike statutory 
copyright, which can correctly be limited to a specific term to maximise social utility, moral 
rights must persist perpetually. As considered in Section 5.2.2, the misattribution of a long-
deceased person’s work would still be a natural offence against the author and the audience 
to which the misattributed work was presented. A term consisting of the life of an author 
plus 70 years is likely too long for economic copyright, based on an economic calculation 
of potential social utility. However, the same term in relation to moral rights would be 
inappropriately short – indeed, inappropriately finite – since natural facts do not expire. 
 
5.3 There are No Natural Economic Rights Unique to Copyright 
 
One of the primary matters that stands to be informed by the further consideration of what 
moral rights are, and of how they ought to be represented at law, is the question of what 
objects ought to be copyrightable. If statutory economic protections represented all there 
was to copyright, with the consequentialist end of overcoming free-rider problems the only 
principle informing the structure of IP law, then it would be difficult to see why there 
should be any delineation between copyright and patent at all. Insofar as copyright is 
intended to provide those protections which best incentivise the production of original 
objects; and patent systems are intended to provide those protections that best incentivise 
the production of original objects, then insofar as the systems differ in the protections they 
provide, one is less effective than the other. Intuitively, the less effective system should be 
reformulated to confer the protections of the other system; or the systems should be 
amalgamated to provide whatever single set of protections is most effective. 
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One response to this suggestion might be that it is appropriate to maintain the distinction 
between copyright and patent because each of the systems provides the best protections to 
incentivise the different objects to which they respectively apply. If this is so, then it has 
not been demonstrated. Indeed, as highlighted throughout Chapter 2, the arguments which 
have informed the structure of copyright law within the United States have not been 
directed towards supporting the principle of that claim, far less demonstrating its truth 
empirically. Instead, the primary concern in the formulation of modern U.S. copyright law 
has been a regard for the (alleged) inherent desert of authors. While it has been asserted 
that authors naturally deserve to enjoy lifetime (and beyond) economic copyright 
protections, the same case is typically not advanced in relation to patents. The justificatory 
bases of copyright and patent are different; however, the difference seems unjustifiable on 
a purely economic basis. 
 
In addition, if the distinction between copyright and patent is defended on the basis that 
each system provided the unique protections which best incentivised production of the 
objects to which they applied, then it is natural to question why further specificity is not 
encouraged. It seems prima facie improbable that maximally incentivising creation requires 
that the production of maps and charts be treated unlike the production of mechanical 
inventions, yet exactly like the production of sculptures; dictionaries; software; and motion 
pictures. In terms of their economic structure, the various industries which produce 
copyrightable objects are as unalike to one another as they are (collectively) unalike to 
industries that produce patentable objects. It seems highly unlikely that the same incentive 
structure would prove equally effective in the case of all the industries that copyright 
affects. 
 
Compared to any economic factor, moral rights present a much more viable basis for 
justifying the preservation of the copyright-patent divide. Insofar as there is an intuitive 
difference between copyrightable objects and patentable objects, which can sustain their 
separate treatment under IP law, it is something natural but non-economic. Indeed, the 
United States House of Representatives has functionally affirmed as much, reporting that 
“an author’s intellectual creation has the stamp of his personality and is identified with 
him” in such a way as to make authorial rights “a unique kind of personal rights.”158 
 
If a full and accurate account of moral rights can sustain the copyright-patent divide, it is 
because authorial moral rights define what copyright is. That is, if the copyright-patent 
divide is defensible, then copyright eligibility ought to be decided based on the unique 
                                                     
158 House Comm. on the Judiciary, above n 66, p. 4. 
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applicability of certain moral rights to authored objects. The next chapter describes the 
historical difficulty of defining copyright’s scope, and by Chapter 8 moral rights are re-
examined as a legislative avenue for resolving those difficulties in a principled manner. For 
that account to function, it is imperative to recognise moral rights as protecting against 
deception offences, and not property offences. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Although explicit moral rights legislation is incorporated as a component of intellectual 
property law, moral rights are not property rights. Rather, the protection of moral rights 
represents a protection against deception. Because of the way in which they regard truth 
and accuracy, moral rights must be understood as perpetual natural rights which cannot be 
transferred; waived; or modified via fiat. This understanding is important for generating a 
moral rights account that can explain the appropriate scope of copyright. A moral rights 
account is developed for that purpose in Chapter 8, after a consideration in Chapters 6 and 
7 as to what quality of copyrightable objects moral rights are uniquely required to protect.  
  
106 
 
Chapter 6  
A Non-Physical Basis Is Required for Determining Copyright 
Eligibility 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Copyright’s historical expansion in scope has largely been predicated on a series of 
arguments by analogy that, individually, have each seemed intuitively reasonable. For 
example, the extension of copyright to musical recordings can ostensibly be understood as 
a natural extension of copyright’s application to sheet music. However, in more recent 
expansions of copyright (e.g. the inclusion of computer code within the scope of copyright), 
this extension by analogy has resulted in largely counterintuitive (and even intuitively 
objectionable) conclusions. It is not obvious, for instance, whether computer code being 
written makes it sufficiently analogous to objects like books to be copyrightable, or if the 
function of most computer code makes it more analogous to (patentable) machines. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to diagnose this failure in reasoning. I argue that the failure 
is the result of a critical conflation: it arises when the abstract ideational objects which are 
deemed eligible for copyright are treated as conceptually indistinct from the physical forms 
in which those ideational objects are expressed. For instance, many ideas which ought to 
be eligible for copyright protection are ideas expressed through the medium of books; but 
this fact has erroneously been used in grounding the view that books should be deemed 
eligible for copyright protection qua books. Thus, although copyright, in principle, is 
supposed to protect intangible (intellectual) objects, legislation has traditionally resorted to 
determining copyright eligibility by appeal to the physical qualities of objects. 
 
The prevailing legal preoccupation with categorising physical classes of objects as either 
copyrightable or uncopyrightable is a consequence (though avoidable) of copyright’s 
historical development. Although the frequency with which this method has delivered 
unintuitive and undesirable conclusions has sharply increased over time (culminating in the 
present IP landscape), the origin of the conflation which underlies this preoccupation is to 
be found in copyright’s earliest inception. When Britain’s King William III identified the 
printing press as a potential threat to social order, his response was to seek control over the 
physical medium of print. When that practice was abandoned, authors and printers sought 
a different justificatory basis for copyright, since they had an interest in maintaining the 
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status quo (the system of monopolies developed under the Crown’s early provisions being 
of immense commercial value to them). Since change was unsought and unwelcome, the 
prevailing practice of gauging copyrightability based on an object’s physical medium went 
unchallenged. The natural temptation of this error was subsequently compounded by the 
entirely rational requirement that, for an idea to be eligible for copyright, it must first be 
expressed in some tangible medium. 
 
Resolving this error is important for two reasons. First, determining copyright eligibility 
based on an appropriate non-physical quality can deliver a version of copyright which 
avoids the counterintuitive consequences that are encountered when determining copyright 
eligibility based on physical criteria. Second, establishing a principled non-physical basis 
for what copyright ought to protect is necessary to provide a sufficient basis for determining 
what protections ought to be extended in relation to copyrighted objects (especially in terms 
of non-economic protections). 
 
Section 6.2 contains an analysis of the historical entrenchment of the conflation outlined 
above. This analysis considers the origin of copyright in Great Britain, and describes how 
accidental factors of its origin led to the conflation between ideational object and physical 
expression becoming heavily entrenched into the structure of British law. This incorporates 
an account of the British Crown’s political motivation for introducing copyright, as well as 
the stationers’ subsequent economic motivation for retaining that system. 
 
In Section 6.3 I then consider the landmark legal case of Baker v Selden (1879), in which 
the United States Supreme Court was confronted with, and forced to acknowledge, the 
conflation already described. Specifically, the conflation had led to a situation in which, if 
the law was applied as written, types of objects that the Justices considered correctly 
uncopyrightable would have to have been deemed copyrightable. The Justices responded 
to this problem by seeking to overturn the historical precedence of determining copyright 
eligibility based on the media of an object’s expression. To this end, they introduced the 
notion of an Idea-Expression divide. This divide was intended to distinguish between an 
author’s ideas, and the tangible form in which those ideas are embodied or ‘expressed.’ 
 
Section 6.4 subsequently demonstrates that, although the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
legal inadequacy at the centre of Baker v Selden, the proposed Idea-Expression divide did 
not represent a satisfactory solution against that inadequacy. The Court clarified that the 
Idea-Expression divide could only be applied in relation to what it termed ‘technical’ 
objects (e.g. tools); not to what it termed ‘ornamental’ objects (e.g. sculptures). The 
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distinction, per the Court, was that the essence of technical objects could be distinguished 
from the form of those objects; but in the case of ornamental objects “their form is their 
essence.”159 This, however, leaves the copyright eligibility of ornamental objects still 
determinable only by appeal to their physical forms. 
 
The analysis in Section 6.4 demonstrates that, contra the Court’s suggestion, the essence of 
ornamental objects cannot clearly be reduced to their physical forms. For example, a novel 
and a film which both convey the same story could conceivably be understood to involve 
the expression of the same object – the narrative – even though they take distinct physical 
forms. This presents a dilemma: The way in which United States law is written indicates 
that the copyright protections which extend to ornamental objects ought to attach strictly 
to their forms. However, the way in which the law is implemented treats copyright as 
attaching to an essential quality of ornamental objects that is not their physical form. For 
example, when a copyrighted object (such as a book) is adapted without authorisation into 
another form (such as a film), this constitutes a copyright offence. If the law truly only 
protected specific expressions, then the formulation of the same narrative expressed 
uniquely in a different medium would not constitute an offence.  
 
Resolving this dilemma requires changing either the wording or the implementation of 
United States. copyright law. If one is to accept the law as it is currently written, then this 
entails a much more constricted copyright regime than presently exists in practice. On the 
other hand, if the prevailing implementation is maintained, and the law is rewritten to 
reflect such an interpretation, then once again the law is left without a positive account of 
an appropriate non-physical basis for justifiably determining copyright eligibility. 
 
This chapter therefore demonstrates the way in which the law’s historical preoccupation 
with the physical forms of objects, when determining what is copyrightable, has led to an 
inadequate formulation of the copyright-patent divide. Examining certain examples of 
copyrightable classes of object – such as maps; forms; and computer code – reveals the 
inadequacy of determining eligibility for copyright (especially as opposed to patent 
eligibility) by appeal to the physical qualities of different types of objects. This discussion 
establishes the motivation for Chapter 7, in which an appropriate, principled point of 
distinction between copyright and patent is described. 
 
 
                                                     
159 Baker v Selden, 101 US 99 (1879), 103. 
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6.2 The Historical Entrenchment of Physical-Centric Copyright 
 
As outlined above, United States law contains a fundamental ambiguity that presents us 
with an important dilemma in relation to determining copyright eligibility. To understand 
the origins of this ambiguity, it is necessary to revisit the British introduction of copyright. 
As described in Chapter 2, the original establishment of copyright in Britain was not 
conducted pursuant to any notion of authors’ rights or of social utility. Rather, the 
motivation was simply one of its self-interest on the part of King William III. Having 
observed the potential for the printing press to transfer political power and influence to the 
general population, and being particularly concerned that it represented a potential avenue 
for the spread of seditious and blasphemous ideas that might present a challenge to the 
Monarch’s authority, the Monarch’s response was to assume control over the medium of 
print. This was enacted through a system of licenses – i.e. copyrights – which restricted the 
right to produce printed materials to a limited pool of pre-approved licensees.160 
 
Already, the division between the physical and non-physical qualities of copyrightable 
objects is evident in the actions of King William III. Sedition and blasphemy were already 
crimes; the spreading of seditious and blasphemous ideas was already illegal. What the 
King’s primitive system of copyright secured was a pragmatic control over printed 
materials. His strategy was therefore to control the spread of (non-physical) ideas 
indirectly, by controlling the (physical) medium in which they might be expressed. It is 
important to note, however, that for the King’s purpose, it was not necessary for the 
physical objects restricted under copyright to be indexed one-to-one with the ideational 
objects that were in principle the target of the restrictions. That is, the King was served no 
worse by extending the restriction to all printed material, even if only a subset of those 
objects could potentially be offensive or threatening to the Crown. 
 
The British King’s strategy for controlling the spread of certain ideas, by seizing control of 
print media entirely, may have been effective in achieving his intended objective. By 
comparison, however, the implementation of that strategy has since had problematic 
ramifications for the establishment of an ethically well-grounded model of copyright. This 
is because the justification of copyright does ultimately turn on there being a one-to-one 
relationship between the ideas that copyright is intended to track and protect, and the 
physical objects in which those ideas are expressed. Only those physical objects suitably 
indexed to eligible ideational objects ought to be deemed copyrightable. That component 
of an ethical justification for copyright has been overlooked, however, because subsequent 
                                                     
160 Sherman and Bently, above n 9, p. 11. 
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reasoning regarding the expansion of copyright’s scope has been inappropriately predicated 
on the acceptance of the British Crown’s original designation of printed material as 
copyrightable qua printed material. 
 
The first British Licencing Act, passed in 1662, effectively extended the Crown’s original 
copyright system. When that act expired in 1695, the printers who had benefited from the 
artificial scarcity it had created, and which had enabled monopolisation, sought a 
continuance. Although the Statute of Anne was eventually implemented in 1710, this only 
provided a temporary protection (at most 28 years). When the protections established by 
the Statute began to elapse, stationers once again turned towards establishing a 
justification of (natural) perpetual copyright.  
 
Although stationers sought a principled justification for copyright during this period, they 
were not motivated by a commitment to justice for its own sake: they had become 
economically dependent on the system of monopolies at the core of the industry. As a 
product of their motivation, the stationers’ discourse did not progress from establishing a 
justificatory basis for copyright to constructing a legal apparatus that fit the principles so 
derived. Rather, in the stationers’ minds the conclusion was largely fixed: the arrangement 
under which the stationers had previously operated was accepted de facto as justifiable. 
The only philosophy to be done was to determine what justification led to that model of 
protection.161 
 
The regime established by William III thus anchored the discourse on copyright, even in 
the decades after the Statute of Anne was enacted. The notion that copyright ought to apply 
to all printed material never came under challenge. With the Statute of Anne replacing the 
Royal licensing regime, publishers had inherited the King’s vested interest in controlling 
printing. Although this was not precisely the same interest – since the King’s had been a 
political interest, and the stationers’ a primarily economic interest – both had in common 
the fact that they were well served by a broad conception of copyright that incorporated 
restrictions on all printed materials. 
 
The effect of this mistaken commitment has historically been exacerbated by the serial 
expansion of copyright’s scope based on analogies drawn between already-copyrightable 
media forms and newly emerging media technologies. For example, if the copyrightability 
of printed objects is assumed, then the expansion of copyright to sheet music is natural, 
given that sheet music is produced via print. In turn, the analogous qualities of sheet music 
                                                     
161 Ibid, 12-3. 
111 
 
and recordings of musical performances provides an ostensible reason to extend copyright 
protection to those recordings. Similarly, on the same assumption, the print-like nature of 
photographic development makes it natural to extend copyright to photographs; and the 
production of motion pictures can be understood to simply amount to an arrangement of 
photographs. Although these objects conceivably share something in the way of an ‘artistic’ 
or otherwise non-physical quality, their eligibility for copyright protection can be asserted 
(by analogy) on a purely physical basis, provided that the original categorisation of printed 
material as copyrightable qua printed material is accepted.   
 
Between 1710, when the Statute of Anne was implemented, and 1787, when the United 
States Constitution was ratified, the subject of copyright underwent much public debate 
and legal consideration. Nevertheless, the physical-centric development of copyright since 
William III’s licensing regime continued uncorrected. As for the contribution of American 
legislation, the Copyright Act (1790) promoted an even greater preoccupation with physical 
qualities. In the United States, maps and charts were afforded copyrightable status 
alongside books and other printed material, in accordance with the historically entrenched 
preoccupation with the printing press. There was not yet any “recognition or claim of 
protection in other fields, based on the general principle of rights in the creative product of 
the mind,”162 because the concept of copyright remained tied exclusively to the physical 
products of a press. 
 
In practice, there was a divergence between the ideological motivation for the Copyright 
Act (1790) and the practical consequences of its implementation. Although copyright 
discourse preceding the American implementation of copyright was often couched in terms 
of celebrating the intellectual genius and creative artistry of original authors, the pattern of 
objects that received copyright was slanted differently. Most objects which received 
copyright protection in the first years after 1790 (when copyright was not granted 
automatically) were of a practical or utilitarian nature. For instance, almost half of the first 
one hundred objects protected in Pennsylvania were either textbooks; manuals; atlases; or 
commercial directories. This trend was repeated throughout the United States. Although 
protection was typically sought for substantial novels, original literature and poetry made 
up just a small minority of copyright registrations.163 The enduring insistence on tying 
copyright eligibility to the physical medium of print had thus resulted in “the most 
commonly copyrighted works ha[ving] very little to do with the stereotypical image of 
                                                     
162 Oren Bracha, ‘Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act 1790’ (2008), in L Bently & M Kretschmer (ed.s), 
Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900) 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_us_1790>. 
163 Ibid. 
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original authorship in the romantic sense.”164 
 
6.2.1 Understanding ‘Romantic Authorship’ 
The notion of authorship ‘in the romantic sense’ (henceforth ‘romantic authorship’) that is 
quoted above is underdefined and requires elaboration. Broadly, it appears intended to pick 
out authorship that produces objects like fictional prose and poetry, while excluding 
authorship that produces things like directories and reference books. Unfortunately, 
although that distinction represents an intuitive difference, articulating the essential 
dissimilarity between romantic and non-romantic authorship is difficult.165 Nevertheless, I 
intend to show that the distinction is materially important. Whether an object (including 
non-textual objects) is a product of romantic or non-romantic authorship ought to serve as 
the central criterion in determining its copyright eligibility. 
Demonstrating the appropriateness of this criterion requires refining an account of what is 
intended by ‘romantic authorship,’ and articulating its essential quality. This task is 
undertaken in Chapters 7 and 8, but first it is important to consider the nature of the 
relationship between ideational objects and the physical forms in which they are expressed. 
In making this consideration, it is worthwhile examining the case of Baker v Selden in some 
detail, since this was a case in which the United States Supreme Court was required to 
consider the same relationship. To this end, the Justices ultimately introduced the notion of 
‘ornamental’ objects, which can be best understood as referring (generally) to objects 
                                                     
164 Ibid. 
165 This difficulty has spurred some theorists to conclude that such a notion is unsuitable for the purpose of 
informing copyright law. See, for example, Mark Rose, ‘The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and 
the Genealogy of Modern Authorship’ (1988) 0(23) Representations, 51. Rose concludes that what 
distinguishes a person as an author is specifically that they are a proprietor by virtue of their authorial acts of 
creation. Rose uses this conclusion to explain what he takes to be the function of copyright regimes. Rose 
outlines his claim by saying that: “The distinguishing feature of the modern author … is that he is a proprietor, 
that he is conceived as the originator and therefore the owner of a special kind of commodity, the ‘work.’ And 
a crucial institutional embodiment of the author-work relation is copyright, which not only makes possible the 
profitable publishing of books but also, be endowing it with legal reality, produces and affirms the very identity 
of the author as author” (p. 34). 
 
On one possible reading of this passage, Rose can be interpreted as simply providing an interesting descriptive 
account. In that case, it suffices here to say only that the objective of the present thesis is to demonstrate why 
that view – as taken up in the way Rose describes – is wrong. On the other hand, if Rose is read as normatively 
affirming this view, then further consideration of Rose’s account is necessary. Insofar as Rose normatively 
affirms the ‘author as proprietor’ view, however, he does so on a poor basis, which has already been critiqued 
in earlier chapters: namely, he is persuaded by naïve Lockean natural law accounts of intellectual property. 
 
Rose suggests that, when Lockean discourse is extended in relation to the topic of literary production, it ‘blends 
readily’ with accounts of the unique qualities of literature and authorship. Because authorship involves 
labouring to produce original objects; and because the Lockean account of property establishes natural 
proprietorship on the basis of labour that adds original value of objects, Rose takes the act of authorship to 
necessarily add original value, which situated in an object, that qualifies the author for natural proprietorship 
over the thing they produced (p.56).  Rose does not consider, however, how the restrictive nature of the ‘as 
good and as much’ and ‘waste’ provisos should correctly curtail the ability for authors to claim natural, 
exclusive proprietary rights over the products they produce (see Chapters 3 and 4 for such an analysis). 
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produced via romantic authorship. 
 
6.3 The Inadequacy of a Physical Basis in Baker v Selden (1879) 
 
The case of Baker v Selden involved an example of a published book that was ‘practical or 
utilitarian’ in nature. It was a book that was not the product of the romantic notion of 
authorship discussed in the previous section. Baker v Selden is a notable case because it 
concluded with the United States Supreme Court largely acknowledging the inadequacy of 
making an appeal to an objects’ physical form in determining its eligibility for copyright 
protection. However, the case did not result in the Court adequately diagnosing the reason 
for this inadequacy. A general solution to the problem of the inadequacy was therefore not 
effected into law. 
 
Ostensibly, the object at the centre of Baker v Selden was a book written by Charles Selden, 
on the topic of bookkeeping. The book contained a description of what Selden considered 
to be a vastly improved ledger system, including printed examples of blank ledger forms, 
which Baker was accused of having copied illegally.166 I say that this was ostensibly the 
object at the centre of the case because simply asserting that it was so would be to beg the 
central question of the case. The core contestation between W.C.M Baker and Selden’s 
estate (Selden being then deceased) ultimately came down to whether the object Baker was 
accused of copying constituted Selden’s book or Selden’s system. 
 
Selden’s lawyer argued, based on the law’s entrenched preoccupation with the physical 
classification of objects, that the case was clear-cut: the copyright statute offered protection 
to books, provided they contained original contributions to useful knowledge. Selden had 
produced a book, and it contained his contribution of an original useful system to the art of 
bookkeeping. Surely, the argument went, this had to qualify the contents of Selden’s book 
for copyright protection.167 
 
Baker retorted that Selden’s work was ineligible for copyright protection because its 
contribution was to the ‘useful arts,’ rather than to ‘science.’ For present purposes (since 
to define these categories precisely would, again, be to beg the question), we can take 
                                                     
166 Baker’s defence included a denial of the allegation that he had copied Selden’s work at all. The Court 
considered there to have been evidence that he had. I make no assessment on the matter because it is 
inconsequential to the question considered here, which is how the nature of Selden’s object ought to impact its 
eligibility for copyright in the case that someone did aspire to copy it. For this reason, I proceed as though 
Baker did undertake the copying alleged of him. 
167 Pamela Samuelson, ‘The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and 
Invention’ in Jane C Ginsburg and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss (eds), Intellectual Property Stories (Foundation 
Press, 2006), pp. 174–5. 
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Baker’s use of the term ‘useful arts’ as meaning to pick out something approximating the 
class of objects eligible for patent protection; and ‘science’ to mean knowledge in a broad 
and general sense (including the sort of knowledge conveyed through fiction and art). 
Baker’s case seemed bolstered by the fact that, in parallel to claiming copyright, Selden 
had sought to obtain a patent to protect his innovative bookkeeping system. This had the 
visage of an implied admission of ineligibility on Selden’s part. 
 
The Court agreed with Baker. It was not the first time such an argument had found favour 
in case law. In Perris v Hexamer (1879), for example, it had been held that, despite being 
a product of print, a system of symbols used to represent information on a map was not to 
be considered eligible for copyright.168 Even earlier, in Great Britain (as the Court noted in 
the decision of Baker v Selden), a court had found in Page v Wisden (1869) that blank 
cricket scoring sheets were similarly ineligible for copyright, despite originating from a 
press.169 Nevertheless, even in view of such precedents, the Court struggled to articulate a 
legal basis for resolving in favour of Baker. 
 
The Court noted that useful arts could typically “only be represented in concrete forms of 
wood, metal, stone, or some other physical embodiment,”170 and as Pamela Samuelson 
explains: 
 
The Court could not explain why an author could not get copyright protection for 
a bookkeeping system by applying the then-conventional framework for analyzing 
copyright claims. Such an inquiry typically proceeded by asking: Was the 
plaintiff’s work a “book” or otherwise statutory subject matter qualifying for 
copyright protection? Was the work original? Had the defendant copied a 
substantial or material part of the plaintiff’s work?”171 
 
The law’s prior practice of deciding IP eligibility on appeal to objects’ physical qualities 
had ostensibly trapped the Court into the dichotomy of protecting ‘wood, metal, and stone’ 
in one way, while protecting ‘books’ in another – to the exclusion of any other factors (e.g. 
a book’s content). The Court resolved to abate this dichotomy by, in effect, declaring 
Selden’s bookkeeping system to be an atypical instance of useful art that was embodied in 
writing rather than wood, metal, or stone; but which was subject to the same principles 
nonetheless.172 
                                                     
168 Perris v Hexamer, 99 US 674 (1879). 
169 Page v Wisden [1869] 20 L.T.N.S 435, cited in Baker v Selden, 101 US 99 (1879), 103. 
170 Baker v Selden, 101 US 99 (1879), 102. 
171 Samuelson, above n 167, pp. 175–176. 
172 Ibid, 179. 
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This attempt to move away from relying on the physical qualities of an object in 
determining copyright eligibility was a positive development in the history of IP 
jurisprudence. However, the Justices’ attempts to renounce the historically entrenched 
physical basis of copyright eligibility did not deliver a positive account of what constitutes 
a ‘useful art,’ or of what (by comparison) ought to be eligible for copyright protection. 
Neither did the Court’s decision approach an explanation of why, or in what ways, 
copyright and patent protections should differ. While the question of what protections 
copyright ought to entail (and why) was not touched upon in Baker v Selden, the Justices 
did attempt to make some headway on the matter of what constituted a ‘useful art.’ A key 
distinction was constructed by the Court, in the form of the Idea-Expression divide. 
 
6.3.1 The Idea-Expression Divide 
 
The most well-known distinction to come out of Baker v Selden was the distinction between 
what were, nominally, called ‘Ideas’ and ‘Expressions.’ This distinction needs to be 
unpacked in two stages, since it ostensibly establishes a false dichotomy. That is, the 
distinction appears to suggest that expressions are not themselves ideational by nature. The 
first stage of unpacking the distinction is therefore to determine what the Justices intended 
by the respective terms ‘Idea’ and ‘Expression.’ The second stage then involves explaining 
that those concepts – being specific legal artefacts – are different from the concepts 
typically intended when ‘idea’ and ‘expression’ are used in an everyday sense. I maintain 
this distinction by reserving the use of the capitalised forms of the words to specify the 
legal artefacts. 
 
The Justices introduced the notion of the Idea-Expression divide because they saw a need 
to distinguish between the object that was Selden’s book and the object that was Selden’s 
bookkeeping system. The difference, the Court attested, was that Selden’s book contained 
a description of his bookkeeping system, without containing the system itself. The Court 
demonstrated how upholding this distinction was important to the functioning of IP law by 
describing three other hypothetical cases. The Justices posited that: 
1) A book written on the topic of medicines could not, regardless of its venerable 
qualities as a text, establish for its author a proprietary right in any of the 
medicines described therein. Even if the author had invented the medicine 
described, a patent would be required to protect it. 
2) A book containing illustrations intended to demonstrate the artistic effect of 
perspective could not, despite the illustrations being copyrightable, be used as 
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the basis for claiming a proprietary right to monopolise the artistic use of 
perspective. 
3) A mathematician, having published writings containing original formulae, 
could not invoke their copyright in such writings to prevent an engineer from 
using the formulae to design and construct structures.173 
 
Importantly, the Justices held that this principle preceded the appeal to objects’ physical 
qualities in determining their copyrightable status. Hence, even if an Idea was embodied in 
the medium of print (as Selden’s was), rather than a medium like wood; metal; or stone, it 
would not be eligible for copyright protection. Instead, only the written description (the 
‘Expression’) of the Idea would be copyrightable. Moreover, the Court also held that 
copyright could never protect an Idea, even if the Idea was contained in, or could not 
otherwise be separated from, an Expression. 
 
The Justices regarded Selden’s bookkeeping system to be an Idea inseparable from the 
Expression that was contained within Selden’s book. That is, the Justices recognised that 
Selden’s system could not be used “without employing the methods and diagrams used to 
illustrate the book,” and so regarded the Expression in Selden’s book to be a “necessary 
incident”174 of the Idea itself. As such, because Selden’s Expression constituted a necessary 
part of his Idea, the Justices determined that protecting his Expression would amount to 
protecting his Idea. Therefore, it was resolved that neither Selden’s Expression nor his Idea 
could be the subject of copyright.175 
 
6.3.2 ‘Expressions’ and ‘Ideas’ as Strictly Legal Artefacts 
 
A clarification is needed, regarding the terms ‘Idea’ and ‘Expression.’ Taken by itself, the 
notion (as expressed in Baker v Selden, and later codified into the United States Copyright 
Act) that copyright must never protect Ideas seems to stand in plain contradiction to my 
previous claim (made as early as Chapter 2, and repeated here) that copyright always 
protects ideas. This apparent tension, however, is an illusion: It arises due to a conceptual 
error made in the way the Idea-Expression divide has been characterised. Regardless of 
how functionally useful the Idea-Expression divide may (or may not) be, it is ill-named 
insofar as it obscures the fact that expressions are ideas. When a person devises an effective 
way to describe an object, they have thereby arrived at an idea about how to describe that 
object. 
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Expressions, which the Court considered copyrightable, can therefore best be characterised 
as ‘ideas about how to describe (or express) Ideas.’ That is, copyright protects ideational 
content in the form of expressions of ‘Ideas,’ but it does not thereby protect the ‘Ideas’ that 
have been described. However, insofar as copyright protects expressions; and insofar as 
expressions represent ideas (about how to describe or express Ideas), this still means that 
copyright is protecting a certain kind of idea. 
 
The legal claim regarding what copyright protects therefore cannot be interpreted to mean 
that copyright never protects ideas; only that copyright never protects certain kinds of ideas. 
Specifically, the kind of ideas copyright never protects (i.e. Ideas) are those which are either 
correctly protected under the scope of an appropriate patent system; or which should not 
be eligible for protection under any IP system at all. This account clearly begs the question, 
however, insofar as it functions on a presupposition about which objects ought to be 
protected under a patent regime rather than a copyright regime. Thus, although the Justices 
wisely noted that the distinction between copyrightable objects and patentable objects 
could not be determined based on the objects’ physical qualities, they failed to recognise 
that the Idea-Expression distinction is insufficient in sustaining an alternative, justifiable 
basis for determining copyright or patent eligibility. 
 
6.4 The Lack of a Positive Account 
 
Although the motivation for introducing the Idea-Expression divide was to rectify the law’s 
historical preoccupation with determining copyright eligibility based on the physical 
qualities of copyrightable objects, the distinction does not present an adequate alternative, 
because it relies upon a circular presupposition about what ought to be copyrightable and 
what ought to be uncopyrightable. The principle of an Idea-Expression divide is also 
inadequate for an additional reason. As demonstrated in Section 6.3.2, the notion that 
copyright should only protect Expressions cannot be interpreted as meaning that copyright 
should never protect ideas (since Expressions are ideas, although not Ideas). However, a 
certain facet of the Idea-Expression inadequacy raises the additional possibility that 
copyright should (and in practice at least, does) also protect Ideas too. Explaining this 
requires the consideration of a clarification that the United States Supreme Court felt 
compelled to issue, specifying in what instances an Idea and an Expression are to be 
considered indissociable. 
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6.4.1 The Technical-Ornamental distinction 
 
The Justices presiding over Baker v Selden considered it necessary to make one final 
discernment between what they called ‘technical’ and ‘ornamental’ objects. This was 
because, although the purpose of the Idea-Expression principle was to prevent the copyright 
of an Expression from functionally securing a patent-like monopoly over an Idea, the 
Justices considered that there was a class of objects (ornamental objects) to which that 
principle was inapplicable. The Justices went to pains to explain that the Idea-Expression 
divide could not be appropriately applied to “ornamental designs or pictorial illustrations 
addressed to the taste.”176 The Court intended to compare such objects against scientific 
and ‘technical’ objects which find their end in “application and use.”177 
 
In effect, the Court had determined that ornamental Expressions ought to be regarded as 
eligible for copyright even if that entailed a functional monopoly over the Idea being 
expressed. In explaining why this distinction was appropriate, the Justices only offered the 
observation that “it may be said [of ornamental designs] that their form is their essence and 
their object is the production of pleasure in their contemplation,”178 where their form is 
presumably to be taken to be their physical realisation. In view of this description, two 
potential bases for the stipulation against applying the Idea-Expression principle to 
ornamental objects could have been intended. Either the principle was not intended to apply 
to ornamental object because of: 
1) The difference between the intended functions of ornamental objects compared 
to the intended functions of technical objects; or 
2) The difference between the way in which the form and essence of ornamental 
objects intersect, as compared to the way in which the form and essence of 
technical objects intersect (i.e., because the form and essence of technical 
objects diverge; but the form and essence of ornamental objects converge). 
The Justices presented no compelling case to demonstrate the adequacy of either of these 
interpretations. The case for applying the Idea-Expression divide to technical objects, but 
not to ornamental objects, is therefore insufficiently justified. 
 
Regarding the first possible interpretation, the Justices may have intended to convey that 
objects which are ‘addressed to the taste’ in order to produce ‘pleasure in their 
contemplation’ are fundamentally different compared to utilitarian objects that are intended 
for ‘application and use.’ A distinction along these lines would appear to track, at least to 
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some extent, the distinction between romantic and non-romantic authorship outlined in 
Section 6.2. For instance, fictional novels and poetry (works of romantic authorship) might 
be considered ornamental, whereas other works of authorship such as textbooks and 
reference books might be categorised as technical objects. In this case, however, a much 
more fundamental redefinition of copyright eligibility is required, which would prevent the 
copyrighting of often-copyrighted technical works like textbooks. A fuller account of what 
constitutes ‘romantic authorship’ would therefore be required to systematically determine 
copyright eligibility, on this interpretation. 
 
If, instead, the second interpretation is affirmed, then the relevant point of difference 
between ornamental and technical objects is that the essence of an ornamental object is 
defined by its physical form; whereas the essence of a technical object is distinct from its 
physical form. Moreover, it is this difference that the Justices must have identified as the 
appropriate basis for exempting ornamental objects from the restriction against 
copyrighting Ideas. However, the Justices’ conflation of essence and form in the case of 
ornamental objects is erroneous: The form and essence of ornamental objects can be as 
distinct as the form and essence of technical objects. This can be demonstrated by 
comparing the nature of Selden’s forms and the nature of the fictional book series Harry 
Potter. 
 
Samuelson provides an effective summary of one the core principles exemplified through 
Baker v Selden, which can be used to demonstrate (by example) the falsity of the claim that 
the essence of an ornamental object can be reduced to its form. Samuelson suggests that 
the central principle the Court sought to espouse was that “copyright law should allow 
second comers such as Baker to build upon a first author’s work,”179 and that “authors of 
functional writings should not have too much control over subsequent adaptations of their 
work.”180 Samuelson explains that: 
 
Selden’s forms may have been a substantial improvement over the old-fashioned 
bookkeeping system previously used in Ohio, but they presented only one stage in 
the evolving art of bookkeeping. Selden’s death meant that any further innovation 
in this field would have to come from others. Baker advanced the state of the art 
when he realized that county officials wanted to keep closer track of accounts than 
Selden’s forms permitted…. Had [Selden’s case] prevailed, further improvements 
to the “art” of bookkeeping might well have been thwarted until Selden’s 
copyright expired. This outcome would have disserved both patent and copyright 
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goals because it would have slowed the progress in the useful art of bookkeeping 
and would even have impeded fellow bookkeepers from explaining better than 
Selden had how to use his eponymous system.181 
 
This account of the situation seems correct. As such, insofar as an application of the 
historically entrenched system would have netted the result of affirming Selden’s case, that 
system must have been inappropriate. However, while Samuelson’s account accurately 
reflects the Court’s reasoning, her account is incomplete – although this also accurately 
reflects the state of the Court’s reasoning. This can be seen by appropriating the framework 
of Samuelson’s explanation to a different copyright example, involving an ornamental 
object. 
 
Samuelson’s example assesses Selden’s technical object, but the application of the same 
method to ornamental objects arguably yields a different result. To illustrate this, I shall 
consider a counter-factual example that supposes a challenge against J.K. Rowling’s claim 
of copyright over Harry Potter, and present the resulting assessment as an application of 
Samuelson’s original argument: 
 
J.K. Rowling’s novels may have been a substantial contribution to fantasy 
literature, but they represented only one stage in the development of the Harry 
Potter universe. Rowling’s death would mean that any further innovation in the 
field would have to come from others. Warner Brothers advanced Harry Potter 
worldbuilding when the company realised that audiences wanted a cinematic 
experience of the fictional universe. If Rowling’s copyright prevailed, further 
improvements to Harry Potter might well have been thwarted for many years. This 
outcome would have done a disservice to the goals of copyright because it would 
have slowed progress in the process of Harry Potter worldbuilding, and would 
even have impeded fellow authors from telling Harry Potter stories better than 
Rowling had previously been able to tell them. 
 
The extent to which the law might endorse this hypothetical claim is unclear. This issue is 
notoriously grey in the case of fan-fiction, in which communities of an author’s audience 
come together to contribute their own worldbuilding efforts. In this case, private 
individuals publish sequels; re-edits; alternative versions of an original author’s story; or 
additional stories set in the same fictional universe. It is not necessarily clear that this legal, 
but the activity is typically permitted – or even encouraged – at least insofar as it promotes 
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and solidifies fan bases (and is not conducted for profit).182 
 
However, when the fan-fiction writers in the previous scenario are replaced by a corporate 
entity like Warner Brothers, the legal situation becomes much more determinate. Although 
Warner Brothers produced the Harry Potter films after purchasing the relevant film rights 
from Rowling, a counterfactual situation can be imagined in which Warner Brothers had 
produced the films without Rowling’s express prior consent. In such a case, one can 
reasonably expect that a lawsuit would have been filed against Warner Brothers – and that 
the suit would have been upheld. 
 
The upholding of such a lawsuit at least initially seems consistent with the position 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Baker v Selden. As the author of an ornamental 
copyrightable object, Rowling (or the transferee of her copyright) should have the right to 
preclude unauthorised copies or derivatives. The Idea-Expression divide does not apply to 
such objects, and as such it would provide Warner Brothers with no grounds for an 
exemption. As already noted, the Supreme Court advanced no positive account as to why 
the Idea-Expression divide should not apply to ornamental objects, except to say of 
ornamental objects that their form is their essence. There is a considerable challenge, 
however, in reconciling that notion with an endorsement of the upholding of Rowling’s 
hypothetical lawsuit against Warner Brothers. 
 
The challenge is this: If the essence of an ornamental object is reducible to its form, then 
in what sense is Rowling’s Harry Potter ‘copied’ when it is adapted into a film? If we take 
seriously the notion that the form of Rowling’s Harry Potter is its essence, then it logically 
follows that the Warner Brothers’ filmic object Harry Potter – being expressed in a 
different medium, and thus having a different form to Rowling’s books – is an essentially 
different object. 
 
This also reveals a fundamental inconsistency between the way the law is written, and the 
way in which the law is implemented, when it comes to the Idea-Expression principle. The 
law states that only Expressions are to be protected by copyright (not Ideas), yet Rowling’s 
protections appear to extend not only to the way in which she expressed her Ideas, but also 
to precluding Warner Brothers from generating their own Expressions of her Ideas. This 
presents a dilemma: either the wording of the law, or the implementation of the law, must 
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be abandoned. 
 
6.4.2 A Consistent Physicalist Formulation of Copyright 
 
One stable solution to this dilemma involves simply affirming the Idea-Expression division 
but rejecting the exemption for ornamental objects. This would involve accepting that there 
should be no difference between the treatment of Selden’s and Rowling’s objects. In this 
case, the Idea-Expression divide should be applied in both instances, and any film 
adaptation of a book should never be regarded as constituting a copyright offence. This line 
of reasoning would invoke the fact that copyright can never protect an Idea (e.g. the story 
of Harry Potter), and that Rowling’s Expression of her Idea is not copied in Warner 
Brothers’ Expression of her Idea, since those Expressions do not take the same form. 
 
This physicalist approach, by which copyright eligibility is determined exclusively on 
appeal to the physical form in which an Idea is expressed, has several advantages. First, 
quantifying the similarity or dissimilarity of physical objects is simpler than developing a 
measure by which to adjudicate on the similarity or dissimilarity of two objects’ non-
physical ‘essences.’ This makes determining whether one object is a copy of another object 
(as opposed, for example, to having been ‘inspired by’ another object) a much simpler 
empirical task, since only physical artefacts need to be compared. Second, adopting the 
physicalist approach could be expected to increase the number of creative objects to which 
a society has access. By removing restrictions against derivative works, potential authors 
(from fan-fiction writers to professional content creators) would have access to a much 
greater breadth of resources (which would be common objects, on the Lockean account) to 
employ and make useful in the production of additional valuable objects. 
 
Albeit a matter to be determined empirically, it is also unlikely that the deregulation of 
derivative works like cross-media adaptations would represent a significant disincentive to 
original authorship. Given the small proportion of commercially valuable novels that are 
adapted into film, for example, it seems untenable that denying that prospect to novelists 
would dissuade them from continuing to publish novels. If some authors were dissuaded 
from producing original works because they anticipated the publication of unauthorised 
derivative works, they would likely number few enough that the effect that the disincentive 
would have on the number of new productions would be more than offset by the motivating 
effect of increasing the breadth of source material from which authors could legally draw. 
 
Accepting the physicalist account would present other challenges, however. For instance, 
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a preclusion against copying objects, in the strictest sense, would be too narrow to be 
practically useful. On the narrowest view, for example, a single trivial change to the text of 
a book would result in something that constitutes a new object instead of a copy. Altering 
a character’s name, or deleting a single sentence, cannot reasonably be considered to 
produce an original (non-infringing) object, if copyright’s function as a solution to free-
rider problems is to be effective. Moreover, changing which font a book is printed in, or 
binding it with a different material, should clearly not impact the determination of whether 
one instance of a book constitutes a copy of another. On the other hand, any attempt to 
retreat from this narrow view, to a looser conception of ‘duplication,’ requires an account 
of why certain physical similarities matter (e.g. which words are printed), while other 
similarities do not (e.g. the typeface). Such an account would most naturally appeal to some 
notion as to the way in which that certain aspects carry the ‘meaning’ of certain objects – 
but that involves a deferral to a non-physical component. 
 
Despite it being clearly necessary to preclude trivial variations from exempting an object 
from claims of copyright infringement, the only principled basis available for that 
preclusion, on the physicalist account, would therefore be the economic utilitarian 
justification that underpins copyright generally. That is, a determination of whether a 
derivative work infringed copyright (where the derivative work could be anything ranging 
from a cinematic adaptation of a book, to a textual adaptation involving nothing more than 
changes to characters’ names) could only be made by establishing whether the author of 
the first work would still have been sufficiently motivated to produce it, even if they had 
anticipated the derivation being legal. There would be no natural reason, outside of that 
consideration, to regard these as ‘copies’ instead of derivative works. 
 
As simple as it is to adjudicate the physical similarities and dissimilarities of two physical 
artefacts, determining which physical similarities potentially constitute copyright 
infringements, without further reference to the non-physical qualities of those objects, is 
impossible. For example, two instances the ‘same’ book, where one is an English language 
version and the other is a Japanese language version, would contain physically distinct 
textual markings. It is obvious that copyright law ought to regard the replication of things 
like distinct narratives and literary devices, rather than the replication of things like the text 
size and paper weight of a book. Nevertheless, any explanation of the relative importance 
and unimportance of those respective components, that turns merely on demonstrating the 
respective incentivising or disincentivising effect of their potential replication, is 
incomplete and unsatisfactory. 
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6.4.3 Preliminary Qualities of a Non-Physicalist Account 
 
By comparison, if the current implementation of the law is to be defended (such that an 
unpermitted cross-media adaptation could possibly be upheld as a copyright offence), then 
two implications follow. First, it means that copyright protects not only ornamental ideas 
(i.e. ornamental Expressions), but also ornamental Ideas. Rowling’s copyright does not 
only secure an exclusive right for her in her Expression, but it secures for her an exclusive 
right in any Expression of her Idea. Second, insofar as ornamental and technical objects are 
to be treated differently, the reason for this must be attributable to some non-physical 
inequivalence between the two. Since ornamental and technical objects can share the same 
physical medium of Expression, something else must distinguish them. 
 
Because it expands the scope of their rights, by protecting Ideas as well as Expressions, the 
formulation of such a non-physicalist account is ostensibly to be preferred by copyright 
holders. That option, however, requires dispensing with (or vastly reformulating) the Idea-
Expression principle, and replacing it with an account capable of providing the normative 
impetus for distinguishing between copyrightable and patentable objects, without appeal to 
their physical forms. This task is pursued in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Accidental factors relating to the historical origins of copyright – stemming first from a 
Monarch’s self-interest – have embedded into the development of copyright law a harmful 
preoccupation with determining copyright eligibility based on objects’ physical qualities. 
This historical preoccupation was challenged in the case of Baker v Selden, in which the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged the inadequacy of the prevailing legal basis 
for determining copyright eligibility. The Justices of the Court sought to repair (by 
superseding) the historically affirmed basis for determining copyright eligibility by 
introducing the Idea-Expression divide. 
 
Unfortunately, the Idea-Expression principle was not adequate in addressing the prevailing 
problems. At worst, the Idea-Expression divide collapses back into a physical, medium-
based apparatus that fails to escape the physicalist preoccupation. At best, the distinction 
genuinely tracks an important quality that should inform copyright eligibility – the notion 
of ‘romantic’ authorship – but it fails to establish an adequate positive account of how that 
quality can be assessed. 
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The inappropriateness of the historical appeal to the physical qualities of objects, in 
determining copyright eligibility, is well demonstrated in Baker v Selden. However, if this 
historically entrenched basis is to be overcome, two questions require answers: 
1) If there is, in a literal sense, an essential non-physical difference between 
‘romantically’ authored objects and non-romantically authored objects (or between 
technical and ornamental objects), then what constitutes the essence of each? 
2) Why does the comparative difference between the essences of those respective 
classes of objects require that they be eligible for different forms of IP protection 
(i.e. copyright or patent protection)? 
 
Chapter 7 establishes a principled non-physicalist account of the difference between 
correctly copyrightable and correctly patentable objects, which can feasibly replace the 
Idea-Expression divide and the technical-ornamental distinction. Chapter 8 then 
describes how that account can be articulated as a moral rights account, with the 
advantage that this also appropriately situates moral rights legislation in relation to 
economic IP legislation. It is demonstrated that adopting a consistent non-physicalist 
account, however, logically entails a significant reformulation of copyright law. 
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Chapter 7  
A Non-Physical Basis for the Copyright-Patent Divide 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter established the inadequacy of determining copyright eligibility by 
appeal to the physical qualities of an object. Indeed, it was shown that, in the case of Baker 
v Selden (1879), the United States Supreme Court introduced the Idea-Expression divide 
in an attempt to repair the historically entrenched practice of determining copyright 
eligibility based on the physical qualities of objects. Although it was ultimately inadequate 
as a solution to this historical preoccupation with physical qualities, the Idea-Expression 
divide was well motivated. The proposed division was an attempt to distinguish between 
the ideational objects which should be the subject of copyright, and the tangible 
manifestation (or expression) of those ideational objects in physical artefacts. The 
motivation of the present chapter is the same: its objective is to establish an accurate 
descriptive account of the essential (and non-physical) quality of objects which ought to be 
protected under copyright. This is in comparison to objects that should be patentable or 
otherwise uncopyrightable. 
 
A detractor might argue that no distinction between copyright and patent protection ought 
to be sustained. Instead, the suggestion may be posited that the two systems should simply 
be amalgamated into a single unified regime. To be defensible, this would require that any 
perceived differences between copyrightable and patentable objects must be illusory, or 
otherwise not substantial enough to warrant different treatment. Instead, I contend that the 
historically entrenched physical-centric system does track, albeit with limited accuracy, an 
important intuitive distinction between copyrightable and uncopyrightable objects. 
Therefore, the positive account of the difference developed here, while intended to replace 
the physically-preoccupied historical approach, aims to preserve but refine the central 
intuitive difference between copyrightable and patentable objects. Nevertheless, the 
account developed is compatible with a version of statutory IP law that involves a 
significant convergence between copyright and patent protections. 
 
In Section 7.2 I consider the respective relationships that exist between different labour 
processes and the products that those processes deliver. The motivation for this 
investigation is the potential thought that the need to locate a non-physical difference 
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between copyrightable and patentable objects could be avoided by instead locating a 
difference between the respective labour processes that produce them. That is, instead of 
artistic objects being somehow different to inventive objects, perhaps the process of artistic 
creation could be shown to be different to the process of invention in some relevant way. 
It is demonstrated, however, that formulating the copyright-patent divide based a difference 
between artistic and inventive products; and formulating the divide based on a difference 
between artistic and inventive processes, is functionally equivalent. Despite this, it is also 
shown that articulating the difference in terms of differences between the objects produced, 
rather than the labour processes that produced them, is to be preferred for pragmatic 
reasons. 
 
Given the conclusion of Section 7.2, any essential difference which determines what ought 
to be copyrightable and what ought to be patentable must be able to be articulated as a 
difference between the objects themselves. Three relevant, intuitive points of difference 
between copyrightable and patentable objects are therefore identified in Section 7.3: 
1) Copyrightable objects are communicative, whereas patentable objects are useful; 
2) Copyrightable objects have a special uniqueness, whereas patentable objects can 
be independently derived by inventors pursuing different means; and 
3) We treat copyrightable objects as being non-modifiable, whereas we regard 
patentable objects as being modifiable. 
To demonstrate the way these points of distinction currently inform determinations of 
copyrightability and patentability, example cases are given in which they are correctly 
applied. In addition, however, several examples of well-known problem cases in IP 
literature are also examined. These are cases wherein the intuitive principles which have 
historically informed the copyright-patent distinction become unclear and contradictory. It 
is shown that these cases prove problematic because they involve an insensitivity to these 
distinctions. 
 
Although a justifiable account of the copyright-patent divide should largely preserve the 
intuitive distinctions described in Section 7.3, a clear and precise articulation of the 
principles underlying that distinction allow for its refinement. In this way, the prevailing 
basis by which copyright and patent eligibility is determined can be shown to be 
inappropriate. This serves to resolve counterintuitive cases in which – guided by the 
historically entrenched preoccupation with objects’ physical qualities – intuitively 
uncopyrightable objects have been deemed copyrightable. Moreover, it is also shown that 
this is not only the case in instances of well-known problem examples; it is also true in 
relation to objects that rarely have their copyrightable status challenged. 
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Section 7.4 provides an initial positive account intended to repair the prevailing errors 
identified in the determination of copyright eligibility. This account proceeds by expanding 
on the first intuitive point of difference (identified in Section 7.3) between copyrightable 
and patentable objects. Whereas the account in 7.3 merely identifies that copyrightable 
objects are typically communicative, while patentable objects tend to be ‘useful’ in a more 
directly utilitarian sense, Section 7.4 identifies a more specific aspect of certain 
communicative objects (beyond the simple fact of their communicativeness), which ought 
to define copyright eligibility. 
 
The quality common to all correctly copyrightable objects is that they are second-
personally communicative. An object is second-personally communicative if it can only be 
accurately interpreted, and made use of, when it is understood as being the product of a 
specific author. This is true even if the identity of the specific author is indeterminable. 
Implementing second-personal communicativeness as a prerequisite for copyright 
eligibility would greatly constrain the scope of copyright, since it would preclude many 
currently copyrightable objects (which are third-personally communicative) from 
continuing to be considered copyrightable. 
 
In this way, the present account indexes copyrightability much more closely to the intuitive 
notion of ‘romantic’ authorship that was introduced in Section 6.2, while clearly 
articulating a principled basis to explain the intuitive uniqueness (and importance) of that 
kind of authorship. This enables the resolution of famously difficult copyright 
categorisation problems, such as whether software and computer code should be regarded 
as copyrightable or patentable. Moreover, it enables the resolution of these cases based on 
appeal to a general principle. This represents a marked improvement on the serial pursuit 
of individual, industry-specific solutions that may be determined on disparate and 
inconsistent principles. Several example cases are examined at the end of the chapter to 
demonstrate this potential for universalisation. 
 
7.2 The Equivalence of Labour Accounts and Object Accounts 
 
As described in Chapter 6, the case of Baker v Selden progressed through three critical 
stages. First, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the inadequacy of the 
prevailing practice of categorising objects as copyrightable or uncopyrightable based on 
their physical qualities. Second, the Court responded to that inadequacy by attempting to 
draw an Idea-Expression divide, which would allow for the conceptual separation of the 
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physical component of an object from the essential non-physical component of that object. 
The intended consequence of this separation was to enable the essential, non-physical 
component of objects to serve as the basis in determining copyright eligibility. Third, the 
Court undercut the success of the Idea-Expression divide by stipulating that the distinction 
could not be applied to ‘ornamental’ objects. The Court held, instead, that the physical form 
of an ornamental object ought to be regarded as its essence. It might be supposed that the 
Court intended, for instance, that the form of a sculpture is the defining quality of that 
sculpture. Unfortunately, this reintroduced a problematic conflation between the physical 
and non-physical components of ornamental objects. 
 
It might be thought that one way to avoid this problem would be to identify a unique 
difference in the labour processes which produce copyrightable objects, rather than 
identifying a unique quality of copyrightable objects themselves. These respective 
approaches are reflected in the two primary formulations that have already been considered. 
The object-formulation of the copyright-patent distinction is represented in the distinction 
between ‘ornamental’ and ‘useful’ objects introduced by the United States Supreme Court 
in Baker v Selden. By comparison, the notion of romantic authorship introduced in Section 
6.2 alludes to a formulation based on the nature of the labour undertaken in producing 
copyrightable objects. 
 
An appeal to the different natures of various labour processes might seem especially 
promising because it seems to be in keeping with the labour centrism of a Lockean property 
account. This fit seems even more natural considering the demonstration, in Section 4.2, 
that labour is never a solely physical process. Given that labour always contains an 
intellectual, non-physical component, an identifiable variation in that component could 
potentially serve as a basis for distinguishing between kinds of labour which do or do not 
produce copyrightable objects. For instance, it could be considered that only labour which 
involves an intellectual component that is ‘romantic’ (whatever that intends) should 
establish copyright privileges. 
 
A formulation of the uniqueness of copyright that is based on a distinct quality of certain 
labour processes would be correct and well founded, but not sufficiently functional. This 
is largely because of the inherent difficulty involved in articulating the nature of that 
distinct quality. In comparing the labour processes of a poet and an inventor, for example, 
it is difficult to say much more than that the poet engages in a poetic process; and the 
inventor engages in an inventive process. Perhaps an inventor engages in a methodical 
process of trial and error, while attempting to get an invention to work in fulfilling some 
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need. But so too, we can imagine, a poet has their own process of trialling and revising as 
they edit and rewrite until they refine something which ‘works’ poetically. Moreover, the 
most obvious measure by which to adjudicate whether a labour process was (for example) 
poetic or inventive is to assess whether the intended product of the process is a poem or an 
invention. 
 
This is equally true of broader categorisations, which identify a commonality between 
different varieties of labour. For instance, both a poetic labour process and a sculptural 
labour process might be described as ‘creative’ or ‘artistic.’ Once again, however, this 
functionally amounts to an observation regarding the nature of the objects produced: both 
poems and sculptures are creative, artistic works. This pattern even applies to the colloquial 
sense in which the terms ‘physical labour’ and ‘intellectual labour’ are used. ‘Physical 
labour’ produces physical objects (or otherwise physically alters something), and 
‘intellectual labour’ produces intangible, ideational objects (albeit necessarily expressed in 
a physical medium). 
 
This trend generalises in such a way that labour based formulation of the difference 
between copyrightable and uncopyrightable objects could be presented in a logically 
equivalent object formulation of that difference – and vice versa. Suggesting, for example, 
that people who engage in artistic labour processes should be rewarded with copyright 
protections amounts to saying that copyright should attach to artistic objects. Similarly, the 
suggestion that creative objects should be eligible for copyright can be restated as the claim 
that creative labourers ought to receive copyright in return for the kind of labour that they 
perform. Some qualification would be required in that case, however, since copyright 
attaches to successful projects. Although successful projects (which deliver objects) are 
always the result of labour efforts, labour efforts do not always result in successful projects. 
 
Although this means that either a labour account or an object account of the copyright-
patent divide could be formulated, neither can succeed by drawing the distinction on the 
basis of physical qualities. In addition, despite both formulations being logically 
equivalent, there is a natural reason to initially prefer the object formulation rather than the 
labour formulation: property rights attach to objects, not to labour processes. This 
represents a purely pragmatic concern, in that implementing a copyright regime (or a patent 
regime) is much more practicable if it eligibility is assessed based on a consideration of the 
features of the object to be protected, rather than on the nature of the labour which produced 
it. 
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Because copyright (and patent protection) attaches to objects, the objects to which they 
attach are necessarily observable (and therefore examinable) in a way that the labour 
processes which produced them are not. Patents represent the clearest example of this: A 
patent application necessarily requires the submission of an accurate description of the 
object over which patent protection is sought, which can be tested against the protected 
object and against any objects which are alleged to infringe the patent. By comparison, not 
only does the labour process which produced the object not need to be detailed, but the 
accuracy of those details would be impossible to police even if their submission was 
required. 
 
Some specific cases may present exceptions to the preferability of an object-based 
formulation of the difference between copyrightable and uncopyrightable objects. For 
example, the United States Copyright Office, in a section of the Compendium of U.S. 
Copyright Office Practices titled ‘Works That Lack Human Authorship,’ states that the 
Office “will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that 
operates randomly or automatically without creative input or intervention from a human 
author.”183 This might include, for example, experimental poetry which is produced 
through the mechanical arrangement of random words. Similarly, the United States 
Copyright Office cites as an example the case of “a mechanical weaving process that 
randomly produces irregular shapes in the fabric without any discernible pattern.”184 
 
These cases ostensibly involve objects that would have been be copyrightable, if they were 
produced by other means (i.e. guided by the correct propositional attitudes). On this view, 
determining the copyrightability of a given arrangement of words (or a weave in a fabric) 
would rely on an assessment of the labour process through which it was produced. Even in 
these cases, however, the difference can be formulated in terms of the nature of the objects 
rather than the nature of the labour processes. That is, a random arrangement of words is 
not a creative arrangement of words, even if the process of randomisation, or the idea to 
use randomisation, is creative. Furthermore, a random arrangement of words represents an 
object which is distinct from any creative arrangement of words – even where it shares a 
physically identical arrangement of words. One has the quality of being an embodiment (or 
expression) for an ideational object, and the other does not have that quality. 
 
For this reason, the notion that an uncopyrightable object would otherwise have been 
copyrightable, if only it were produced via different means, is effectively the mere claim 
                                                     
183 U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices (2017) 3rd ed. § 313.2. 
184 Ibid. 
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that an uncopyrightable object would have been copyrightable if it were a different 
(ideational) object. The unimportance of the physical identicality of the objects should not 
be surprising, given the demonstrated requirement for a non-physical basis by which to 
determine copyrightability. Pragmatically, these cases may benefit from being considered 
through the lens of a labour formulation of copyrightability – but that formulation remains 
replicable as a logically equivalent object-based formulation. 
 
Given the equivalency that has been established, the account developed in Section 7.3 could 
be formulated in terms of the nature objects or in terms of the nature of labour processes. 
Because an object formulation is simpler to articulate, and can be more pragmatically 
tested, I provide an account of which non-physical qualities of certain objects render them 
correctly copyrightable. This can be adapted to a labour-based formulation if such an 
adaptation is advantageous in the application of the account to specific cases. 
 
7.3 Intuitive (Non-Physical) Bases for the Copyright-Patent Divide 
 
In addition to identifying a non-physical basis for copyrightability, an account of the 
copyright-patent divide should largely continue to reflect several intuitive differences that 
exist between currently copyrightable and currently uncopyrightable objects. This is not to 
say that the account, when applied, ought to preserve existing categorisations of 
copyrightability and patentability. Rather, a new account should be able to offer an 
articulation of what it is that our prevailing intuitions correctly track, and (subsequently) 
where those intuitions have been misapplied. This shall amount to a demonstration of how 
a correct and nuanced application of existing intuitions necessarily entails certain 
recategorizations when it comes to what is copyrightable and uncopyrightable. Since the 
prevailing intuitions informing the existing copyright-patent divide are typically left 
implicit, however, the articulation of this new account requires their explication. Three 
intuitive bases for the categorisation of objects as copyrightable or patentable can be 
identified. 
 
7.3.1 Communicative vs Useful objects 
 
The first intuitive distinction between copyrightable and patentable objects is that 
copyrightable objects are communicative in nature, whereas patentable objects are useful 
or utilitarian devices; techniques; or processes. This is perhaps the most immediately 
apparent distinction of the three presented here. It is reflected, for instance, in the United 
States Supreme Court’s characterisation of copyrightable objects (to which the Idea-
133 
 
Expression divide supposedly ought not to apply) as ‘ornamental’ and patentable objects 
(to which the Idea-Expression divide ought to apply) as ‘technical.’185 The Court regarded 
that ornamental (copyrightable) objects found their purpose in ‘contemplation,’ whereas 
technical (patentable) objects found their purpose in implementation.186 
 
Existing categorisations which accord with this basis are common. Books; poems; plays; 
music; and photographs – broadly, any artistic objects – convey an author’s ideas and 
communicate their thoughts. These objects either inform an audience (e.g. research papers 
and textbooks) or provoke the kind of contemplation that can engender new knowledge and 
understanding (e.g. George Orwell’s 1984 or Christopher Nolan’s Memento). These are 
typically considered copyrightable by modern standards of copyright eligibility. By 
comparison, the lightbulb; the telephone; and toaster ovens are all socially valuable insofar 
as they have straightforwardly instrumental uses as practical tools. Under existing IP law, 
these are all to be regarded as patentable. 
 
Not all cases are clear, however. Well known problem-cases which exist in relation to 
copyright – such as the case of categorising software as either copyrightable or 
uncopyrightable – arise because of a contradiction in our perceptions regarding software’s 
communicativeness and usefulness. Software is constructed of computational code, which 
in turn consists of a series of instructions or commands that are to be executed by a machine. 
These computational instructions and commands (which contain informational content) 
represent a form of communication, which would ostensibly render software copyrightable. 
On the other hand, however, the way in which software is typically implemented by end 
users is as a tool. As such, the communicative component of the object is usually invisible 
to the user, and certainly does not constitute the purpose of the object. This makes software 
seem much more akin to lightbulbs; telephones; or toaster ovens (all of which, it might be 
noted, come in modern versions that implement software into their functionality). This 
tension makes it unclear, on appeal this intuitive basis, whether software ought to be 
copyrightable or patentable. The Baker v Selden case was also a case that centred upon this 
tension between an object’s communicativeness and usefulness. 
 
7.3.2 Uniqueness vs Multiple Realizability 
 
The second intuitive basis for the copyright-patent divide is most commonly reflected in 
the everyday distinction between ‘artistic’ and ‘inventive’ creation. This involves an 
                                                     
185 Baker v Selden, 101 US 99 (1879), 103. 
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important difference between the feasibility of multiple people independently developing 
the same artistic or the same inventive objects. This distinction is sensitive (albeit 
implicitly) to the natural constraints to which an object is known to be subject, even before 
it exists. 
 
To understand these natural constraints, it is valuable to consider a distinction between the 
different ways in which we use terms that describe the intellectual content of productions, 
such as ‘thoughts’ and ‘ideas.’ Sometimes we discuss an item of intellectual content as 
being a particular characteristic of one person’s mind, whereas at other times we describe 
an item of intellectual content as though it is something common and accessible to multiple 
people. Hugh Breakey points out, for instance, that one person may have the idea that the 
sun is shining, and yet another person could ordinarily be said to have the same idea: 
 
On the one hand, ideas are something very personal, embodied within particular 
minds. If I have the idea, ‘the sun is shining’, that is my idea insofar as it is a 
property, in some sense, of my mind. On the other hand, it is quite meaningful to 
say that you have just the same idea as I do, as might occur if you too believe that 
‘the sun is shining.’187 
 
I take Breakey’s particularly-embodied ideas to be possessed ideas, held as specific 
instances of potential ideas ‘qua abstract propositions.’188 Although many ideas qua 
abstract propositions are accessible to others in the way Breakey identifies, it is also true 
that certain other ideas are not. 
 
To see how this understanding influences intuitive conceptions of what is copyrightable 
and what is not, consider a novel such as Tolstoy’s War and Peace. This is a book that 
seems intrinsically linked to its author, such that it is practically impossible to imagine that 
anyone except Tolstoy could have written it. This kind of object can be contrasted with 
objects that, while they may be attributable to a particular individual creator, could feasibly 
have been created by somebody else. An example of this second class is a telephone. 
 
It is quite reasonable to assume that in a counterfactual world in which Alexander Graham 
Bell had never existed, a machine functionally equivalent to Bell’s telephone would 
predictably have been produced, at some time, by somebody else. By contrast, it is virtually 
impossible to imagine that, had Tolstoy died in infancy, a text identical to War and Peace 
                                                     
187 Hugh Breakey, ‘Liberalism and Intellectual Property’ (2009) 8(3) Politics, Philosophy and Economics, p. 
330. 
188 Ibid, p. 331. 
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would ever have been written by someone else. Tolstoy was not merely ‘the first’ to pen 
the book, and his premature death would not have merely delayed its publication. Tolstoy 
was the only person through whom a society could come to enjoy War and Peace, and 
without him it simply would never have existed.189  
 
Another way of expressing this is to say that, where it perhaps makes intuitive sense to talk 
of Bell’s experiences leading up to the invention of the telephone as experiences ‘qua 
abstract possibilities,’ which he was the first to conceive, Tolstoy’s particular experiences 
were so personal and particular to himself, and so necessarily formative to the object War 
and Peace, that it is absurd suppose that some other person could have had the thoughts 
and experiences that led to the writing of that book. Although it is logically possible that 
someone else could have independently produced a work identical to War and Peace, 
earnestly suggesting that we could have expected it to be so would be as absurd as sincerely 
tabling the suggestion of infinite monkeys with typewriters as a counterfactual means of its 
production.190 
 
These differences inform the ways in which artistic and inventive labour is performed. The 
development of patentable objects is usually quite tightly constrained, in that our existing 
knowledge of the physical world greatly informs our understanding of what potential 
objects are viable. For instance, the inventive pursuit of the telephone was informed and 
motivated by the then-most-recent developments in physics. Those developments 
significantly evidenced the possibility for, and tightly constrained the viable scope of, 
methods by which sound could be relayed across great distances. 
 
As human knowledge of the physical world increases, the future realisation of inventive 
(and thus patentable) objects becomes less of a speculative possibility and more of a 
perceived inevitability. The realisation of the telephone came as no surprise at the time; 
several different parties had been developing and presenting work towards the same end. 
Such situations frequently occur in today’s commercial environment, as competing firms 
‘race’ towards the production (and patenting) of new but anticipated technologies. In this 
sense, the development of patentable objects is largely predictable; anyone well versed 
enough in the relevant physics can follow a largely broadly prescribed, predictable path 
towards an intended invention. Even though the details of the invention might not be 
known, the inventive idea is nevertheless characterizable as an external abstract proposition 
that is being sought. 
                                                     
189 McKeahnie, above n 119, pp. 200-201. 
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The same is typically not true of copyrightable objects, even where ostensible similarities 
exist. Sometimes, the themes of artistic works may be predictable, in that they reflect 
common reactions to a zeitgeist. This (or otherwise, just chance) can lead to something that 
resembles a patent race, but which involves the production of copyrightable objects instead. 
For example, the 1998 films Deep Impact and Armageddon are an example of what are 
known as ‘twin films:’ the films were released within two months of each other, and both 
were science-fiction disaster films depicting desperate, last-minute attempts to prevent 
catastrophic comet or asteroid strikes on Earth. In cases of twin media, where creators have 
knowledge of each other’s projects, there may be a rush to get products to market, as each 
creator attempts to gain a first-mover advantage over their competition. 
 
This kind of race-to-release is similar, in many respects, to a patent race. However, there is 
a fundamental difference between the two: In patent races, the first producer to bring their 
product to market (or, to the patent registry) thereby precludes their competitor(s) from 
bringing a product to market at all. In races involving copyrightable objects, however, all 
creators retain the right to publish independently developed ‘twin’ objects, irrespective of 
who published first. The advantage gained by winning a patent race is a statutorily enforced 
monopoly; in copyright cases, any advantage of being the first to market must result purely 
from natural market forces. 
 
This is an appropriate reflection of the intuitive difference between creations and 
inventions. Although remarkably similar, objects like Deep Impact and Armageddon are 
not functionally equivalent in the way that convergent inventions are. Because the inventive 
process is so tightly constrained by the scope of plausible solutions (as determined through 
our ever-increasing understanding of the world), inventors naturally converge upon a locus 
of very similar objects that, when implemented, are functionally equivalent. By 
comparison, multiple creative producers – even when they are producing content within a 
narrow scope involving the same medium; genre; themes; tone; and overarching narrative 
– will nevertheless inevitably produce unique objects representing distinct interpretations 
and treatments of those components. This relates closely with the previously described 
feature of copyrightable objects (their communicativeness), in that these various objects, 
despite their close similarities, derive uniqueness from the fact that they communicate the 
personal thoughts and ideas of their respective creators. 
 
7.3.3 Non-Modifiability vs Modifiability 
 
A third intuitive basis for the copyright-patent divide regards the matter of when (that is, 
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under what circumstances, and by whom) an object can be altered or modified. The crux 
of this differentiation is that copyright owners who have purchased copyrights (but who 
were not an author of the protected objects) are not permitted to alter or modify the objects 
over which the copyrights are held. By comparison, patent owners who have purchased 
patents (but who did not invent the objects covered by the patents) are permitted to alter or 
modify the objects protected by those patents. For instance, consider a publishing house 
which agrees to purchase the copyright to an author’s original novel. Further, imagine that, 
before sending the manuscript to print, the publishing house determined that the novel 
could be improved by a making changes to the ending; or by adding an epilogue. If the 
publishing house made such alterations or modifications without the consultation and 
agreement of the original author, but nevertheless still attributed the modified version to 
the original author, then this would constitute a legal offence against the author. Of course, 
removing the attribution would also be an offence as it would involve representing the 
modified version as an original production, when in fact it was largely a wholesale 
reproduction of another author’s work. 
 
By comparison, if an individual or corporation purchases the patent rights to a piece of 
proprietary technology, then that person or corporation is subsequently regarded as having 
the sole right to use the object described in the patent. In addition, the new patent holder 
also secures the right to modify the design of the protected object, in whatever way shall 
make it best serve their ends. If the patent owner determined that an improvement could be 
made to the original design of the technology; or that a modified version would better meet 
specific requirements, then there would be no legal prohibition against making those 
changes. Moreover, the original inventor of the technology would not need to be consulted 
to approve the implementation of such modifications. The justification of this different 
treatment once again intersects with the distinction between communicative and useful 
objects, as well as the difference between uniquely realisable and multiply realisable 
objects. 
 
The fundamental reason for considering copyrightable objects to be unalterable stems from 
the fact that they are communications. The offence of a publisher making unauthorised 
modifications to an author’s novel, prior to printing and distributing it, is most naturally 
characterised as a deontic offence. This is because the objection against the modification is 
not rooted in any contention as to whether the object could be improved with modification; 
nor in whether that specific modification represents an improvement. Even if the modified 
version of the object was universally regarded as an improvement over the original, and 
thus in some sense would provide greater social utility, this would be insufficient to absolve 
138 
 
the publisher of the action. Instead, the modification of another person’s communication 
prior to its publication is a natural offence in view of the act constituting an undue 
interference against a person’s ability to communicate. 
 
The unmodifiable-modifiable distinction is therefore contingent on a difference between 
the temporal qualities of the actions which produce copyrightable and patentable objects. 
In the case of an invention, the act of inventing is temporally fixed: invention occurs (or 
comes to a culmination) at the specific moment when an object is produced. This is 
represented, under the patent system, in the fact that patent applications capture the state of 
an invention at a specific point in time. After this, if a purchaser of the patented invention 
modifies the invention, this does not affect the inventive act previously performed by the 
original inventor. By comparison, an author’s act of communication is temporally 
persistent: the act of communication does not happen at one fixed point in time, but persists 
so long as the communicative object continues to exist. Thus, the modification of a 
communicative object constitutes an interference against an author’s act of communication. 
An inventor whose every invention was modified before reaching market would still have 
invented, but an author whose every product was modified before it was published may 
potentially never have communicated. 
 
The fact that the modification of communicative objects does not merely modify what is 
communicated, but modifies whether an author has communicated at all, should critically 
inform non-economic conceptions of copyright. Without requiring any reference to the 
personal benefits that financial protections provide, for example, an account established on 
the principles Cwik describes (as discussed in Section 4.2.1) could saliently incorporate 
speech as a critical productive capacity that deserves protection. Cwik observes, for 
example, that there is “an important connection between control over one’s labor (as a 
distinctly human, intentional, rational activity) and the capacity to control one’s life 
according to one’s goals, values, and identity.”191 Speech, perhaps more than any other 
form of labour (and indeed, even when it is not performed as labour) exemplifies these 
distinctly human; intentional; and rational qualities, and fundamentally impacts an 
individual’s ability to exercise control in the manner Cwik describes. In addition, the right 
to communicate can very naturally be understood as a right that authors must have reserved 
for them, without being an exclusion against the speech acts of others. 
 
 
                                                     
191 Cwik, ‘Labor as the Basis for Intellectual Property Rights,’ above n 119., p. 686. 
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7.4 Second Personal Communicativeness 
 
The three points of distinction presented in Section 7.3 do broadly track a genuine 
justificatory basis for establishing separate copyright and patent regimes. However, without 
significant refinement, these distinctions are not nuanced enough to deliver a consistent 
account of the distinction between correctly copyrightable and correctly patentable (or 
otherwise uncopyrightable) objects. While a successful account of the difference between 
copyrightable and patentable objects should be expected to largely preserve this series of 
distinctions, such an account must also contend with the fact that the distinctions do not 
represent true dichotomies. For instance, it is possible for communicative objects to be 
useful or utilitarian. Such useful or utilitarian communicative objects will, in addition, 
frequently be able to be independently derived by multiple creators; and will be naturally 
regarded as permissibly modifiable. Therefore, the defining characteristic of copyrightable 
objects must, despite being sensitive to the communicativeness of objects, be construed 
more narrowly than to suggest that all communicative objects are correctly copyrightable. 
 
The scope of copyrightable objects should be constrained to a subset of communicative 
objects. The essential quality of the communicative objects included in this copyrightable 
set is that they are uniquely second-personal. The identification of this quality as the 
appropriate criterion draws on Stephen Darwall’s observation that “many central concepts, 
including those of moral obligation, right and wrong, and moral rights, have an irreducibly 
second-personal structure” in that they “implicitly refer, in a way other ethical and 
normative concepts do not, to claims and demands that must be capable of being addressed 
second personally.”192 
 
Darwall contends that a large part of ordinary morality involves what he refers to as second-
personal reasons. These are reasons that are provided on an agent-relative basis, meaning 
that one person issues a reason to a second person, about how the second person should act 
or behave, in a manner that is contingent on the presupposition that the reason-giver has 
some authority, relative to the reason-receiver, which informs the validity of the reason. 
For example, the phrase “It is better if people do not lie” represents a moral claim that is 
agent-neutral, in that the claim directs an audience towards a fact (if it is true) that should 
direct behaviour independent of speaker’s identity (and even independent of it being spoken 
at all). By comparison, the phrase “Do not lie to me” represents a second-personal demand 
that, to correctly function, must be understood (by speaker and recipient) to imply a right 
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of the speaker to make moral claims on the actions and behaviours of the recipient.193 
 
Many types of communication (whether delivered verbally or non-verbally) must be 
understood to be essentially second-personal on this view. Darwall explains that: 
 
A second-personal reason is one whose validity depends on presupposed authority 
and accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of 
the reason’s being addressed person-to-person. Reasons addressed or presupposed 
in orders, requests, claims, reproaches, complaints, demands, promises, contracts, 
givings of consent, commands, and so on are all second-personal in this sense. 
They simply wouldn’t exist but for their role in second-personal address. And their 
second-personal character explains their agent-relativity. As second-personal 
reasons always derive from agents’ relations to one another, they are invariably 
fundamentally agent relative.194 
 
For example, consider a guard who presides over a prison, and who receives a letter 
declaring the prison to be too cold. The letter explains that the thermostat in the prison 
should be adjusted to a prescribed temperature. In such an event, the guard’s understanding 
of the communicative function of the letter would be contingent on their being able to 
ascertain the identity of its author. If, for instance, the letter had been authored by a prison 
inmate, then the communication would constitute a complaint and suggestion; but if the 
same letter had been authored by a prison warden or superintendent, then the letter would 
correctly constitute an imperative or command. In this case, if the guard (the audience) 
cannot ascertain the identity of the author, they cannot reach a correct and complete 
understanding of what the object (as a communication) is. As Dawall explains, “[f]or an 
utterance to count as a command, for example, certain conventional authority relations must 
be in the background, and this must be common knowledge between speaker and 
addressee.”195 
 
I intend to construct an account of the connection between second-personality and 
copyright that has similarities to Darwall’s account of the connection between second-
personality and the nature of interpersonal moral claims. Unlike Darwall, however, I am 
not concerned with second-personal interactions qua interactions that position two people 
in a relationship of accountability. An author of a copyrightable object does not 
(necessarily) exist in a relationship of accountability with their audience, since when an 
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artist produces something like a novel or a musical score that act of creation does not by 
that communication’s substance imply that the artist exists within a relationship of 
accountability with their (potential) audience. This is especially the case because an 
author’s potential addressees are (typically) free to ignore the author’s work entirely.196 
 
Despite this difference, however, there is a similarity between correctly copyrightable 
objects and the second-personal modes of imparting moral reasons with which Darwall is 
concerned (orders, requests, claims, etc.). In the same way that, in the example case of the 
guard’s letter, the identity of the letter’s author must be known to the guard for them to 
have a complete epistemic conception of what the letter is as a communication, it is also 
true that the audience of a correctly copyrightable work need some second-personal 
conception of the author of that work in order to develop a complete epistemic appreciation 
of what the copyrightable object is. This is true even when the substance of the 
copyrightable work does not establish a relationship of accountability between author and 
audience. 
 
An author of any communicative object (correctly copyrightable or not) is responsible, and 
must be held accountable, for the things that they author. Authors are appropriately subject 
to a variety of responses in relation to their authored objects, including credit; blame; 
praise; and criticism. As was demonstrated in Chapter 5, this means that the preservation 
of truth and accuracy, in attributing authorship to objects that are second-personally 
communicative, is centrally important not only to authors (for the sake of guaranteeing the 
fair assessment of honour and reputation), but also to audiences who can only meaningfully 
interpret agent-relative communications within the context of a specific second-personal 
agent-relation. Because of their second-personal quality, correctly copyrightable objects 
also demand of their authors the additional requirement that the author-identity that is 
recorded in connection to an author’s work is not unsuitably inaccurate or deceptive (see 
more on this standard below, section 7.6, in relation to anonymously and pseudonymously 
published works). 
 
To recap, then: as informed by copyright’s foundational principles of truth and accuracy, 
the term ‘second-personal,’ as it is used in relation to communicative objects (and as 
distinct from Darwall’s use of the term), describes those objects which, to function 
correctly and completely, must be accurately understood to have been authored by a 
                                                     
196 I owe this observation, of the difference between my own account and Darwall’s, to reviewer Hugh Breakey, 
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distinguishable author-identity.197 This is not necessarily to say that the identity of the 
object’s author must be known – since anonymously and pseudonymously published works 
may still (arguably) be second-personally communicative (see Section 7.6) – but that the 
authored object must be recognisably the product of a specific author in a way that bears 
upon an understanding or interpretation of the object. In this way, the appeal to second-
personal communicativeness both acknowledges the nature of ‘creative’ authorship as 
involving speech, and of the appropriateness (and necessity) of indexing claims about 
speech acts to relevant speakers. 
 
An account of what it means for the author-identity of an object to bear upon the 
understanding and interpretation of an authored object, in such a way as makes the object 
function ‘correctly and completely,’ is difficult to articulate. For this reason, although much 
of prevailing copyright law approximately tracks this feature, certain indicative phrases 
have historically been relied on to allude to this component without explaining it. For 
example, insofar as the phrase ‘authorship in the romantic sense’ is intended to select a 
subset of authorship that produces objects such as fictional novels and poetry, while 
precluding objects such as instruction manuals and reference books, the phrase closely 
tracks the notion of second-personal communicativeness. 
 
                                                     
197 There is an interesting comparison to be made here between the present account and the account of 
‘authorship as public communication’ that Immanuel Kant advanced in response to the issue of copyright. See 
for example Anne Barron, ‘Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom’ (2012) 31 Law and Philosophy 1. 
Barron explains that Kant characterised authors’ rights “as speech rights, and not as rights of property in works 
considered as crystallizations of their authors’ communications,” (pp. 5-6) and that “Kant’s premise is that a 
book considered as a material object must be distinguished from a book considered as the vehicle for an activity 
of authorial speech” (p. 6).  However, despite the similar way in which the Kantian tradition identifies copyright 
with communicative acts and is concerned with how an author’s integrity is contingent on the preservation of 
truth (i.e. the preservation of attribution), Kantian arguments ground copyright in the norms of public reason 
(for example see: Maurizio Borghi, ‘Copyright and Truth’ (2011) 12(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 1). That 
is, the Kantian concern for truth stems from the observation that authors engage in public speech (via 
authorship) in a way that is dependent on the norms of public reason; and that public reason has a fundamental 
telos – the collective pursuit of knowledge. On this view, then, the proper function of copyright is to guarantee 
the appropriate conditions under which authors can successfully contribute to society’s collective pursuit of 
knowledge. By comparison, the account I present is less constrained, in that I do not hang the need for copyright 
on the notion of an author’s pursuit of knowledge. This is likely to be important, for example, in articulating 
the need for copyright in relation to certain cases of fiction – i.e. work that is not written for the purpose of 
uncovering or communicating knowledge. 
 
A fuller consideration of the relationship between Kantian accounts of copyright and the Lockean account 
presented here would depend on an analysis on the way that specific readings of Kant situate his writings on 
copyright within the context of his broader philosophy. A meaningful interpretation of a Kantian conception of 
author’s rights qua communicators’ rights would require, for example, a consideration of Kant’s conceptions 
of autonomy; freedom; the Doctrine of Rights, and so forth. Due to constraints of scope I do not offer further 
consideration here, but for an example of how varied considerations of these components of Kant’s philosophy 
can impact the effectuation of a Kantian account of authors’ rights, compare Barron’s account with the account 
offered by Abraham Drassinower in Barron. See also: Abraham Drassinower, ‘Copyright Infringement as 
Compelled Speech’ in Annabelle Lever (ed.) New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 203; Abraham Drassinower, What’s Wrong with Copyright? (Harvard 
University Press 2015); Laura Biron, ‘Public Reason, Communication and Intellectual Property’ in Annabelle 
Lever (ed.) New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press 2012) 225; 
and Niel Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civic Society’ (1996) 106(2) Yale Law Journal 283. 
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his is also true in the case of the distinction made in Baker v Selden between ‘ornamental’ 
and ‘useful’ objects. The notion, posited by the Justices in that case, that ornamental objects 
realise their purpose through being ‘contemplated’ (as compared with ‘implemented’) 
represents an attempt to capture the second-personal nature of those objects. It cannot be 
denied that Selden’s book about bookkeeping systems – including the forms it contained – 
was communicative. Indeed, it might reasonably be contended that, to make use of his book 
and implement Selden’s system of accounting, one would need to contemplate it. 
Nevertheless, the determination was made by the Supreme Court that the purpose of 
Selden’s book was not realised through contemplation. Although the Court was unable to 
articulate the point, the difference between Selden’s work and a so-called ‘ornamental’ 
work is not that it is not contemplated when used, but that Selden’s identity as its author 
does not appropriately bear on the audience’s contemplation of it. 
 
What these phrases attempt (or at least should be attempting) to capture is the importance 
of an author-function in the interpretation (or the ‘contemplation’ of) certain 
communicative objects. To function meaningfully, the notion of romantic authorship must 
constitute an attempt to capture the image of the author as communicator: as someone 
whose unique, intimate thoughts offer a peculiar insight into some aspect of the world or 
of the human condition, and whose expression of those ideas can (when performed 
skilfully) render those thoughts accessible and understandable to an audience. Similarly, 
the way in which something ornamental is ‘contemplated’ (in a way that utilitarianly 
‘useful’ objects are not) should be understood as describing the process by which the 
expressions of authors, which represent unique products of their mind, are interpreted and 
digested as those authors’ communications. Subsequently, for a ‘romantic’ or ‘ornamental’ 
communicative object to be contemplated fully and correctly, the person doing the 
contemplating must be able to form a sufficient conception of the author as well as the 
object. This follows from the general principle that, for a communication to be understood, 
it must be contextualised as a communicative object. 
 
The reasons for which ascertaining an author’s identity is necessary in relation to artistic 
communications are perhaps more complex, or less obvious, than the reasons for which 
ascertaining the identity of an author is necessary in cases like the previously considered 
example of a prison guard’s letter. For instance, if a person were to uncover a long-
forgotten painting in a relative’s attic, and notice that it bore a signature resembling that of 
Picasso’s, it would presumably be of great importance to that person to ascertain whether 
it was a genuine Picasso piece. Although this would undoubtedly be motivated at least in 
part by a financial interest (a Picasso painting being much more valuable than a painting 
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by an unknown artist), the value in the piece being a genuine Picasso is not arbitrary. 
Although the known physical qualities of the object would persist identically in either case, 
the importance of determining the identity of the painter is not the merely the product of 
an arbitrary rarity (i.e. the rarity of Picasso pieces compared with the rarity of anyone else’s 
pieces) that the art market is particularly (if irrationally) sensitive to. 
 
Rather, although the object would remain physically identical, ascertaining the identity of 
the painter would determine what the painting is as a communication. A communicative 
object that exists within the context of a prominent creator’s entire body of work, or which 
was produced consciously as part of a significant historical movement in the development 
of the medium, is essentially a metaphysically different object than the ‘same’ object 
produced by any other author in any other context. Akin to the guard’s letter, the identity 
of the person who created an artistic communication informs the object’s communicative 
function. This substantive difference may inform the financial value of an object, but the 
importance of determining an author’s identity is independent of that single consequence. 
 
Instead of being extended to all communicative objects, copyright ought to be extended 
only to those objects whose complete and accurate ‘ornamental’ function (their function as 
communications) is contingent on the second-personal qualities that those objects have. 
Not only would the application of this principle preserve what is intuitive about existing 
determinations of copyright eligibility (based broadly on the qualities identified in Section 
7.3), it would also consistently resolve a variety of un-intuitive cases that represent 
challenges under existing conceptualisations. 
 
Moreover, indexing copyright to second-personal communicativeness represents an 
appropriate recognition that the process of paradigmatic (or ‘romantic’) authorship 
involves an inherently personal engagement in speech. In this way, the notion of second-
personal communication attaches to a notion that has driven much of the ideological 
impetus of copyright’s development, without ever successfully impacting its 
implementation in an equivalent way. For example, the Unites States House Committee 
Report, prepared ahead of an anticipated legislative overhaul in 1961, records the 
Committee’s opinion that “an author’s intellectual creation has the stamp of his personality 
and is identified with him.”198 Despite the ideological motivation this may have provided, 
however, the Committee’s very next sentence of the report reads: “But insofar as his rights 
can be assigned to other persons and survive after his death, they are a unique kind of 
                                                     
198 House Comm. on the Judiciary, above n 66, p. 4. 
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personal rights.”199 This demonstrates the Committee’s inability to disentangle the natural 
personal rights which arise in relation to authored works – as second-personal 
communications –  and the economic rights intended as the subject of legislation. 
 
The constriction of the scope of copyright, through the indexing of eligibility to second-
personal communicativeness, shall result in numerous presently copyrightable objects (or 
otherwise ambiguously or disputably copyrightable objects) to be categorised as 
uncopyrightable. Exploring several examples of such objects, and subjecting them to the 
refined-communicative account just presented, further demonstrates the appropriateness of 
this recategorization. In addition, the consideration of a variety of cases demonstrates that 
the universalizability of this approach – there is no requirement for the development of a 
myriad of media-specific or industry-specific approaches to determining copyright 
eligibility. 
 
7.5 The Second-Personal Principle in Action 
 
7.5.1 Maps 
 
Maps have historically been regarded as copyrightable (in that the layout and drawings 
upon them are copyrightable, although the informational content they convey is not), based 
on the preoccupation with determining copyright eligibility based on the physical qualities 
of objects. This is seemingly because they were one of the first objects to be derived via 
mechanical print. Maps do, however, demonstrate an important, non-physical similarity 
with correctly copyrightable objects: they communicate information. Being communicative 
objects, then, maps – in accordance with the preliminary account outlined in Section 7.3.1 
–  might be expected to be deemed eligible for copyright protection. However, maps also 
serve a clear utility function: the information they communicate is useful. Per the same 
preliminary account of the communicative-useful distinction, then, maps (if they are 
eligible for IP protection of any kind) should be expected to be rendered patentable. 
 
Categorising maps as copyrightable also contravenes the intuitive principle regarding 
uniqueness and multiple realizability presented in Section 7.3.2. Insofar as maps are 
intended to form accurate representations of the natural world, they are tightly confined by 
the world’s physical qualities.200  A map that did not reflect the properties of the world 
                                                     
199 Ibid. 
200 For present purposes I consider maps only insofar as maps are intended as representations of the real world. 
It is possible, of course, to produce a map of a fictional place, such as of Tolkien’s Middle Earth. An assessment 
of fictional maps may determine that their copyright eligibility ought to differ from non-fictional maps. 
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would be, in that regard, an imperfect instance of a map. Therefore. multiple cartographers, 
all of whom were perfectly competent in mapmaking, each laboured to produce maps of 
the same area (in the same style; recording the same details), then they should be expected 
to produce equivalent objects. This is because mapmaking involves the pursuit of an idea 
qua abstract property, in that there exists some perfect idea of how the features of the world 
are arranged, which mapmakers seek to possess (and to communicate). 
 
Second, as utilitarian tools, maps are correctly modifiable. As the location of national 
borders; human infrastructure (e.g. roads); and natural features (e.g. rivers) inevitably 
change over time, static maps become unavoidably outdated. The continuing usefulness of 
maps is therefore contingent (especially in cases of dramatic change) on their modifiability. 
Subsequently, it is reasonable for the a company that commissions a mapmaker to make a 
map, with the intention of producing copies for commercial sale, to expect to enjoy the 
right to make subsequent updates and changes to the object they have purchased, between 
the time the map is completed and the time the map is reproduced for sale. Again, this is 
necessarily directed by the known physical qualities of the world. Such modifications 
should not be considered to constitute an offence against the original mapmaker, even if 
the mapmaker is not consulted about the changes. 
 
The application of the second-personal principle lends clarification to the case of maps. 
Maps can standardly be recognised not to be second-personal communications, despite the 
information they convey, because their successful implementation is in no way contingent 
on the identity of the mapmaker who produced them. Although the accurate attribution of 
a map, to the mapmaker who made it, ought to be maintained, this is only so that praise or 
blame can be appropriately assigned in if the map functions well or poorly as a tool. On 
this basis, maps should be considered uncopyrightable.  
 
7.5.2 Instruction manuals 
 
Like maps, instruction manuals are useful communications. A flat-pack furniture company, 
for example, may commission a simple printed pamphlet, combining rudimentary images 
and text, that conveys the process by which a customer can assemble the furniture. On the 
traditional conception, such a pamphlet could be considered eligible for copyright by virtue 
of its being a printed object. Conceived of correctly, however, such an object would not be 
considered copyrightable. Although communicative, the scope of potential instructions for 
assembling a specific pre-packaged object is tightly constrained. Several agents, each 
tasked with producing instructions on how to assemble the same piece of flat-pack 
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furniture, should be expected to arrive at equivalent and likely similar solutions. If, when 
the sets of instructions that were returned were followed accurately, their application did 
not result in identical outcomes, then this would be an indication that at least some of the 
instructions were incorrect. 
 
As well as being useful and multiply realisable, categorising an instruction manual or 
pamphlet as copyrightable is incorrect because situations are conceivable in which it would 
be just to consider them modifiable. For instance, if the commissioned instructions were 
discovered to contain a minor inaccuracy – or if the design of the furniture was modified 
after the instructions were produced – then it would be natural to consider the 
commissioning company to be within their rights to modify the instructions. The 
commissioning company would presumably not be required to restart the process of 
commission instructions anew. In this way, not only is the Idea contained within the 
instructions patentable rather than copyrightable, but the Expression of that Idea is treated 
in much the same way. 
 
The categorisation of an instruction pamphlet as modifiable is not merely motivated by a 
pragmatic interest. Similarly, an instruction manual’s combination of usefulness, multiple 
realizability, and modifiability is not merely an accident or coincidence. These aspects stem 
from the fact that, although the object is communicative, it does not form a second-personal 
communication. As a technical object, intended to be implemented rather than 
contemplated, the way in which the end-user implements an instruction manual can in no 
way be contingent on their knowledge of the identity of the author who authored it. 
 
The case of instruction manuals can be resolved by the application of the second-personal 
principle in much the same way as the case of maps. Correctly following the information 
communicated in a manual either results in the successful achievement of a desired 
outcome or it does not; the outcome of this process is never contingent on an audience’s 
conception of the author-identity of the manual’s creator. Because of this, instruction 
manuals ought to be deemed uncopyrightable. 
 
7.5.3 One Million Random Digits 
 
In contrast to the previous two examples, this example regards a specific instance of an 
object, rather than a class of objects. Prior to the existence of electronic random number 
generators, the generation of random digits was produced via analogue means. Rather than 
producing random values mechanically (e.g. by flipping coins or rolling dice), the 
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production of the book One Million Random Digits presented a popular (and standardised) 
means to that end. It is a book that, as the title suggests, contains one million randomly 
derived and arranged digits for the use of random number generation. 
 
The example of One Million Random Digits represents a peculiar case, in that, assuming 
the series of digits is truly random, there is no perceptible reason that a person would ever 
want to modify the object. Any modification would, at best, be trivial (if it did not affect 
the randomness of the digits therein). At worst, such modification would be non-trivial, in 
that it would reduce the degree of randomness within the arrangement of digits. This lack 
of perceptible motivation, however, ought not to be confused for a principled basis for 
deeming the object legally unmodifiable. The second-personal (or otherwise) nature of the 
object must still determine whether One Million Random Digits should be considered 
alterable. 
 
On this point, two claims stand to be made. The first (a strong claim) is that One Million 
Random Digits does not represent communication at all. This position contends that a 
requisite component of communicative objects is that they are meaningful, but that 
randomness is (by definition) meaningless. One Million Random Digits would, then, not 
qualify as communication. The second (weaker) claim is that – even allowing for 
information to suffice as communication; and granting that One Million Random Digits 
contains information – the communicativeness of the book is nevertheless not second-
personal in nature. This second claim, at least, must certainly be granted. In contrast to 
objects which, to function fully and correctly, depend on the audience to have a conception 
of the author as well as the object, the function of One Million Random Digits would fail 
to be realised insofar as its use was dependent on any non-random factor. It would therefore 
be incorrect to extend copyright protections to One Million Random Digits, even though it 
takes the physical form of a book. 
 
7.5.4 Computer Code and Software 
 
If a book that serves to produce random digits lacks the second-personal 
communicativeness to correctly attract copyright protection, then using software to achieve 
the same end cannot possibly introduce it. Moreover, the fact that the RNG function of a 
book like One Million Random Digits can be adapted and implemented identically as a 
piece of software – such that the book and the software represent precisely equivalent (if 
differently efficient) tools – demonstrates that software only represents the form, and never 
the essence, of any digital object. Considering whether software per se ought to be 
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copyrightable or patentable therefore misses the point (as with any determination of 
copyright eligibility made based on an object’s medium). 
 
A comparison of two example objects demonstrates this irrelevance of an object’s being 
software (or not) in determining copyright eligibility. On one hand, consider the qualities 
of a narratively rich computer game. On the other hand, consider the qualities of a 
computer’s operating system. These two programs – both equally the product of computer 
code – are dissimilar in every relevant respect. A computer game, like a novel or a film, 
can convey a narrative that constitutes a second-personal communication. The game thus 
finds its function in being played (within intentional interactive constraints), by an 
audience. Two narratively similar computer games can co-exist (for example the games 
Deep Impact and Armageddon) without any IP infringement occurring (provided that one 
was not directly derived or adapted from the other). It is implausible that two developers, 
working independently, could arrive at functionally equivalent narrative games. It would 
be a natural offence for the publisher of an independently developed game to alter any part 
of the game’s narrative structure prior to distributing it (for instance, by giving the narrative 
a happier conclusion) without consultation with, and approval by, the author whose artistic 
vision the game represented. An offence against this obligation would constitute an undue 
incursion upon the author’s speech. 
 
An operating system is unlike a computer game in each of these ways. Although all 
computer code is communicative in the sense that it conveys information (albeit sometimes 
only to another machine), the code of an operating system is not second-personally 
communicative. Operating systems are not intended as objects of contemplation, but 
instead function as utilitarian tools that are implemented in pursuit of various ends. Two 
developers, working independently, could feasibly arrive at equivalently functional 
operating systems (though the scope for this may be wider than in the development of more 
limited programs), but utility patents awarded to the first successful developer would 
reasonably preclude the publishing of functionally equivalent operating systems by 
subsequent developers. A company that purchased the patent rights to such a system could, 
however, permissibly modify or adapt any part of the system’s code, to substantively 
change it, without engaging or consulting in any way with the original developers.  
 
Whereas it was previously shown that considering the copyright eligibility of software per 
se led to a contradiction between existing intuitive bases for eligibility determination, 
considering the copyright eligibility of digital objects based on the nature of their 
communications they represent resolves this tension. Dispensing with regard for the 
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medium through which they are expressed, digital objects can be assessed, as any other 
object, on whether they constitute second-personal communications. Those that do (e.g. 
narrative games) can be afforded copyright protection, and those that do not (e.g. operating 
systems) can be afforded patent protection. Understood on this basis, this does not represent 
a conceptual contradiction. 
 
7.5.5 Rube Goldberg Machines 
 
Although their occurrence is rarer, this account of the copyright-patent divide also provides 
a basis for clarifying unclear cases in which mechanical objects (to which only patents 
typically apply) might be intuitively regarded as copyrightable. A machine that is creatively 
inefficient – such as a Rube Goldberg machine – presents an example of such a case. 
Although, plausibly, a patent may be sought on a Rube Goldberg machine, such a patent 
would seem to hold very limited utility to an ‘inventor’ seeking to preserve their machine. 
Under the provisions of patent protection, if an instance of a Rube Goldberg machine was 
sold, then despite the design of the object having been patented, the purchaser would 
nevertheless assume the right to modify the form of the machine. 
 
Also dissimilar to utilitarian devices, Rube Goldberg machines represent objects that, 
although they have ostensible ‘functions,’ are not multiply realisable because the ‘method’ 
by which the function of such a machine is achieved intentionally subverts the method that 
would be produced by an inventor seeking to maximise efficiency. The attempts of multiple 
inventors to locate the most efficient means by which to achieve an end should be expected 
to arrive at convergent solutions, since there is typically only one most efficient means – 
given the physical properties of the world. By comparison, the task of intentionally making 
a machine less efficient, as in the development of a Rube Goldberg machine, can be realised 
in an effectively infinite number of ways. Because of the divergent nature of this pursuit, it 
is highly unlikely that multiple independent attempts would return the same result. 
 
Patent protection therefore represents an insufficient form of protection in such cases, 
because, presumably, the utilitarian function is not actually the essential function of a Rube 
Goldberg device. Although such an object could be conceived as a very poor attempt at 
engineering, the second-personal interpretation that people naturally engage in makes 
audiences of Rube Goldberg machines, by which they contextualise the object as the work 
of an artist. In this way, the second-personal attribution is essential to determining what the 
object is (a terrible piece of engineering, or a (plausible) competent example of art). The 
application of the second-personal principle, therefore, reveals that Whereas it is not clear 
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under what copyrightable medium a Rube Goldberg machine could be categorised in 
accordance with a strictly physicalist determination of copyright eligibility, this difficulty 
is avoided by remaining sensitive to the second-personal communicativeness of such 
objects. 
 
7.5.6 Selden’s Description of His Bookkeeping System 
 
Finally, this account of the copyright-patent divide also succeeds as a basis for deciding the 
case between Baker and Selden. The Supreme Court was correct in deeming Selden’s 
bookkeeping system ineligible for copyright, but employed an unsatisfactory basis in 
reaching that decision. Although the technical-ornamental distinction tracks a valuable 
division between importantly different kinds of objects, this difference does not turn on the 
forms of ‘ornamental’ objects being constitutive of their functions. 
 
Instead, the reason Selden’s book should not be considered copyrightable, even though it 
is a book, is because it does not represent a second-personal communication. A reader 
employing Selden’s description of his bookkeeping system, and who wants to learn how to 
implement the system, regards the book in the same way that someone constructing flat-
pack furniture regards an instruction manual. Moreover, if the reader determined that 
Selden’s system was valuable, but could amended to better serve their ends, then it would 
be natural for them to make such amendments. In making those amendments, the reader 
may take to physically altering the example charts included in the book (or copies made of 
them), which Selden also sought copyright over. 
 
Although Selden made an appeal for patent protection over his bookkeeping system, only 
to have it denied, patent protection is the appropriate domain for such an object. Indeed, by 
modern standards, a large part Selden’s book might feasibly have been submitted in the 
form of a patent application. This would establish protection over the system itself (which 
would still be modifiable, presuming one secured the initial right to its use), while not 
extending any protection over the text.201 Crucially, however, the reason for not affording 
copyright protections in relation to Selden’s book is not because the system it represents is 
‘useful’ or in some sense distinct from the textual object encompassing its description. The 
feature that precluded Selden’s book from being copyrightable is that it is not second-
personally communicative, and thus does not need to be treated as unmodifiable. 
 
                                                     
201 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Terms of Use for USPTO Websites (Nov 5, 2015), 
<https://www.uspto.gov/terms-use-uspto-websites>. 
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7.6 Anonymous and Pseudonymous Works 
 
Before concluding, a note ought to be made about anonymously and pseudonymously 
published copyrightable works. For this purpose it is necessary to define terms, since there 
is some overlap between the conventional used of the words ‘anonymous’ and 
‘pseudonymous.’ For present purposes I take an anonymously published work to be any 
work to which the relevant author has not attached their name. This includes cases in which 
the author has attached a false name, provided that the name is intended to be (and succeeds 
in being) understood by an audience as a false name. In this way, although such a false 
name may ordinarily be called a pseudonym, I reserve that term here for false names which 
audiences are expected to, or could reasonably, understand to be the author’s real name. 
Two cases considered below, involving the authors ‘Inspector Gadget’ (an obvious false 
name) and Helen Demidenko (an unobvious false name), are intended to render this 
distinction clear. 
 
These notions of anonymity and pseudonymity are relevant because, on the second-
personal account developed in this chapter, it might be thought prima facie that 
anonymously published works would be unable to function as second-personal 
communications; and that pseudonymous works might necessarily constitute deceptions 
which qualify as moral rights offences. Against the claim that anonymous works cannot 
function as second-personal communications, I contend that this notion would rely on an 
over-interpretation of second-personality. Rather than second-personal communications 
requiring addressees to hold in their mind some conception of an object’s author as a 
specific, identifiable agent, it is sufficient (in at least some cases) for addressees to 
understand second-personal communications as a product of some (albeit unidentified) 
relevantly situated author. 
 
The case of anonymous British blogger ‘Inspector Gadget’ illustrates this point. Inspector 
Gadget (hereafter ‘Gadget’) was the pen name and online handle of the author of Police 
Inspector Blog, which operated in its original format between 2006 and 2013.202 Attesting 
to be a British police officer, Gadget used the blog to provide a frontline perspective on 
matters of crime and policing that was sharply critical of alleged bureaucratic inefficiency, 
overregulation, and ‘political correctness.’ The anonymous author has also written a book 
contributed columns to British newspaper The Daily Telegraph under the same false 
                                                     
202 Reproduced in part at: Inspector Gadget, Police Inspector Blog 
<https://theinspectorgadget.wordpress.com/>. 
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name.203 
 
The controversial content and whistle-blower nature of the Police Inspector Blog makes 
the deployment of the ‘Gadget’ name understandable. The continuance of the blog 
depended on Gadget’s anonymity. Moreover, however, despite not knowing the true 
identity of Gadget, the Police Inspector Blog still successfully functions as a second-
personal communication insofar as its function as a communication hinges on its 
audience’s ability to attribute it to Gadget qua a British police officer. If it was revealed 
that the blog’s author was not truly a police officer, then the Police Inspector Blog would 
have to be reinterpreted and understood as something other than it was presented as. 
Perhaps it could be interpreted as speculation, or fiction; but not as a genuine blog. A 
similar reinterpretation would be required if the blog was revealed to be a compilation of 
accounts from separate British police officers rather than a specific individual. 
 
Of course, it follows that if anonymity is used to obscure some relevant fact about an author, 
such that a communicative object can be passed off as something other than the thing it is, 
then this would be a deception that constitutes a moral rights offence. However, this would 
also be true in the case of an author misrepresenting themselves in the same way while 
writing under their own name. Anonymity is not inherently deceptive, and anonymous 
works can still function (if albeit sometimes in a limited capacity) as second-personal 
communications. 
 
On the matter of pseudonyms, I concede that pseudonymously authored works constitute 
deceptions, and acknowledge that one consistent way to regard such works is as objects 
that necessarily offend against moral rights. However, an equally consistent alternative 
account (which I prefer, but shall nevertheless only outline rather than argue for here) is 
available. On this account, although some pseudonymously published works constitute 
moral rights offences, other uses of pseudonym are morally permissible (and possibly 
sometimes morally praiseworthy). On this view, therefore, not all deceptions are moral 
rights offences; but all moral rights offences, including those committed via use of 
pseudonym, are offences because they are deceptions (and not, for instance, property 
offences). 
 
This difference, between the conception of all pseudonym use as inherently impermissible 
and the conception of pseudonym use as variably permissible or impermissible (depending 
                                                     
203 See: Inspector Gadget, Perverting the Course of Justice: The Hilarious and Shocking Inside Story of British 
Policing (Monday Books, 2008). 
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on the particulars), can be characterised as simply a specific instance of moral disagreement 
regarding deception generally. For example, a deontologist might consider all 
pseudonymous authorship to be immoral qua acts of deception. By comparison, a 
consequentialist might consider some pseudonymous authorship to be morally acceptable 
while believing other pseudonymous authorship to be morally condemnable, based on the 
respective consequences that the deception brings about.  
 
A consequentialist might object, for example, to the use of pseudonyms in cases such as 
that of Helen Darville’s novel The Hand that Signed the Paper. In that example, Darville 
wrote under the name ‘Helen Demidenko,’ and although she prefaced her novel by 
explicitly stating that it was a work of fiction, she misrepresented herself as being of 
Ukrainian descent – partially through the adoption of the Ukrainian ‘Demidenko’ surname. 
This misrepresentation was important in positioning the work as a second-personal 
communication because the novel tells the story of a Ukrainian family which collaborates 
with the Nazi Party in Germany during the Holocaust. Moreover, an ostensibly constitutive 
quality of the novel is (or rather was) that it was the product of an author uniquely 
positioned as the descendent of Ukrainian parents and grandparents who lived during the 
Holocaust. This situatedness of the author and her work framed the way in which the novel 
functioned as a communication, and it was integral in establishing the authenticity that 
addressees attributed to the work. The attribution to ‘Demidenko’ was particularly 
important to the way addressees interpreted the author’s moral ‘ownership’ and 
accountability for what were confronting expressions of anti-Semitism by central 
Ukrainian characters in the novel. 
 
Literary communities often respond to cases of ‘literary fraud’ like The Hand that Signed 
the Paper with condemnation in a way that they do not routinely react to other cases of 
pseudonymous authorship. For example, it is not typically considered objectionable to use 
a pseudonym to maintain separate authorial identities when publishing across different 
genres or otherwise for different audiences. It is not my objective to convince a reader of 
the merit of these responses by literary community (a deontologist may still consider this 
an inconsistency), but merely to highlight that insofar as such a divergence in reaction to 
different cases of pseudonymous authorship is rational, it is based on an observation of the 
(variable) consequences of falsely situating a work when it is a second-personal 
communication. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
 
Despite the intuitive difference between copyrightable and uncopyrightable objects, a clear 
and principled articulation of that difference has historically been lacking. An account of 
that difference, formulated as a difference between objects (rather than labour processes) 
is therefore necessary. Establishing the distinction using second-personal 
communicativeness is both principally well informed and pragmatically useful. A critical 
function of this account is to allow for the determination of what unique non-economic 
copyright protections (as distinct from statutory economic copyright protections) ought to 
be understood to naturally apply to correctly copyrightable objects. Usefully, an 
appropriate basis for such protections is already represented at law in the form of IP moral 
rights. However, as was seen in Chapter 5, moral rights are often poorly understood and 
wrongly implemented. Chapter 8 therefore contains a consideration of the intersection of 
second-personal communicativeness and moral rights, to establish a suitable formulation 
of copyright law. 
  
156 
 
Chapter 8  
Appropriate Copyright Protections Derived from Second-
Personal Communicativeness 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter identified second-personal communicativeness as the quality by 
which an object’s eligibility for copyright protection ought to be adjudicated. Objects that 
are second-personally communicative should have copyright protections extended to them, 
while objects that are not second-personally communicative may (or may not) be eligible 
for patent or other protections. This observation alone, however, is insufficient to determine 
what protections copyright ought to confer. One might still ask, for instance, why 
copyrightable objects need to be protected distinctly at all – especially as compared to 
patentable objects. Why, for instance, would it be inappropriate for a unified system to 
handle both kinds of objects identically? The purpose of this chapter is to explain what 
unique protections copyright ought to confer, especially in comparison to alternative IP 
systems. This is conducted in accordance with the principle that any protection which is 
unique to copyright must necessarily be derived from the defining feature of copyrightable 
objects: their second-personal communicative nature. 
 
The most prominent and consequential difference between copyright and patent, under 
existing law, is the disparity between the duration of their respective economic protections. 
With respect to economic monopoly, the maximum duration of patent protection is 25 years 
(for pharmaceuticals), and usually only 20 years (for everything else). By comparison, the 
minimum duration of copyright protection is 70 years. This affects the determination of 
copyright’s scope insofar as there is an incentive (from the point of view of IP owners) to 
classify ambiguous or seemingly borderline objects as copyrightable. All else being equal, 
an object’s owner presumably prefers the more generous term of protection. Despite this 
focus, however, a more fundamental (albeit less often considered) difference exists in 
relation to the respective non-economic protections that copyright and patent systems 
extend to creators. 
 
The relevant non-economic difference between copyright and patent is already reflected 
within existing moral rights legislation. As illustrated in Chapter 5, however, there exists 
significant confusion around both the theoretical basis for, and implementation of, that 
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legislation. A refined moral rights account is therefore required to accurately reflect the 
uniqueness of copyrightable objects at law. As the argument developed in Chapter 7 
suggests, this refinement of moral rights legislation ought to be informed by the conception 
of copyrightable objects as second-personally communicative. Therefore, the function of 
moral rights legislation, as it relates uniquely to copyright, ought to be to secure those rights 
to which second-personal communicators ought naturally to be afforded. 
 
The conclusion reached is that a repaired account of moral rights, which overcomes the 
various misapprehensions raised in Chapter 5, represents be the only defensible basis for 
the copyright-patent distinction. One problem this presents for existing moral rights 
legislation is that several existing moral rights apply in relation to objects that are not (and 
should not be) copyrightable. Moreover, it is shown that only one moral right correctly 
applies exclusively in relation to copyrightable (i.e. second-personally communicative) 
objects. That moral right is the right to have the fidelity of one’s second-personally 
communicative works preserved. 
 
Appropriately reformulating IP law to reflect this observation should be expected to entail 
radical change. A successful reformulation requires the extensive modification and 
redistribution of the respective protections that are afforded under copyright and other IP 
systems. Such a redistribution can only be achieved by reassessing which objects should 
qualify for copyright or patent protection, and then indexing the respective protections 
afford under those systems to the qualities which determine object eligibility. 
 
8.2 Refining an Account of Moral Rights 
 
Moral rights legislation represents a plausible instrument for the principled differentiation 
between copyright and patent. This is because, as established in Chapter 5, moral rights are 
natural rights. Nevertheless, there remains a significant initial obstacle to identifying a 
moral right which is capable of sustaining that point of differentiation. A consideration of 
the treatment of moral rights within the United States reveals that moral rights cannot 
reasonably be characterised as relating uniquely to the domain of copyright. Despite 
explicit moral rights legislation being indexed as a subset of copyright legislation, but not 
arising explicitly in relation to patents or other non-copyright domains, their enforcement 
within the United States relies upon the (largely theoretical) appropriation of trade mark; 
defamation; and other non-copyright law. Insofar as the appropriation of these legislative 
avenues, for use in the protection of authors’ moral rights, is justifiable in principle, it must 
be the case that the same moral rights are recognised (albeit not under that term) in relation 
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to non-copyrightable objects. 
 
To understand how and why this has become the domestic legal situation in the United 
States, it is necessary to consider the broader international copyright landscape. 
Particularly, one must understand the United State’s obligations as a signatory of the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation’s Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (‘Berne Convention’). The Berne Convention is the largest international 
copyright treaty in existence, with 176 signatory countries, and was first ratified in 1886.204 
The function of the Convention is to standardise domestic copyright provisions between 
signatories through the stipulation of minimum protections, and to establish the mutual 
recognition of copyright claims that originate in any signatory country. 
 
As with copyright law generally, the central preoccupation of the Berne Convention regards 
economic copyright protections. However, in addition its economic provisions, the 
Convention also requires that signatories establish domestic moral rights legislation. On 
this, the Convention stipulates that signatories must ensure that: 
 
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and 
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.205 
 
Two central issues arise in relation to this clause. First, the passage alludes to the function 
of moral rights legislation as being to protect an author’s honour and reputation. This, 
however, does not represent a sufficiently basic account of the purpose of moral rights. 
Second, despite the Convention stipulating the requirement for domestic moral rights 
legislation – and despite the United States being signatory to the Convention – the United 
States has not passed explicit legislation that fulfils this obligation. Instead, the United 
States Congress has asserted the view that it is not necessary for the U.S. to introduce 
explicit moral rights legislation in order to meet their obligation, because moral rights 
offences can be sufficiently addressed under other existing law. 
 
These issues are closely related. The United States Congress’s claim that explicit moral 
rights legislation is unnecessary turns on the ability for existing legal avenues to serve the 
                                                     
204 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Berne Convention (Total Contracting Parties:176), 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15>. 
205 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), opened for signature September 
9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24 1971 and amended in 1979 S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27. 
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same end. However, if that amounts to the claim that alternative legal apparatus can be used 
to guarantee the preservation of an author’s honour and reputation, when that should not 
be the purpose of moral rights legislation in the first place, then this clearly presents a 
problem for the sufficiency claim. 
 
8.2.1 The Problem of ‘Honour and Reputation’ 
 
In Chapter 5 it was shown that moral rights offences are deception offences. Specifically, 
the examples of plagiarism and forgery (two types of fraud) were examined. Understanding 
moral rights in this way reveals an incongruence in the prominence that official accounts 
of moral rights (such as in the Berne Convention) afford to the concept of ‘honour and 
reputation.’ This is not to say that the appeal to honour and reputation in relation to 
copyright is altogether misplaced, since protecting honour and reputation is an important 
function of moral rights. Rather, it is to point out that while there is a clear and important 
relationship between accurate (and therefore non-deceptive) attribution, and the concept of 
an author’s honour and reputation, the two concepts are logically distinct. 
 
Specifically, honour and reputation products of responsibility and accountability. This 
means that the authors are invested in the accurate attribution of creative works, for the 
sake of their honour and reputation, because it amounts to the accurate attribution of 
responsibility and accountability. Audiences, too, are invested in the accurate attribution of 
creative works for the same reason. There is a mutual importance both in being held 
responsible for the things one is truly responsible for, and not for other things; and in being 
able to accurately hold other people accountable for the things they are accountable for. 
This subsequently requires object fidelity is maintained in the case of authored objects, for 
as long as the attribution to the author is maintained. 
 
The objection presented here is not, therefore, that the concepts of honour and reputation 
are unrelated to moral rights. Instead, the appropriate claim is that the prominence afforded 
to honour and reputation represents too narrow of a view to be admitted. Particularly, this 
is true because such an account, at least as reflected in the Berne Convention, is too 
individualistic in focus. To derive a defensible account of moral rights, accuracy of 
attribution, and fidelity in reproduction, must be promoted to prominence independent of 
honour and reputation. This is because falsification through the misattribution of authorship 
represents a natural offence independent of the way in which it impacts an author’s honour 
and reputation. It therefore represents the only sufficiently basic foundation for establishing 
moral rights legislation. 
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The concept of ‘honour and reputation’ retains relevance under this framework because 
both components represent prominent second-order values (after truth) which often become 
casualties when deceptions occur. Attributing sub-standard work to an otherwise respected 
author could obviously damage that author’s reputation. However, some moral rights 
breaches remain objectionable despite not being harmful to the honour or reputation of the 
relevant author. This is akin to the way in which, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, frauds that 
do not impose a negative economic impact on defrauded authors nevertheless constitute 
natural moral rights offences. 
 
It is worth considering how the protection of moral rights, in the two ways prescribed by 
the Berne Convention, is ultimately grounded in a concern for the preservation of truth and 
accuracy. Quite straightforwardly, the right of an author to claim authorship over their 
works is a guarantee that certain facts of the world will not be misrepresented. That is, 
certain people, who really are the producers of certain objects, should have the right to be 
acknowledged as such. Less immediately clear, by comparison, is the way in which the 
Berne Convention’s second provision – which introduces the notion of authorial honour 
and reputation – is also motivated by a concern for truth and accuracy. To illustrate this, it 
is worthwhile to examine the United States’ attitude to the Convention’s requirement that 
the identified moral rights be incorporated into the national legislation of its signatory 
countries. 
 
8.2.2 Domestic Moral Rights Legislation in the United States of America 
 
The United States provides no general protection of moral rights.206 The only explicit 
reference to moral rights, within United States law, is provided within the Visual Artists 
Rights Act (VARA). Although VARA acknowledges the existence of moral rights, it only 
extends those rights within a tightly circumscribed scope, which is much narrower than the 
Berne Convention requires.207 The reason that the United States is able to remain a 
recognised signatory of the Convention despite this prima facie failure to satisfy its 
provisions is that the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which oversees the 
Berne Convention, has been satisfied by the claim that complaints regarding moral rights 
breaches within the United States can be sufficiently addressed under existing domestic 
law.208 Defamation law, as well as the Lanham Act (which conventionally concerns 
                                                     
206 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Sul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States 
(Standford Law Books 2010). 
207 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) 17 U.S.C § 106A. 
208 Kwall, above n 206. 
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trademark law) are two components of the United States legal system that have each been 
employed outside of their traditional breadth in order to facilitate moral rights complaints. 
 
There are compelling reasons to believe that neither defamation legislation nor the Lanham 
Act provide sufficient protection to adequately substitute for dedicated moral rights 
legislation.209 For example, under each of these avenues there exists a requirement to 
demonstrate financial or other material harm, rather than to simply evidence damage to 
one’s integrity. In addition, defamation protections are individualistic, in that cases can 
only be actioned by an author who has been wrongly unattributed (or has had something 
falsely attributed to them). As was shown in Chapter 5, moral rights offences like 
plagiarism need to be actionable by third parties, since people other than authors can be 
harmed by moral rights offences, independent of whether an author is harmed. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider why these areas of law have been identified as 
being pertinent to the protection of moral rights. 
 
If either defamation law or the Lanham act does succeed (to even a limited extent) in 
accommodating moral rights claims, then they do because of the way in which they relate 
to the concepts of truth and accuracy. Moreover, given that the measure of their suitability 
is the Berne Convention, their success must derive from their acknowledgement of the 
instrumental importance that truth has in relation to individual honour and reputation.210 
The defining consequences of defamation, being the exposure of a victim to hatred; 
ridicule; contempt; lessened esteem; or shunning, all clearly display a conceptual kinship 
with the notions of honour and reputation. Combined with the condition that only the 
communication of false statements can constitute defamation (which emerged out of the 
landmark 1733 defence offered in the representation of John Peter Zenger: that “truth is an 
absolute defence against libel”), defamation can be reasonably understood as a deception 
offence in which honour and reputation are necessarily casualties. This makes it appear to 
be prima facie a natural fit as an avenue for enforcing moral rights. 
 
Alongside defamation law, the Lanham Act, which is typically applied in relation to 
trademarks, has similar essential components that contribute to the United States Congress 
considering it to be a suitable substitute for dedicated moral rights legislation. The Lanham 
Act provides that: 
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Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services … uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device … or any false designation of 
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation 
of fact, which – 
(A) Is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or 
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person … 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged by such act.211 
 
Although this was written with the intention of governing trademarks, its application to 
copyright and moral rights does seem correctly motivated and appropriate. The Act 
recognises deception offences as potentially impactful in several ways, including to a 
person’s honour or reputation. Additionally, whereas a defamation lawsuit can only be 
actioned by the defamed individual on their own behalf (making it an individualistic rather 
than social protection), the Lanham Act openly protects third parties who also stand to be 
harmed by deception offences like frauds. 
 
Although the Lanham Act has effectively been considered sufficient by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation as a substitute for explicit moral rights legislation, the 
Act makes no direct reference to the notion of honour and reputation. Instead, the Lanham 
Act only references offences such as the false designation of origin and false description of 
fact. Insofar as the World Intellectual Property Organisation is appeased by the existence 
of the Lanham Act, then, it is because the requirements of the Berne Convention, regarding 
honour and reputation, are met by the Lanham Act’s explicit regard for truth and accuracy. 
This demonstrates the way in which the Berne Convention’s preoccupation with honour 
and reputation is ultimately nested within a broader concern for truth and accuracy. 
 
Importantly, by comparison, this is not an equivalency that is bi-directional. That is, 
although a protection of truth and accuracy can successfully substitute, in the intended way, 
as a protection of honour and reputation, a protection of honour and reputation cannot 
successfully act as a substitute protection of honour and reputation. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 5, some instances of fraud seem not to be harmful to honour or reputation at all. In 
the case of a forger who attaches another’s name to the product of their own labour, the 
producer of the object (the forger) incurs no infringement against their honour or reputation. 
                                                     
211 Lanham (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, Enacted July 5, 1946, Codified at 15 U.S.C §1051 
et seq (15 U.S.C. ch.22), § 43(a). 
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Of course, if the product was of poor quality, then the honour and reputation of the person 
whose name was erroneously attached to the work could suffer, but it is not implausible 
that the forged object could be of sufficiently high quality that the forgery could have a 
positive impact upon the honour and reputation of the falsely attributed ‘author.’ 
 
Similarly, by attributing their work to a famous artist, a skilled but unknown artist could 
become better enabled to profit from the marketing of their work, while the famous artist 
could enjoy additional or continued praise for the ostensible application of their skill. This 
would nevertheless cause deception that would result in confusion and mistake on the part 
of the public, which would satisfy the conditions for a successful civil action suit under the 
Lanham Act. On the other hand, despite these continued harms to the public, it is not clear 
how the Berne Convention, with its focus on individual honour and reputation, could be 
straightforwardly applied without there being made a further appeal to the values of truth 
and accuracy. A reformulation of the treatment of moral rights in the Berne Convention, 
through the clarification that the fundamental function of moral rights is to preserve truth 
and accuracy, is therefore appropriate. 
 
8.2.3  Inadequate Duration of Moral Rights Under the Berne Convention 
 
In addition to the re-articulation of the central purpose of moral rights, the Berne 
Convention requires modification with respect to the minimum duration for which 
signatories must recognise moral rights. It was shown in Chapter 5 that moral rights are 
natural rights which do not expire, and thus the Berne Convention should be expected to 
reflect that. Unfortunately, as an extension of the way in which the Berne Convention 
regards moral rights as individualistic rights, it prescribes several unjustifiable limitations 
on the duration of moral rights. First, the Convention requires only that moral rights be 
preserved “at least until the expiry of the economic rights,”212 except where some 
(unspecified) moral rights may be regarded to lapse upon an author’s death.213 
 
Although these limitations are consistent with an interpretation of moral rights as 
fundamentally concerned with honour and reputation, they are incongruous with an account 
of moral rights which identifies their primary function as the preservation of truth and 
accuracy. Again, there is a parallel here between moral rights and defamation law, insofar 
as it is commonly regarded that if the sole purpose of legislation is to provide an avenue 
for the redress of material harms which result from an injury to one’s honour or reputation, 
                                                     
212 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artisitc Works, above n 204. 
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then there is no practical benefit in the extension of those protections to dead people. Many 
jurisdictions regard it to be impossible, for instance, to defame the dead, since dead people 
are not materially affected by reputation (or anything else). 
 
Understood as social protections (not individual protections), which are concerned with the 
preservation of truth and accuracy (not merely honour and reputation), moral rights can be 
naturally understood as appropriately perpetual protections. The truth values of natural 
facts (such as who authored an object) do not expire because of an author’s death or the 
expiration of any person’s economic rights. Instead, preserving the accuracy of such 
records remains perpetually necessary. 
 
8.2.4 Moral rights for non-copyrightable objects 
 
Although it requires something of a creative, non-standard, and ultimately under-
recognised application to succeed,214 in principle the Lanham Act appears capable of 
serving as a avenue for the enforcement of moral rights within the United States. Notably, 
however, the Act was originally only intended to provide trademark protection. This dual 
applicability provides an initial reason to suspect that moral rights ought to be recognised 
as existing in relation to property beyond objects that are copyrightable. This is a notion 
worth exploring in some depth. Indeed, insofar as moral rights represent a right of 
attribution in relation to copyrightable objects, this right only barely, if at all, extends 
beyond the quite standard expectations of attribution that arise in relation to any act of 
labour. That is, social demand for truth and accuracy in the attribution of labour is not 
typically contingent on a consideration of what sorts of property the labour produces. 
Consequently, moral rights can be expected to extend not just beyond copyright, but 
beyond all forms of traditional IP. 
 
This is reflected in the Lanham Act itself, as can be illustrated through considering 
comparative (potential) applications of the Act to different objects. The first and most 
obvious comparison to be made is between the application of the Lanham Act to the 
domains of copyright and trademark. There are many important similarities between 
copyright law and trademark law, and these similarities are of an essentially non-economic 
variety that align largely with the properties specific to moral rights. Dissimilar to an 
institution like the patent institution, wherein formal application and registration is required 
in order to establish legal protections over an idea, within the United States both copyrights 
                                                     
214 Kwall argues, convincingly, that the Lanham Act remains deplorably inadequate as a substitute for dedicated 
moral rights legislation within the United States precisely because of its invisibility to moral rights holders as 
an avenue for the protection of their rights. See: Kwall, above n 206. 
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and trademark rights are attained automatically upon the publication of an object, or the 
use of a mark, respectively.215 Also like copyright, trademark protection serves both the 
individualistic interests of trademark holders (by guarding their brand recognition, and the 
reputation that accompanies their brand) as well as the public interest (by protecting 
consumers against confusion and deception). The overall purpose of trademark is to 
guarantee that the provenance of a product remains clearly apparent to the public, to ensure 
that there are clear lines of accountability for the product’s quality. 
 
Of course, differences also exist between the way in which copyrights and trademarks 
function. Trademarks are used exclusively in relation to commerce, and so might seem 
inherently economic by nature; it has been shown that copyright, although it often protects 
objects that are commercially profitable, is just as able to be employed (when it comes to 
moral rights) in the protection of non-commercially valuable products. The perceived 
commercial nature of trademarks has contributed to their being deemed saleable, and they 
can be transferred in isolation or as part of the sale of a business. This is significant because 
it is equivalent to a transfer of reputation, honour, and implied accountability, which runs 
contrary to the preservation of truth and accuracy. In fact, the sale of a trademark 
independently of the ‘underlying goodwill,’ which consists of the reputational value of the 
name-recognition the trademark brings, is termed an assignment in gross, and invalidates 
the entire transferral of the mark. It may be that the transferral of trademarks is subsequently 
indefensible; though it is likely that differences between corporate identities and individual 
human identities may require this transferability as a matter of pragmatism.216 In either 
                                                     
215 The case of trademarks within the US, the automatic protection occurs at the state level only, with formal 
registration required in order to expand the exclusivity of the mark such that it extends nationwide. This is not 
fundamentally a dissimilarity between copyright and trademark, however, because it reflects the observation of 
the natural limits to the breadth of trademark recognition. It may be likely for residents of a particular state to 
be confused and misled by the operation of an organisation under a mark similar to one that is already in use in 
that area. It is also not unreasonable to expect the second operator to be aware of the existing mark, and to hold 
them accountable if they do not become so before operating their own mark. By comparison, residents are likely 
to be unaware of a myriad of organisations operating in other states, rendering them immune to confusing them 
with other organisations operating under similar marks. The extent of the common law thereby tracks the natural 
communicative reach of the mark within a market, as is right. This is further reinforced by the fact that an 
operator operating in one state, although not expected or required to be aware of existing marks that are used 
only in other states, is nevertheless not permitted to use a mark similar to a mark used interstate if the operator 
does somehow have knowledge of that mark. See also: United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark 
FAQs (5 Aug 2014) <https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/trademark-faqs>. 
216 The complexity arises due to the fluidity of corporate identities as compared to personal identities. When it 
comes to corporate identities, it seems unviable to stipulate that persistent trademarks must track persistent 
corporate bodies, such that any personnel change (such as a single employee leaving the company) would 
mandate a change in associated marks. At the same time, we might imagine a Ship of Theseus situation wherein 
all the original members of Firm Alpha leave, one by one, to take up positions at Firm Omega – a competitor 
in the same industry. Eventually, all of those members (and only those members) come to comprise the entire 
personnel (and in the same configuration of roles) as they once did at Firm Alpha. We might ask which mark 
it would be right for each of the firms to operate under, and whether it would change things had the members 
made a single coordinated transfer as a group. Determining deceptiveness should be the guiding principle in 
answering these questions, and part of that requires determining baseline expectations that clients have 
regarding the consistency or fluidity or corporate structures. Determining appropriate responses to these 
problems is well beyond the scope of the present account, however. 
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case, the fundamental purpose for which trademark regimes are established is to preserve 
clear communication regarding the provenance of objects. This means they can be 
understood as a species of moral rights. 
 
As well as trademarks, moral rights ought to be acknowledged in relation to patent 
protection and justifiably patentable objects, too. Indeed, insofar as the Lanham Act has 
the capacity to satisfy the need for legislated moral rights protection in relation to copyright, 
it appears equally sufficient as a means of providing it in relation to patents. More than 
sufficient, in fact, it appears necessary. 
 
Patent protection has what appears to be an initial advantage when it comes to successfully 
integrating moral rights, because although (like trademarks) patents might be thought of as 
inherently economic in nature, the protection of moral rights is in fact heavily tied up in the 
requirements that need to be met before a patent is granted. For example, attribution is 
guaranteed by the requirement that patent applicants be named on the patent application. 
Moreover, an individual may only enter a patent application on behalf of themselves, and 
only the true inventor of an object may file for a patent over that invention. If a person was 
discovered to have been granted a patent which protects an object that they had not 
themselves invented, then, even if the true inventor was complicit in and consented to the 
application being made, this would invalidate the patent. 
 
Furthermore, because there is a public register upon which successful patent applications 
are recorded, the way in which the original conception of the inventive idea was first 
publicly presented is maintained and can be perpetually accessed. This prevents the original 
expression of a patented idea from being altered and deformed through its inaccurate 
duplication – or it at least provides an authoritative avenue through which to verify the 
(in)accuracy of any representation that is constructed. This means that an inventor’s moral 
right to have their name attributed to their idea (which is faithfully-represented in a patent) 
is protected as soon as they patent it. 
 
Nevertheless, this incidental protection of inventors’ moral rights, via their entwinement 
with the economic processes of the patent system, does not provide sufficient protection in 
isolation. Not only does the patent system’s success in protecting moral rights occur absent 
of any explicit account of the values being protected, but, in isolation, it also excludes from 
protection any inventor who does not seek patent protection on their inventions. It thereby 
unduly treats moral rights as ancillary rights that are contingent on the assertion of statutory 
economic rights. Moral rights must instead be acknowledged to apply independently of 
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economic rights, including in relation to inventors who do not exercise the option to patent 
their inventions. In such cases, a non-patenting inventor could (again, at least theoretically) 
be expected to find redress through the Lanham Act (and perhaps too through other 
legislation such as defamation law). 
 
More broadly still, it is evident that everyday instances of productive behaviour must be 
equally protected, even where they do not at all intersect with traditional IP structures such 
as copyright; patent; or trademark. For example, a landscaper who builds an ordinary 
retaining wall or fence, under contract to a client, must be taken to have the same exclusive 
right to have the product of their labour attributed to them. They are the producer of a 
product in just the same way as an author or inventor is. Not only is this an individual right 
that serves the landscaper, but because contractors and clients may base their hiring 
decisions on a survey of previous work, this attribution plays an essential social function. 
We ought to expect, on appeal to the values of truth and accountability, that a person who 
labours to construct a wall or fence to be afforded the ability (and in some cases, the 
obligation) to claim responsibility for the labour they perform. Fortunately, the Lanham 
Act (and other legislation) protects these kinds of true claims about facts of the word while 
prohibiting competing claims that are made in bad faith. 
 
As has thus been demonstrated, moral rights must be understood to arise in relation not 
only to copyrightable objects, but also to all objects produced via labour. This presents an 
ostensible problem, since (in Chapter 5) it was demonstrated that economic rights cannot 
provide a basis for the principled differentiation between copyrightable and patentable 
objects. If moral rights were also shown provide a basis for differentiating between separate 
categories of object (because they applied equally to all objects) then no principled 
distinction between copyright and patent could exist. On the contrary, however, although 
many moral rights apply equally in the case of copyrightable and non-copyrightable 
objects, the second protection cited in the Berne Convention can be shown to apply 
uniquely to copyrightable objects. That is, the protection against the distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification of an author’s work can be shown to attach appropriately to the 
defining feature of copyrightable objects – being their second-personal 
communicativeness. 
 
8.3 Non-Modifiability as a Moral Right Unique to Copyright 
 
In Section 7.3.3, the comparative nature of copyrightable and patentable objects was 
considered in relation to their respective modifiability. Although the Berne Convention’s 
168 
 
provision against modification is slightly too narrow (because it vests protection only in 
terms of honour and reputation, which is insufficiently basic), a preclusion against 
modification, which applies uniquely to correctly copyrightable objects, is appropriate. In 
other important ways, however, the appropriate scope of this moral right may be narrower 
than its proponents anticipate. This is because a determination must be made as to what 
constitutes the modification of an object, as compared to the derivative production of a 
distinct (albeit similar) object. 
 
An example is useful to illustrate the function of this component of moral rights legislation. 
The case of Alexander Calder – a United States artist – is illustrative. In 1958, Calder 
produced the artwork Pittsburgh, which took the form of a black and white mobile 
constructed from aluminium and iron (two metals taken to be iconic of the city of 
Pittsburgh). Pittsburgh was purchased by a private collector, and it was donated to be 
installed at Allegheny County airport, Pittsburgh. In the wake of subsequent renovations 
that were made to the airport, however, authorities there opted to modify the mobile. First, 
they immobilised the individual parts of the mobile (which were originally able to move 
independently), before attaching a motor to the reworked object to provide movement to 
the artwork as a whole. In addition, the airport resurfaced the new object in the colours 
green and gold – covering up the original black and white – for the purpose of integrating 
the piece into the new aesthetic that had been achieved during the airport’s renovation.217 
 
Calder objected to the implementation of these changes. However, the installation and 
modification of his work occurred prior to the United States becoming a signatory to the 
Berne Convention, and prior to the implementation of VARA. As such, no legislative basis 
existed on which Calder could expect to have his objection legally sustained, and so he was 
dissuaded from pursuing a legal case regarding the matter.218 Under the provision of the 
Berne Convention, however, this would have constituted a moral rights offence. 
 
To reiterate the point made in Section 7.3.3, this is importantly different to the way in which 
a patented object is treated under the law. Had Pittsburgh airport installed a useful 
mechanical device of some kind, which had been designed to specifications outlined in a 
patent (which the airport had appropriately paid for the right to use), then the airport 
authority’s decision to later amend the design of that machine, to make it better serve the 
needs of the airport, would not constitute a moral rights offence (nor an economic patent 
violation). Although the airport authority may not otherwise have been permitted to 
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implement the altered mechanical design without first purchasing the original patent rights 
(i.e. if the altered design was not sufficiently different when compared to the original 
patented design), the securing of the right to use the patented design would also entail the 
right to use similar, but altered, designs. 
 
This different treatment of Calder’s mobile installation and patented utilitarian designs 
reflects the second-personal communicativeness of Calder’s work. Notice that this 
indexation to second-personal communication is not contingent on any affect that 
modification has on a communicator’s honour or reputation. Although a large cause for 
Calder’s objection to the modification of Pittsburgh was that he considered the artistic 
vision it represented to be inferior to his own, that does not represent a necessary basis for 
his objection. This can be seen by examining the logically antecedent case, which, although 
counterfactual, was theoretically possible. That is, we can imagine that the case instead 
involved Calder originally constructing Pittsburgh in its adjoined, motorised, and green 
and gold form. In this case, had the airport authority modified the artwork into its 
segmented, non-motorised, and black and white form, then this should be expected to 
represent a benefit to Calder’s honour and reputation (if he was correct in his belief that 
this form of the artwork reflected more positively on him). 
 
Nevertheless, it should be expected that Calder, in the counterfactual instance, should still 
have the right to object to the unauthorised modification. This, importantly, is not 
contingent on a notion of ambiguity or subjectivity as to which version of the artwork truly 
reflected more positively upon Calder. First, the assertion of an author’s right against 
modification of their work is not contingent on the author being able to demonstrate that 
the modified version reflects less positively upon them than their original version. Second, 
even if such a demonstration of damage to one’s honour or reputation was required (similar 
to the requirement to demonstrate material damage in bringing forward a successful 
defamation case), the demonstrability of that fact in one of the cases would logically 
preclude the demonstration of the same fact in the antecedent example. 
 
Moreover, additional cases can be imagined wherein the original author of a work objects 
to its subsequent (unauthorised) modification, despite openly acknowledging that they 
expect their reputation to benefit from the modification. For example, an artist may have 
created a potentially controversial work of art, which, although they believe it to 
communicate an important message, they also recognise shall bring them into general 
disrepute. If the curator of an exhibit in which that artwork is to be showcased ultimately 
balks at exhibiting the object and modifies it so that it is less controversial and has more 
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mass appeal, then the artist could not object to that modification on the basis that they 
incurred damage to their honour or reputation. The artist could correctly, however, object 
to that modification as an undue corruption of a speech act. In modifying the object, the 
curator would be generating a second-personally communicative object that was not 
attributable, as a communication, to the original artist. 
 
8.3.1 Offence Against Third Parties 
 
It also important to note that, being offences against communication, muting offences 
negatively affect audiences as well as authors. This means that for the duration that 
audiences have a continuing interest in consuming second-personally communicative 
works, there exists a moral basis for preserving their original integrity. For example, despite 
Da Vinci having died approximately 500 years ago, it would still constitute a natural 
offence for an administrator at the Louvre to paint over or otherwise amend the Mona Lisa 
in a (misadvised) attempt to improve upon Da Vinci’s original artistic vision. While 
restorative work (to preserve Da Vinci’s vision) may be warranted, the impartation of a 
new artistic vision, which would corrupt Da Vinci’s (while it was still attributed to him) 
would be both an offence to Da Vinci and to his audience. 
 
8.3.2 Modification of a Work vs Creation of Derivative Works 
 
One final conceptual difficulty arises in relation to the application of a right against 
modification. That is, one must be able to distinguish between modification that simply 
corrupts an original communication attributable to an author, and the kind of modification 
that arises in the process of creating derivative works. This distinction is most clear in 
relation to one-of-a-kind objects like paintings. Painting over a portion of the original Mona 
Lisa in a misguided attempt to improve it, or amending a mural of Christ to cover his bare 
chest for modesty (as in the case of a work by Alfred Crimi in Rutgers Presbyterian),219 
clearly involves an offence that involves an effective deletion of an original author’s artistic 
vision through the substitution of another author’s vision – without appropriately 
modifying the attribution of the work. 
 
By comparison, the publication of a digital reproduction of the Mona Lisa, in which the 
original composition was recognisable, but had been digitally altered, would involve the 
modification of the Mona Lisa that would nevertheless leave the original artefact intact. In 
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this case, the original speech act captured in the Mona Lisa would be preserved, even 
though a subsequent speech act would have also been made. In this case, a distinction 
between the original speech act and the derivative speech act seems clear, such that the 
original has not been corrupted (independent of whether the derivative object is considered 
so similar as to constitute an economic copyright infringement). In this case, the attribution 
of the original and the attribution of the derivative could be separated and simultaneously 
maintained. 
 
In real cases, however, the distinction between two objects is not necessarily as clear. 
Consider, for instance, the recent example involving the sculpture Charging Bull, located 
on Ney York’s Wall Street. Originally installed as a piece of guerrilla artwork by Arturo 
Di Modica in 1989, the 3.2 tonne bronze statue of a bull was placed in the financial district, 
intended to stand as a symbol of prosperity and strength.220 In 2017, however, a separate 
sculpture, created by Kristen Visbal under commission to State Street Global Advisors, 
was placed opposite Charging Bull. Visbal’s sculpture, called Fearless Girl, depicts a 
young girl, feet firmly planted and hand on hips, defiantly staring down (on account of its 
relative positioning) Di Modica’s sculpted bull. Fearless Girl is intended as a 
communication about gender equality and the place of women within the financial industry. 
Di Modica, however, considers Fearless Girl to have corrupted the artistic integrity of 
Charging Bull, rendering it a menace and a villain rather than a positive symbol.221 
 
There is no question that the meaning of Fearless Girl, as a speech act, is contingent on its 
positioning in relation to Charging Bull. In this sense it is a derivative work, and, moreover, 
a person seeing the two sculptures for the first time, with no background knowledge of their 
respective productions, might infer that they constitute a single object. Interpreted this way, 
the situation could be understood as one in which a single object has always existed in that 
location (originally Di Modica’s Charging Bull), which has subsequently been modified 
by Visbal. 
 
On the other hand, however, unlike the previously considered cases which involved (for 
example) the direct application of paint to cover up and physically obscure an original 
object, Charging Bull can still be interpreted as a standalone object as well as a component 
of a second object that involves Fearless Girl. Interpreted this way, Fearless Girl can be 
understood as making a communication which is derived from and exists simultaneously 
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to, but does not interfere with or preclude, the original communication made via Charging 
Bull. On this view, Fearless Girl can be understood in much the same way as any other 
artwork that comments on or criticises other artwork. This function of art is protected as a 
case of free expression, and when it is effective, the criticism or commentary may change 
public perception of the work being commented on. Outside of cases involving 
commentary that defames, authors have no moral rights securing their work against such 
commentary and criticism. Therefore, even if Visbal has changed the way Charging Bull 
is perceived, she has not violated any moral right of Di Modica’s if she has not falsely 
attributed either of their respective works. 
 
Potential cases, similar in nature, can be imagined in relation to the book print industry. 
For example, consider a hypothetical case in which a publisher purchases the economic 
copyright to an author’s original novel, and prints and distributes 100 copies of it. 
Subsequently, imagine that the publisher makes several trivial changes, such as to the 
names of characters, but otherwise republishes the book under the publisher’s own name, 
and prints and distributes 500,000 copies of that ‘new’ derivative work. Such an action may 
or may not (because of the publisher’s having purchased the economic copyright to the 
original work) constitute an economic copyright offence, but that question would remain 
somewhat beside the point of the moral rights question. Although, like with the case of 
Fearless Girl, the publisher’s actions would (technically) preserve the speech act of the 
original author, and contribute a second independent speech act in addition. This should be 
understood as objectionable, however, in a way that Fearless Girl is not necessarily so. 
 
To understand and be able to articulate what makes the previous example naturally 
objectionable, it is worth considering the protected status of parody within the United 
States. This serves as a useful analogue because works of parody are exempt from copyright 
protections, and the reason why that is appropriate can be indexed to the position they 
occupy as derivative communicative objects. That is, a work of parody only successfully 
functions as parody if it is appropriately contextualised as a derivative work by an audience 
sufficiently familiar with the original source of the derivation. Sometimes a parody will 
function to skewer an entire class of objects, such as through the humorous treatment of 
tropes common to a genre of work. At other times, however, a parody will target a single 
title, such as The Lord of the Rings, and attempt the same function specifically in relation 
to it. In either case, the parody relies on the audience’s prior familiarity with the relevant 
genre (or other class) or specific title. 
 
In these cases, then, a successful derivative work of parody cannot be constructed where a 
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record of the original is not maintained (including details of its attribution). This is because 
authors rely on audiences to contextualise parodies within a broader knowledge of a 
specific prior communication or class of prior communications. This is not only true of 
parody, however. Returning to the hypothetical case of the objectionable publisher, 
publishing a derivative but (trivially) new object, we see that the application of the same 
standard is appropriate. That is, irrespective of whether an economic offence is committed, 
a moral rights offence is evident because the publisher’s derivative work, being (by design) 
so much more broadly distributed than the original work from which it was derived, cannot 
reasonably be expected to be understood qua the derivative work that it is. The speech act 
represented in such a derivative work could therefore not reasonably have its relevant 
second-personal qualities ascertained. The production of such a work would not only 
represent an offence against the author of the work from which it was derived, but also a 
natural deception offence against the audience of the work. 
 
Finally, such deceptive cases must be considering against cases of what might be called 
honest (rather than deceptive) modifications of works – including one-of-a-kind works. 
Several cases of this kind are defended as artistically meritorious by Amy Adler in her 
paper ‘Against Moral Rights.’222 Adler considers, for example, Rauschenberg’s erasure of 
a drawing by the revered artist Willem de Kooning. This erasure, which did not completely 
remove the original drawing but left only a faint impression of it to be seen, was 
subsequently presented and contextualised by Rauschenberg as a new work of art titled 
Erased de Kooning Drawing. Although certainly not a parody, Rauschenberg’s artwork 
nevertheless functions in a similar way – as an honestly attributed communication – 
because of the overt attribution of the original drawing as de Kooning’s work (and 
communication) and the act of erasure as Rauschenberg’s work and communication.223 
 
In a significant departure from existing moral rights regimes, I agree with Adler that (at 
least some) such acts of modification, where the nature and extent of the alterations are 
clearly demarcated and attributed to distinct author while a record of the original 
communication is accurately maintained and attributed to the original author, should not 
be considered moral rights offences. While there may be other social; cultural; or political 
reasons to object to the modification of important works (as there may be for objecting to 
the complete destruction of those works, when the preservation of other works is not 
considered important), these bases should not be confused as constituting moral rights 
bases. Indeed, antecedently, similarly social; cultural; or political reasons could lend weight 
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against the preservation of artworks (again, contra existing moral rights regimes), as in the 
case (perhaps) of portraits and statutes of dictators or (in the United States) Civil-War era 
confederate leaders. Moral rights regimes ought to regard the preservation of attribution, 
and not the preservation of communication per se. 
 
8.4 Implications for the Implementation of Copyright law 
 
This reconceptualization of the moral right of non-modifiability as the defining protection 
to be afforded to correctly copyrightable objects has important implications for the broader 
implementation of copyright. In Section 6.4.2 it was shown that, on a physicalist conception 
of copyright, cross-media adaptations would not likely constitute copyright infringements, 
since they necessarily involved obviously distinct physical forms. Moreover, the presence 
of any non-physical similarity between such objects – such as specific plot devices or 
themes – could only be deemed to constitute an infringement on economic grounds, and 
only if it could be empirically shown that the prospect of derivative cross-media adaptations 
represented a disincentive to original production (which is unlikely). Copyright holders 
may be tempted to escape this concession (not wanting to relinquish their existing rights to 
control cross-media adaptation) by appeal to a non-physicalist account. However, given 
qualities of a non-physicalist account that have hereto been demonstrated to be appropriate, 
that manoeuvre cannot succeed without accepting significant additional consequences. 
 
Reconsider the counterfactual case in which Sony produced its cinematic interpretation of 
Harry Potter without J.K. Rowling’s permission. By the time such filmic adaptations were 
made, the Harry Potter novels were sufficiently recognisable that the films could only have 
been perceived as derivative works. If Rowling’s name was not misleadingly used in 
association with the films, then no natural offence would have been committed in producing 
the films without her consent. No second-personally communicative work would have been 
misrepresented, and Rowling’s own novels would not have been modified by the existence 
of the derivative work. Once again, only the empirical economic matter could be used as a 
basis for deeming it an offence, and that basis would not be likely to succeed. 
 
A detractor might object to this position by asserting that such unauthorised derivative 
works do in fact function to modify the original work. Only by giving control over 
adaptations, it might be thought, can an author be assured of having their work retain the 
integrity it needs to be appropriately interpreted as a second-personal communication. 
However, despite asserting the minimum required to sustain such a claim, this argument 
entails more than its proponents are likely to intend. 
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For example, one must recall that moral rights, being natural rights that pertain to the 
protection of truth and accuracy, apply perpetually. In addition, they function as protections 
to the public as well as to authors. Therefore, if one accepts that the only way to ensure that 
the communicative integrity of an author’s work is to have them control cross-media (and 
any other) adaptations of their work, then such adaptations could only ever be made during 
the lifetime of the author. If Rowling had died during the production of one of Sony’s Harry 
Potter films, for example, then production on that film would have to have ceased 
immediately. On this account, if development on the project had have continued without 
Rowling’s oversight, then this would have represented a risk to the integrity of her original 
work. This, in turn, would have presented a risk of offending against its public audience. 
 
The consequence of this is critical, as it means accepting one of two conclusions: 
1) Cross-media adaptation of a creative work is unlikely to reasonably constitute 
an offence (i.e. in that it could only be an offence for economic reasons, 
contingent on a disincentivising effect that is unlikely to be evidenced). Or; 
2) Cross-media adaptations of a creative work, if they are not presided over by 
the original work’s author, represent too great of a risk against the integrity of 
the original object. This means that adaptations can only be permitted 
expressly by the author – while they are alive – and that the author must retain 
the right to veto such an adaptation at any point during its production, prior to 
its publication. 
I endorse the former conceptualization, since it is much more consistent with the general 
economic function of copyright on the utilitarian account. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
Although explicit moral rights legislation (where it exists) is indexed as a subsection of 
copyright law, most of the moral rights provisions which are extended under such 
legislation apply with equal force to uncopyrightable objects. Indeed, this observation 
amounts to the United States’ entire justification for not having general moral rights 
legislation, despite being a signatory to the Berne Convention. That is, such complaints can 
be handled under legislative avenues designed to protect uncopyrightable objects. 
However, one moral right – the right of non-modifiability – applies uniquely to second-
personally communicative objects, and thus represents the only identifiable non-economic 
basis for the copyright-patent (and the broader copyright/non-copyright) divide. 
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Implementing both a system of economic copyright and moral rights protections, in view 
of the account provided in this chapter, requires radical changes to be made to existing 
copyright regimes. First, it is essential to abandon the individualistic focus of a 
predominantly ‘honour and reputation’ based account of moral rights, and to recognise the 
primary relevance moral rights have in relation to truth and accuracy. From that 
acknowledgement it follows that moral rights must be protected perpetually, since the 
importance of truth and accuracy extends beyond the author and to public audiences. 
Moreover, this extension continues past the death of authors, and independently of any 
economic rights they hold. 
 
The role of the right of non-modifiability must also be understood to have fundamental 
implications for the implementation of copyright. If a non-physicalist account of copyright 
is to be preferred over a physicalist account, and the essential non-physicalist property 
unique to correctly copyrightable objects is understood to be their second-personal 
communicativeness, then the right to non-modifiability must be implemented as the 
measure of whether an object constitutes a legitimately derived work or an object that 
infringes against an original author’s natural right to authorial communication. 
 
This measure can be set according (broadly) to one of two standards. On a liberal 
conception, the question of whether a derivative object is too like the original to be 
permissible would be left almost entirely to an economic calculation as to whether that 
degree of similarity, if it were universally permissible, would have a negative impact on 
the incentivisation of original production. The only exception to this would be in the 
consideration of cases wherein a trivially ‘original’ derivative object is (likely 
intentionally) afforded a broader circulation than the original, with the effect that it 
obscures the nature of the object qua a derivative object to the audience. If this standard is 
accepted, then at a minimum we should expect that cinematic adaptations of successful 
novels are not ordinarily considered to constitute infringements, even if they are 
unauthorised. 
 
The second standard by which the right to non-modifiability could be applied is much more 
restrictive. By this standard, almost any derivative work would be regarded as a likely threat 
to the integrity of the original work, to such a degree that the development of derivative 
works could only justifiably occur at the express (and continuing) pleasure of the original 
object’s author. This would also entail that no derivative works could be produced after an 
author’s death, since that would offer no alleviation of the risk to integrity. 
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I advocate the adoption of the more liberal standard, since it better reflects the ordinary use 
of derivation that seems natural in creative processes. Whichever standard one endorses, 
however, a substantial reconceptualization of copyright necessarily follows. Copyright law 
needs to be reformulated with regard to both what objects are categorised as copyrightable 
and uncopyrightable, and how those respective classes are legally regarded and protected. 
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Chapter 9  
A Just Construction of Copyright 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The construction of a just copyright regime requires an appreciation of several critical 
points of nuance. The objective of this chapter is to tie together those various points, which 
have been raised in previous Chapters, and to demonstrate the relationships between them. 
This shall serve to provide a holistic and unified positive account of copyright. Unlike 
historical attempts to locate a justification for copyright, which have overwhelmingly 
involved the post hoc defence of a preconceived formulation of copyright, the intention 
here is to determine the principled based for copyright first, and to derive an appropriate 
formulation of copyright founded on that. This should be expected to deliver a version of 
copyright that is markedly dissimilar to the version implemented in law today. 
 
The most important distinction to draw in formulating a holistic account of copyright is the 
distinction between its economic and non-economic components. The predominant 
motivation driving copyright holders to pursue the continuation and expansion of copyright 
(in its current form) has been the security of financial and economic advantage. As a result, 
the focus placed on the economic function of copyright, both in philosophical theory and 
in the practical application of law, largely overwhelms the consideration of any other 
function copyright may appropriately have. It is essential, however, to differentiate 
between the function copyright has in establishing and protecting economic property rights, 
and the function copyright has in protecting natural moral rights. 
 
Where moral rights are considered within copyright theory, and especially where they are 
implemented as a component of law, they receive a rather confused treatment. Proponents 
of expansive copyright often conflate the economic and moral-rights functions of copyright 
by attempting to attribute the natural quality of moral rights to the economic protections it 
provides. In this way, the natural uniqueness of copyrightable objects is inappropriately 
represented as establishing a reason to eschew appeals to consequentialist reasoning in 
determining what protections (and what durations of protection) are appropriate under 
copyright. On the other hand, the moral rights component of copyright is often intentionally 
minimized at law because the non-economic protections they establish can restrict the way 
that copyrightable objects can be used by copyright holders other than original authors (e.g. 
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publishers). 
 
Stephanie Plamondon Bair notes that scholars typically regard consequentialist and moral-
rights accounts of copyright as being diametrically opposed, with the assumption being that 
the “two theories have little in common and are incompatible with one another.”224 Bair 
acknowledges that “a small subset of scholars”225 pursue a middle ground, and attempts 
herself to “reframe the debate by suggesting that the dichotomy between moral rights and 
utility is a false one.”226 However, these attempts to reconcile moral rights and 
consequentialism typically seek to converge the two accounts. For example, Bair argues 
that “when it comes to creation, the moral rights concern of fairness often is utility in a very 
real sense.”227 
 
By comparison, I argue for a reconciliation of consequentialist copyright and moral rights 
through a divergence of the two. It is not the case that copyright, to be justifiable, must 
either protect natural moral rights or that it must fulfil some economic utility function. 
Rather, copyright must be able to satisfy both an economic social utility function and 
provide adequate deontological protections against certain non-economic offences. 
Although it is plausible that the protection of moral rights contributes to the incentivisation 
of authorial production (e.g. by engendering a sense of fairness), it is inappropriate to 
reduce those rights to an instrumental component of a consequentialist calculation. The 
function of moral rights protections can only appropriately be conceived of as distinct from 
copyright’s utility function. Therefore, instead of conceiving of moral rights accounts as 
being positioned against utility accounts; and instead of conceiving of moral rights 
accounts as utility accounts, it is critical to the success of a justificatory account that 
copyright be conceived of as having two distinct but complimentary components. 
 
9.2 A Paradox of Motivations and Principles 
 
There has historically been an important tension between the principles espoused as the 
basis for expansionist copyright, and the motivations which proponents have for pursuing 
expansionist copyright. Overwhelmingly, the contestation about what copyright 
protections are appropriate (and, especially, of how long those protections should last) been 
driven by the recognition of the economic consequences that are contingent on those 
determinations. Copyright holders recognise the economic value of the monopolies they 
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are granted, and are thus motivated to argue for the establishment of generous monopoly 
conditions. Opponents of expansionist copyright, by comparison, recognise the negative 
impact that monopolies have upon an economy, and are therefore motivated to restrict 
monopolies to the extent that they are not socially valuable. 
 
To strengthen their case against anti-monopoly economic arguments, proponents of 
copyright expansion have been motivated to pursue non-economic justifications of 
copyright. These arguments are intended to be logically prior to considerations of economic 
consequences. The benefit to copyright holders, if such an approach succeeds, is that it 
presents the economic monopolies granted under copyright as incidentally necessary, but 
not the primary objective of copyright regimes. This is an attempt to situate the economic 
consequences of copyright beyond the scope of fair criticism. 
 
 
Importantly, there are two kinds of natural law arguments that proponents of expansive 
copyright attempt. The first involves arguing that property rights are natural rights, and that 
this is as true in the case of copyright as it is in the case of traditional physical property. 
Other proponents, however, make the natural law case in terms of things like authorial 
integrity and personality rights. When it comes to natural property arguments, Bair is 
correct in her observation that natural law property accounts are mutually incompatible 
with consequentialist accounts of copyright as a system of statutory property. However, in 
the case of arguments which turn on notions of integrity or personality (for example), it is 
unclear why these notions would deliver economic property rights rather than non-
economic integrity or personality rights. 
 
Insofar as natural rights relating to integrity or personality are perpetual rights (or at least 
rights which persist for the span of a person’s natural life), pro-expansionist copyright 
proponents motived towards strong economic copyright protections rely on a conflation of 
those two components. That is, the implication is that if provisions for the protection of an 
author’s integrity or right of personality ought to exist in perpetuity, then so too (for some 
reason) must the author’s economic proprietary rights. As shall be shown, the claim 
regarding copyright as natural property rights cannot be sustained; and arguments regarding 
non-economic protections (of integrity or personality, for example) are logically 
independent to the question of economic copyright. 
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9.3 Failure of Natural Law in Economic Copyright 
 
The Berne Convention prescribes that the minimum term for which economic copyrights 
must endure is the entire lifetime of a given work’s author, plus 70 years. The initial 
indexation of copyright to an author’s lifespan reflects the persistent perception that: 
1) There is something intimately personal about acts of authorship; and 
2) The existence of this intimately personal quality warrants that the protections 
afforded to authors, over their works, be conceived of as owed naturally to 
them – including economic protections. 
For this notion to be affirmed, an account of the protections extended to authors under 
copyright – including an explanation of the natural rights those protections serve – would 
be required. 
 
The most plausible basis for such an explanation is typically acknowledged to be a Lockean 
labour account of property. Ultimately, however, the Lockean account is unable to sustain 
such an explanation. Although Locke’s account of property successfully establishes a just 
basis for the recognition of natural economic rights (i.e. property rights) over tangible 
objects, and thus might be suspected of being able to sustain a case for the recognition of 
natural property rights in the form of copyright, key restrictions that are essential to Locke’s 
account prevent the extension of the account to intangible objects. Because intangible 
objects, including ideas, do not naturally exhaust when they are used, monopolising the use 
of an intangible object would standardly count as an offence against one or both Lockean 
provisos (the waste proviso and the ‘as good and as much’ proviso). 
 
The Lockean labour account of property can be read very sensibly as an attempt to 
demonstrate the natural illegitimacy of economic monopolies. Locke takes it as his starting 
point that all (physical) objects of the world belong ‘in common’ to all people. While Locke 
is motivated to provide an account of the way in which this common claim can be 
pragmatically realised (and arrives at private property via labour as the appropriate mode), 
a consistent challenge intended to be addressed by his account is the question of how this 
can be done without enabling the exploitative concentration of essential resources among 
a small minority. This makes it difficult to extract a positive account of copyright from 
Lockean theory, since economic copyright inherently establishes monopolies. 
Nevertheless, the provision that Locke makes for social contracting, in his broader political 
philosophy, makes the Lockean position compatible with a positive account of copyright 
that is established on a social utility basis. 
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The standard social utility account of copyright is therefore as much as can be delivered 
via appeal to Locke when it comes to establishing a positive justification of copyright. Even 
though it would functionally create monopolies, and seemingly usher violations of the 
Lockean provisos, the establishment of economic copyright is compatible with Lockean 
property theory provided it serves the collective interests of a society. A Lockean theorist 
can therefore conceive of just copyright regimes as systems of agreement between 
individuals, who each recognise an equal claim ‘in common’ against certain objects (in this 
case, ideas), and who intended to ensure that they best coordinate their actions to 
collectively realise the maximum potential value of the objects. The question of what social 
arrangement best achieves this outcome is an empirical one, but any protections agreed 
upon in this manner shall always be statutory, rather than natural. 
 
9.4 Inadequacy of the Social Utility Account 
 
Although this means that the consequentialist account of economic copyright is compatible 
with Lockean natural law theory, this still only addresses one of the two functions of 
copyright. Moreover, if the economic social utility function of copyright is taken to be its 
only appropriate function, then it becomes unclear why copyright and patent systems need 
to be conceived of as being distinct. Both the question of copyright’s distinctness from 
other IP protection regimes (especially patent regimes), as well as the impersonal nature of 
economic copyright provisions, give critics of the purely economic consequentialist 
approach to copyright a good basis upon which to mount an objection. These concerns can 
be met, and the objections overcome, but only via an expanded account of copyright which 
articulates its function in protecting non-economic moral rights. The two potential points 
of objection are worth considering more completely. 
 
9.4.1 Indistinct Copyright 
 
When James Madison observed, during the drafting of the United States Constitution, that 
Great Britain had affirmed the legitimacy of a system of monopolies (copyright) over 
creative works, he considered it natural that such a system ought to be replicable and 
applicable in the case of inventions as well. As a result, the provisions for copyright and 
patent regimes were introduced at the same time in the United States, and both systems 
were cited as being founded on the same principle. Madison, guided by what, unknown to 
him, was an already overturned judgement in Great Britain, mistakenly considered 
economic IP protection over contributions to ‘science’ and ‘the useful arts’ (i.e. 
copyrightable and patentable objects) to be warranted by natural law. Nevertheless, 
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Madison’s broader claim – that if IP protections are appropriate in the case of creative 
works, then they ought to be appropriate in the case of inventive works – can be sustained 
when an appropriate conception of statutory IP is affirmed. 
 
The historical development of copyright in Britain, insofar as it established a system 
designed to only protect a specific class of objects, coloured the development of IP in the 
United States. Although Madison was correct to question the disparity inherent in IP 
protections being extended to artistic objects but not to inventive objects, the perception 
remained that such an extension would take the form of a new system distinct from 
copyright. However, were the consequentialist economic account of copyright correct, and 
if it represented a complete account, then it would not be clear why any distinction between 
copyright and other classes of IP protection (e.g. patent) would be necessary. Disregarding 
the respective historical developments of the copyright and patent systems, and 
approaching the cases from first principles, the consequentialist justification based on the 
incentivisation effect of IP would seemingly apply equally to artistic objects and inventive 
objects. What need, then, could there be to treat them under different systems? 
 
One reason that a consequentialist might have to protect certain objects differently than 
other objects, while still protecting them under the broader umbrella of IP, would be if it 
was expected that certain objects involved greater investment of labour to produce or would 
take longer to deliver a worthwhile return on investment. The division of copyright and 
patent (and the difference in their comparative 70-year and 20-year protection periods) 
might be justified, for example, if it could be shown that the creation of copyrighted works 
required a greater up-front investment; or could otherwise only deliver a motivational 
return on investment over a longer term, when compared to patentable objects. This 
sensitivity to differences in the minimum level of protection required to incentivise the 
creation of different types of objects must surely be considered a boon to the 
consequentialist concerned with capturing maximum utility from an IP system (or 
combination of IP systems). However, there are two striking challenges to this 
characterisation of the relationship between copyright and patent. 
 
The first challenge in justifying the existing copyright-patent divide, on appeal to the 
economic consequentialist account, is an empirical one. Although it is ultimately an 
economic question, and thus a conclusive account is not provided here, there is at least a 
strong initial reason to think that copyrightable objects do not, in general, require a more 
substantial initial investment or take a longer time to generate a meaningful return on 
investment compared to patentable objects. If anything, one might expect that this would 
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trend oppositely. As demanding as it may be to write a novel, for instance, one would 
expect the research, development, testing, and production that goes into bringing an 
original pharmaceutical to market to be significantly more demanding in terms of time; 
initial financial outlay; and overall labour. If this were born out evidentially, however, IP 
proponents may still be expected to resist the categorisation of new pharmaceuticals as 
copyrightable objects. 
 
The second challenge, which is largely a conceptual generalisation of the previous 
challenge, is that the distinction between creative objects and inventive objects must seem 
remarkably arbitrary to the consequentialist proponent of IP. Even if the appropriateness 
of that distinction were able to be empirically supported, it would seem peculiar to think 
that it represented the only such point of distinction. It is already the case that a non-
standard patent duration is awarded in the case of pharmaceutical objects, for example, 
which is intended to reflect unique qualities of the pharmaceutical industry, and it has been 
argued that software should be treated uniquely because the nature of the industry is such 
that “the product cycles are short, the database of software patents is impossible to search, 
and software lives and dies on its interoperability with other software.”228 
 
A similar argument could plausibly be constructed in relation to various media forms 
protected under copyright. For example, the financial success or failure of commercial 
films is typically considered to have been determined within the first weeks of commercial 
release. If a film has a ‘bad opening weekend’ it is popularly deemed unsuccessful; the 
consideration is never afforded that the film may realise a profitable resurgence a decade 
later. One might wonder how a consequentialist account of IP could possibly endorse a 70-
year term of protection over objects whose commercial viability is decided over a matter 
of days, even if such a term was appropriate in the case of other (ostensibly similar) objects. 
The copyright-patent divide, even if defensible on the consequentialist model of IP, cannot 
be considered sufficiently nuanced to be the only appropriate basis for differing terms of 
protection for different kinds of objects. 
 
If IP protections were being implemented for the first time (without the influence of the 
historical British or United States experience), and if the social utility account was taken to 
provide the entire justificatory basis of that implementation, then it would be reasonable to 
expect that the protection of creative objects and the protection of inventive objects to be 
handled under the same system. Within that system, it might be appropriate for different 
                                                     
228 Ben Klemens, Math You Can’t Use: Patents, Copyright and Software (The Brookings Institute, 2006), p. 
87. 
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objects to be afforded different terms of protection, depending on the specific conditions 
which might affect the difficulty of incentivising people towards their production. 
However, such differences in the terms of protection should not be expected to be 
established based on the creative or inventive nature of an object alone. Insofar as a broad 
distinction between copyright and patent is appropriate, it must be appropriate on the basis 
of some non-consequentialist basis. 
 
9.4.2 Indexation to the Author’s Life 
 
The second potential point of objection to the consequentialist social utility account of 
copyright has to do with the intuitive indexation of copyright to the lifespan of an object’s 
author. Moreover, it could be asserted that this indexation is naturally appropriate because 
it reflects an inherently personal connection that exists between authors and their creations, 
which is not present between other creators (e.g. inventors or builders) and their creations. 
The argument would proceed that, since this reflects a natural quality of copyrightable 
objects, and the indexation of protection to the author’s lifespan is therefore naturally 
appropriate, it would be wrong to think that statutory provisions can be established on a 
consequentialist account which would undercut or supersede those naturally appropriate 
protections. 
 
Since this poses a meaningful difference between copyrightable objects and patentable 
objects, and since this difference is not accounted for in a purely economic account, it 
requires something more than the social utility account to adequately explain. Although it 
was demonstrated that a labour account of property could not successfully account for the 
natural protections that are owed in relation to copyrightable objects, this does not mean 
that there is no natural law account capable of succeeding in that capacity. At the same 
time, given that this construction is to be undertaken uninfluenced by the historical 
development of copyright and patent, it should not be expected that the determination of 
what is copyrightable and what is patentable, according to a defensible natural account, 
will accord with the categorisations that exist today. 
 
9.5 Statutory Economic Rights are Correct, but not Complete 
 
Correctly conceived of, these objections to the social utility account represent criticisms of 
the completeness of consequentialist accounts that justify purely statutory copyright. 
Insofar as the function of copyright is economic, such consequentialist accounts are correct; 
the contention is over whether copyright’s function ought to only be economic. This marks 
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a departure from the traditional framing of debate, in which the issue of whether copyright 
is of a (statutory) economic or (natural) non-economic character is presented as strictly 
dichotomous. One reason that the social utility account, despite being correct, persistently 
fails to enjoy broad universal traction, is because it addresses only one of the necessary 
functions of copyright. Although proponents who argue for the extension of a traditional 
labour-based property account to intangible objects (to demonstrate the natural non-
economic quality of copyright) are mistaken in the approach they take, the formulation of 
a complete account of copyright requires that their concerns be addressed via an alternative 
explanation. 
 
9.6 Moral Rights Compliment and Complete the Economic Account 
 
The provision of moral rights protections within copyright, alongside the statutory 
economic protections designed to deliver social utility, presents a viable avenue toward the 
development of a complete account of IP. The inclusion of moral rights provisions in an 
account of copyright valuably compliments the social utility account in two main ways. 
First, moral rights are often deeply personal rights. This quality means that it is often 
intuitive to index the protection of moral rights to the lifespan of the rightsholder. Second, 
the copyright-patent divide can be sustained based on the recognition of a moral right which 
applies only in relation to correctly copyrightable objects. That right is the right that an 
author has to the fidelity of their work, whenever that work is copied. 
 
Before each of these contributions is considered in more depth, it is worth noting some 
features of the general interplay between moral rights and economic copyright. Moral 
rights, being natural rights, are logically prior to, and therefore must ordinarily supersede, 
statutory economic rights. The only way this can be excepted if social contract provisions 
can allowably overturn the natural moral rights provisions (by appeal to the collective 
social benefit that such an overturning would achieve), as in the case of natural property 
rights pertaining to (potential) intangible objects being overturned to help incentivise the 
actualisation of those objects in the first place. The way in which moral rights pertain 
specifically to truth and accuracy (c.f. property rights, for example) means that it should be 
expected that no such exception ought to apply to them. 
 
The reason that rights pertaining to the protection of truth and accuracy should be expected 
to be immune to social contraction is because any contract intended to solidify a collective 
agreement to regard something untrue or inaccurate as true or accurate would be self-
defeating. A collective agreement to ignore something true, and to accept as true something 
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untrue, must necessarily be predicated on each of the contracted individuals having 
knowledge of the deception – in which case the deception ceases to function. Moreover, 
truth and accuracy are natural qualities, and could not be altered via fiat even if it would 
(somehow) be socially beneficial to do so. Given the overwhelmingly complimentary 
nature of implementing a moral rights component in addition to the statutory economic 
component of copyright, the two main advantages of the moral rights component are worth 
considering. 
 
9.6.1 Intuitive Personal Gap 
 
The implementation of moral rights protections into an account of copyright contributes a 
recognition of the intimately personal nature of artistic endeavours. In addition, moral 
rights legislation assists in preserving the truth and accuracy of attribution claims which 
are particularly important because of this personal connection. Correct attribution is 
acknowledged in existing moral rights legislation to be critically important to artistic 
creators’ honour and reputation.229 Drawing upon the reasoning used in other areas of 
legislation concerned primarily with the preservation of honour and reputation, this can be 
shown to provide an initial reason for indexing moral rights to the life of an author. 
 
The closest legislative analogue to moral rights, in terms of its preoccupation with the 
protection of honour and reputation, is defamation law. This similarity is so pronounced 
that the Congress of the United States considered that dedicated domestic moral rights 
legislation was unnecessary, largely because offences against moral rights could be 
effectively dealt with through the enforcement of defamation law. A prominent limitation 
of defamation law, however, is that an action which would otherwise be defamatory cannot 
be considered an offence if it is directed at a deceased individual, since the dead cannot be 
victims of damaged honour or reputation. By the application of the same reasoning, then, 
if moral rights elicited their importance solely from the importance they have in relation to 
honour and reputation, it would be appropriate that they expire upon a creator’s death. 
 
Although the conception of moral rights as primarily functioning to protect honour and 
reputation would contribute to satisfying the intuitive desire to index copyright protection 
to the lifespan of authors, it is nevertheless vulnerable to other significant criticisms. 
Particularly, because personal honour and personal reputation pertain to specific 
individuals, conceiving of moral rights in this way increases the risk them being considered 
inherently individualistic rights. That is, if the moral rights which I am due are intended 
                                                     
229 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, above n 204. 
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only to protect my honour and my reputation, then it would be natural to think that their 
enforcement ought to occur at my discretion. This notion is especially enforced when moral 
rights are categorised under the umbrella of intellectual property rights, since property 
rights are individualistic rights which can be transferred or waived at the discretion of the 
relevant rightsholder. 
 
Contrary to this conception, the fundamental function of moral rights is more basic than 
the protection of honour and reputation. The fundamental function of moral rights is to 
guarantee truth and accuracy. Since the true and accurate attribution of authorship is of 
special importance to the honour and reputation of authors, the protection of individuals’ 
honour and reputation is one of the most important consequences of enforcing moral rights. 
Notice, however, that moral rights ought to only guarantee the preservation of a reputation 
that is deserved (i.e. only where honour and reputation are derived from a true and accurate 
record of events). The false attribution of an acclaimed artwork (to an artist not responsible 
for its production) must be considered a moral rights offence even if (and perhaps especially 
if) that attribution improves the reputation of the falsely attributed author. This is true even 
if the attribution is endorsed by the actual creator. 
 
The indexation of moral rights to the lifespan of authors is therefore fraught, since the 
importance of true and accurate attribution persists beyond the death of any given author 
(c.f. that author’s honour and reputation). While moral rights may not, therefore, ultimately 
satisfy the traditional desire to index copyright protection to the lifespan of an author, the 
critical point to notice is that the argument which leads to this determination contends with 
moral rights as natural, deontic rights. This makes the argument much better able to inform 
intuitions to do with the indexation of copyright protections (compared to the purely 
economic consequentialist account), since it directly contends with the question of what 
deontic function they ought to serve. This represents a marked improvement over 
dismissing natural law copyright out of hand, on the basis that they serve a non-
consequentialist function. 
 
9.6.2 Distinct Copyright 
 
The implementation of moral rights as a complimentary component of copyright, in 
addition to the economic consequentialist component, has the further advantage of serving 
as a principled basis for the establishment of distinct copyright and patent regimes. Under 
a pure social utility account, incentivising the creation of socially valuable intangible 
objects need not be achieved by different means (i.e. different provisions) simply due to 
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some intangible objects being ‘artistic’ and others ‘inventive.’ While different protection 
durations may be justified on a case by case basis, due to differences in the degree of 
difficulty or cost of investment required to produce specific intangible objects, there is no 
initial reason to expect these differences in difficulty or cost to correlate with the present 
copyright-patent divide. 
 
Through a consideration of moral rights, however, a copyright-patent distinction can be 
defended. This might not be immediately apparent, since many moral rights ought to be 
taken to apply equally to both copyrightable and uncopyrightable (including patentable) 
objects. For example, true and accurate attribution should be asserted in relation to all 
objects, whether artworks; inventions; or ordinary physical objects. One moral right, 
however, applies uniquely to a certain kind of object that is typically considered 
copyrightable. 
 
The right to fidelity in one’s work – that is, the right to have one’s work preserved against 
alteration, even after the economic sale of that work – is a moral right which applies 
uniquely to those communicative objects that can only be sensibly interpreted as the 
product of a specific (known or unknown) author. Because the nature of these second 
personal communicative objects is inherently contingent on the respective identities to 
which they are attributed, the truth and accuracy of those attributions is essential to the 
integrity of the objects themselves, since the attributions form a constitutive part of what 
the objects are. Antecedently, any alteration of a second personal communicative object, 
which changes what the object is, amounts to an interference against a speech act. The 
social importance of speech acts – especially those fixed in persistent physical states – 
makes this form of interference particularly egregious. 
 
9.7 Radical Redefinition of the Scope of Copyright 
 
Although an appropriate incorporation of moral rights into an account of IP delivers a 
justifiable basis for establishing copyright and patent as distinct systems, it does not enable 
a justification of either of those systems in their current forms. It is clear, upon review, that 
the categorisation of objects as either copyrightable or patentable does not consistently 
reflect the second personal communicativeness of those objects. Adherence to the 
principled account of copyright outlined herein would therefore require a radical 
redefinition of copyright’s scope. 
 
Certain presently-copyrightable objects, such as maps and reference books, communicate 
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information without being second-personally communicative. Such objects serves a purely 
utilitarian function, and the information communicated through them can be sensibly 
digested without reference to the identity of a relevant author. This acknowledgement of 
the appropriate role of moral rights in an account of copyright is particularly useful in 
informing the treatment of newly emerging classes of object, such as computer software 
and code. Rather than attempting to account for the inclusion of all software as either 
copyrightable or patentable, the approach endorsed here enables a principled basis for 
determining the copyright or patent eligibility of any specific instance of computer 
software, without having to categorise all software in the same way. A utilitarian piece of 
software, such as an operating system, can be categorised as patentable, while code that 
contributes narratively rich content to a computer game may be categorised as 
copyrightable due to the way in which it situates the end user as an audience of deliberate 
communication. 
 
A final point is worth reiterating in relation to the radical recategorization of objects as 
copyrightable or patentable: despite the otherwise consequentialist justification for IP 
systems (as vessels for incentivising the production of socially valuable intangible objects), 
the categorisation of an object as copyrightable rather than patentable, or vice versa, should 
not bear on the economic protections afforded to that object. The only legal impact that 
categorisation should have, is in determining whether fidelity must be maintained 
throughout the use and duplication of the object. 
 
9.8 Appropriate Provisions Under a Just Conception of Copyright 
 
Copyright ought to provide economic monopolies to creators of second-personally 
communicative works. The purpose of providing such monopolies should be to incentivise 
the production of socially valuable works. This is achieved through temporary monopolies 
because monopolisation prevents free-riding competitors from driving down prices in a 
way that would make original production prohibitively costly. Because the justification of 
economic copyright is therefore to make socially valuable objects socially accessible, the 
duration of the monopolies should be as tightly constrained as possible (while still fulfilling 
their incentivising function), because monopolies that artificially inflate prices also thereby 
restrict the ability for consumers to access those objects. 
 
Determining the minimum monopoly term capable of providing the requisite incentivising 
function of copyright must be undertaken as an empirical economic task. Although I have 
not attempted to make that determination here, it has been suggested that an economic 
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copyright term of approximately 15 to 25 years would be appropriate.230 
 
The breadth of economic copyright protection should also be determined based on 
incentivisation. That is, whether a derivative object infringes copyright ought to be 
determined by consideration of whether, had the original author anticipated the derivative 
being legal, they would still have partaken in the production of the original. This means 
that direct copies and trivially different derivations would be prohibited, while things like 
cross-media adaptations of an original work should be expected to be permitted. 
 
In addition to being subject to economic protections, second-personally communicative 
objects ought to be uniquely regarded as unmodifiable objects. This means that, whereas 
patented designs can be altered by anyone who subsequently purchases the relevant patent 
rights, someone who purchases the rights to reproduce a second-personally communicative 
object must not be permitted to make alterations to it. Moreover, this ought to represent the 
central defining feature of copyright. Whereas different economic provisions might be 
appropriate due to different economic conditions within specific industries (to be 
determined empirically), non-modifiability represents a moral right which must be 
understood to apply uniformly to all copyrightable object. 
 
In addition, although the non-modifiability requirement is particularly important for the 
fair preservation of an author’s honour and reputation, it reflects a broader and more basic 
concern regard that must be held for the preservation of truth and accuracy. It follows that, 
because the preservation of truth and accuracy is important to audiences of second-
personally communicative objects as well as to authors, this right must be considered to 
persist perpetually. The term of an author’s right of non-modifiability cannot be restricted 
by being indexed to the lifespan of the author. 
 
One final point of difference between copyright and patent protection, which exists today, 
should also be preserved. Whereas patent protection ought to be contingent on an inventor’s 
compliance with an application process, copyright protection ought to apply automatically 
to second-personally communicative objects. The automatic applicability of copyright is 
appropriate because of the uniquely realisable quality of those objects. Because inventions 
are multiply realisable, meaning that it is feasible that different people could arrive at the 
same inventive objects independently, it is necessary to establish a centralised measure for 
determining who achieves such realisation first. By comparison, correctly copyrightable 
objects could only feasibly be realised by specific authors, and as such the demonstration 
                                                     
230 Productivity Commission, above n 95, pp. 130-131. 
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of one’s being the legitimate author of an object can be more easily established after the 
fact. 
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